Theology of punishment

In a recent First Things review, Gilbert Meilander summarized Oliver O’Donovan’s theory of punishment as follows: “anything called punishment must be ‘backward-looking’ and hence, in some sense, retributive. But he is not persuaded by any account of retribution that things of it as a simple exchange – in which the offender receives something rather like the wrong he inflicted. Instead, O’Donovan suggests that we should think of punishment as attributive rather than retributive. What the offender gets back ‘in return’ is precisely society’s judgment of himself as an offender – not an ‘echo’ but an ‘answer.’ He hears the truth about himself.”

He adds, “whereas theories of punishment normally seek to benefit the society at large (by deterrence), the offender (by remediation), and the victim (by retribution), a Christian political ethic leaves no place for the thought that one purpose of punishment is to benefit the victim. God himself has taken the side and place of victims, and – though government as God’s servant must defend the right of victims – no private act of vengeance is needed or permitted. Hence, ‘it is a measure of the deep de-Christianization of our times that it is once again possible to speak in public of the victim’s interest in punishment.’”

Intriguing thoughts. I wonder, though, how the “answer” v. “echo” idea squares with the lex talionis, and also how O’Donovan’s views on the absence of any victim interest in punishment squares with the Torah’s emphasis on restitution (perhaps O’Donovan’s discussion is limited to crimes, and doesn’t cover torts). Guess I’ll have to read the book.