Eschatological self

Jerrold Seigel suggests that Locke’s self has “three different aspects”: We are selves to others “by virtue of what they know about our mental and moral life”; we are “selves to ourselves, but incompletely so, through the imperfect consciousness we have of our lives and deeds in the here and now”; and we will transparent to ourselves at the final judgment when everything hidden is revealed. Seigel comments parenthetically that “Those of us who do not believe that such a third moment of selfhood will ever arrive must content ourselves with the incomplete modes of being selves to ourselves.”

Indeed. Locke thus not only (as mentioned in an earlier post) was already working through the problems of a “decentered self,” but he was, like Derrida, forcing the issue to eschatology. Difference is, Locke believed in a final judgment.