Union and Substitution

Following a long tradition that stretches back at least to Aquinas, Grotius argues that Christ’s substitution for sinners is legitimate only because of the union that He has with those whose sins He bears ( Defensio Fidei Catholoicae: De Satisfactione Christi Adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem , 4.11):

“It is not equally free to all to punish someone for another’s sins as to confer upon someone a reward or thanks for another’s service or benefaction. For the act which consists of reward or thanks is a beneficial one, which by its own nature is permitted to all people. But the act which consists in punishment is a harmful act, which is not granted to all people, nor with regard to all people. For punishment, therefore, to be just, it is required that the act of punishing itself is within the power of him who punishes, or by the just and valid consent of him whose punishment is concerned, or by a delict of the same. When the act is made lawful n these ways, nothing prevents it being ordained as punishment for another’s sin, so long as between him who has sinned and him who is to be punished there is a certain connection. This connection, then, is either natural, as between father and son, or mystical, as between king and people, or voluntary, as between defendant and surety.”

He finds this principle at work not only in Scripture, but in pagan authors: “the idea that a people is punished by God for the sin of its king has been equally common from the times of Hesiod onwards, who had said that Dike was the daughter of Jove, and besought him ‘in order that the people pay for the mad folly of their kings’” (4.12). Roman sons paid for the sins of their fathers: “Exclusion from public offices for the children of those who had sinned against the state was already common among the Romans from Sulla’s days onwards. Cicero says that the custom of making sons pay with their poverty for their parents’ crimes was both ancient and of all nations” (4.19).

So also, Christ could pay for the sins of His people by His death because he “was very closely connected by his nature, reign, and suretyship” (4.23).