Objectivity and incarnation

In his early work on Husserl’s treatise on the origins of geometry, Derrida highlights the critical insight that the objectivity and universality of geometric axioms depends, paradoxically, on their embodiment in writing. On the one hand, geometry is “there for ‘everyone.’” Yet, “how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal objectivity”? How do others come to know the Pythagorean theorem? Derrida says that it is “by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body.”

Derrida employs the notion of incarnation to describe this: “The possibility of necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity; it is the sine qua non of Objectivity’s internal completion.” When Objectivity “is not in a position to be party to an incarnation . . . then OBjectivity is not fully constituted.” Or again, “Husserl insists that truth is not fully objective, i.e., ideal, intelligible for everyone and indefinitely perdurable, as long as it cannot be said and written.”