Reciprocity

In his introduction to Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (p. 5), Richard Seaford argues that the “debate about the extent to which virtues in Homer are cooperative (such as justice and generosity) or competitive (such as individual prowess in war)” is wrong-headed.

Seaford claims that “this distinction may obstruct our understanding of a system of ethics pervaded by reciprocity, for reciprocity transcends the distinction. Generosity may at the same time be admired as generosity and, precisely because it is so admired, be a competitive means of obtaining prestige and power. Individual competition for honour (and its material embodiments) through military prowess is of benefit to the community that bestows it . . . . The potential unhelpfulness of the division here between competitive and co-operative virtues is a symbol of the wider inadequacy of discussing ethics with insufficient attention to social formation.”