Preferences

Responding to Isaac Watts’s claim that we love things purely out of our choice, Jonathan Edwards deftly isolated the problems of that position: When we choose one thing over another, we are clearly preferring that thing, but “that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its setting a higher value on that thing.” If that were the case, then the choice would be purely sui generis , the desire for the thing a product of the desire for the thing. Watts’s explanation is no explanation at all. For Watts, “I prefer X” is a base-line assertion, explainable only as “I prefer X.” No explanations may be offered, no contrary arguments admitted. Just “I prefer X.” As Roger Lundin points out, in that case we are all Bartleby the scrivener.

Instead, Edwards argued, preference is a symptom or sign of a “prevailing inclination of the soul.” Changing preferences requires conversion.