Objective subjectivism

Joel Weinsheimer ( Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory ) neatly summarizes Gadamer’s argument that objectivism and subjectivism are the same thing: “Governing itself by rule, objectivity tries methodologically to eliminate bias, prejudice, and all the distortions that go by the name of subjectivity. This Cartesian endeavor assumes that a methodologically purified consciousness guarangees certainty.”

And that’s where the quest for objectivity turns subjective: “On one level, objectivity consists in humble self-effacement, but on another, it is marked by a distinct arrogance insofar as it makes individual self-consciousness the locus and arbiter of truth,” that is, the purified consciousness. Thus, “though it is by definition not subjective . . . objectivity as an ideal derives from a highly subjectivist epistemology.”

Following Heidegger, Gadamer insists that “consciousness always is more than it knows,” and it is thus self-contradictory to think that this “more” can be discovered “by trusting solely to the self-governance of consciousness.” Method cannot purify the consciousness. But self-consciousness can be grasped, if not wholly, by attention to tradition, because “consciousness belongs to historical tradition.” Interpretation within a tradition, then, can understand “the truth that exceeds self-consciousness.” In short, if there is “truth that exceeds what can be methodologically certified, its disclosure invariably requires an interpretation of tradition from within a tradition,” a circular interpretation that is neither objective nor mere subjectivism.