A little over a year ago, I arrived in Budapest for a ten-month stay as a senior fellow at one of Hungary’s academic institutions. My task was to teach students about the relationship between Christianity, Europe, and the European Union. The central question on the syllabus, one the Orbán government clearly wanted the next generation to wrestle with, was this: “Is Christianity the foundation of the European Union?”
I welcomed the assignment. It was rewarding to explore with the students how the European Union was originally shaped by a Christian vision. I spoke of the founding fathers, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcide De Gasperi—all devout Catholics who saw a united Europe as a recovery of Christian civilization. I reminded them of Jacques Delors’s call for “a soul for Europe,” which he too rooted in the continent’s Christian heritage. As a Dane from one of the world’s most secular societies, I had come to Hungary expecting a kind of Christian Canaan: a place where a government unapologetically championed the faith, defended Christian values in the E.U., and stood as the last real bastion against aggressive secularization. Here, I imagined, the streets of Budapest would overflow with vibrant Christian life.
They did not.
The first sign that my expectation was misplaced came during a lecture when I asked a sharp young law student: “If Orbán’s government falls, will Hungary still be a Christian country?” He looked at me with an uncertain flicker in his eyes and answered simply, “I’m not sure.”
That hesitant reply really stuck with me, because it confirmed the growing unease I had already begun to feel. In ten months of daily life in Budapest, I saw remarkably few signs of living Christian faith. I regularly went to Mass in several Catholic churches, and they were decently full on Sundays, yet overall participation remained strikingly low. The statistics confirm this: Hungary has one of Europe’s lowest rates of regular church attendance. Only about 12–17 percent of the population attends religious services at least monthly, and among young adults the figure drops below 10 percent. While most Hungarians still identify culturally as Christian, predominantly Roman Catholic or Reformed, the country is functionally highly secularized, with a large share claiming no active religious affiliation.
Yet on St. Stephen’s Day each year, one could easily be tempted to believe that Hungary was filled with fervent Christians. Hungarians flocked to the national celebrations. They cheered and took photos as drones lit up the night sky with the glowing image of the Christian king’s crown above the Danube. But when the lights went out, Hungary was no more Christian than before.
Orbán himself was fully aware of this disconnect, yet he continued to believe strongly in the importance of cultural Christianity. He repeatedly stressed that Christian virtues lead to peace and happiness, and the Hungarian constitution explicitly obliges the state to protect “Hungary’s constitutional self-identity and Christian culture.” He saw the preservation of this Christian cultural framework as absolutely essential. That is why he fiercely opposed same-sex marriage and the broader LGBTQ agenda. In his eyes, accepting it would mean that Christianity no longer functioned as the moral code for Hungarian and European culture. Once that foundation was abandoned, culture would break loose from its Christian roots and slide into a post-Christian void.
His government therefore offered concrete incentives rooted in Christian anthropology as part of one of Orbán’s flagship policies: strengthening the traditional family. For example, mothers with three or more children received a full lifetime exemption from personal income tax. Yet even after the policy was expanded in late 2025, few women actually took advantage of it.
This, it seems to me, is the deeper lesson. Orbán’s project was not without merit. After forty years of communist destruction, Hungarians understandably craved a recovered national identity, a moral code for what is right and what is wrong. Yet when the defense of “Christian culture” becomes primarily a top-down state project, it risks turning into identity politics wearing a cross. Cultural Christianity, a thin veneer of heritage, symbolism, and national pride, lacks the power to re-Christianize a people. It cannot substitute for the Church’s own work of preaching, sacraments, discipleship, and conversion.
Hungary shows that a government can champion Christian values in law and rhetoric while the population remains largely unmoved in heart and habit. When Fidesz lost the election, practical concerns proved far more decisive for many voters: struggling health care, a weak economy, and corruption scandals. The Christian identity Orbán had championed simply did not run deep enough to keep them loyal. The Christian symbols had not reshaped souls; they had mostly rallied a cultural tribe.
The state can create space for faith. It can protect the Church from persecution. It can even order society in ways that reflect natural law and Christian moral reasoning. But it cannot generate living faith. That remains the Church’s vocation. When governments try to shoulder the Church’s role and when Christian identity becomes a political brand rather than a costly, personal allegiance to the crucified and risen Lord, the project remains shallow. It may win elections for a season, but it rarely produces saints.
Hungary will only become a genuinely Christian nation when the churches take up the task that was always theirs. With the state no longer wrapping itself in the mantle of Christian nationalism, the gospel may finally speak with the clarity and freedom it needs, untangled from political power and uncompromised by the compromises of governance. A Christianity that depends on Orbán (or any Caesar) for its survival was never going to endure. A Christianity that rises again through preaching, prayer, and sacrificial witness just might.
Nations are not Christian because their constitution says so or because their leaders wield the cross. People become Christian when their hearts are claimed by Christ, something no government, however well-intentioned, can accomplish in their place. The real work begins now.
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