Philip the Chancellor

According to Stephen Duffy, Philip, Chancellor of the University of Paris, was responsible for elaborating the theorem of the supernatural. He claims that during the Pelagian controversy Augustine had left various problems hanging: “How can one be bound to do something not in one’s power? Can the virtues of unbelievers be so facilely discounted as splendid vices? Do not the Scriptures and the Fathers furnish evidence of unbelievers preparing themselves for justification by their own activity? If God does not deny grace to unbelievers who do what is in their power, can what unbelievers do without grace be necessarily sinful and valueless? Why is everything not grace, for what is there that is not God’s free gift?”

By the 13th century, distinctions were being made between meritorious and non-meritorious works, as well as between the “healing grace of justification, which enables one to act meritoriously, and an assistance not a grace in the strict sense ( gratia gratis data ), which enables one to do what is in one’s own power.”

Philip clarified the gratuity of grace by insisting that grace is supernatural “because it brings humans to a fulfillment far beyond anything human nature could ever achieve left to itself.” Thus, through Philip “the medievals came to view meritorious acts as radically beyond the abilities of humans and the grace making them possible as a supernatural, elevating grace ( gratia elevans ).” But what he really contributed was “not the supernatural character of grace, something already known, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature.” The whole system thus underwent a significant adjustment: “whereas meritorious activity was viewed as supernatural, good, non-meritorious activity was viewed as connatural, i.e., within the range of human powers. And the general moral impotence whereby one cannot avoid sin for long without grace is now considered in its ontological dimension. Humans cannot achieve even their connatural fulfillment without healing grace ( gratia sanans ). Habitual grace thus came to be viewed as healing as well as elevating.”

This appears to be a move in the right direction – all moral achievement is assisted by grace. But I’m suspicious. The whole premise here appears to be a human nature that might, theoretically, be able to achieve something on its own, “left to itself.” In fact, in the post-lapsarian situation, even “connatural” moral actions require some sort of gracious assistance. Of course, this is true; but this inability to do something on its own power is a result of sin. A sinless human could, apparently, achieve natural virtue “by its own powers.” But human beings cannot achieve any sort of action, virtuous or otherwise, except by the power of God working in us. Further, though the “elevation” might be taken as a medieval version of eschatological glorification, the import of Duffy’s discussion seems to be other than this. It appears that the elevation achieved by grace is not a completion and fulfillment of humanity, but an elevation to something slightly above humanity. As Duffy says, the premise of the supernatural theorem is that “To be fully human one must become more than human.” Not at all: To be fully human is simply to be fully human. This can be achieved only by the gracious gift of God, but then even minimal humanity can be achieved by the gracious gift of God.