The End of Everything
by m. john harrison
riverhead books, 208 pages, $30
Science fiction is more successful as a cinematic than as a literary genre. The world-building that requires extended exposition and awkward neologisms on the page can be done in a single artful frame on screen. Dune the novel has its virtues, but it is a stylistic failure; Dune the film, whatever its vices, is an aesthetic success—and this is not just a point about Herbert and Villeneuve.
One trick of M. John Harrison’s Booker Prize–winning novel, The End of Everything, is that it puts the opacity of words to constructive use; it exploits how much language can not show. The novel is set some decades in the future, after the arrival of the mysterious iGhetti—forces or beings, or a single extended being—which have disrupted life across Britain. Their arrival has populated the sea with amorphous, apparently organic objects called artefacts that, when recovered, slowly assume the appearance and behavior of human beings. The novel follows a thirty-eight-year-old Englishman, Philip Tennent, who recovers one such artefact. He and his elderly aunt Marnie travel, separately and together, with and without the slowly developing artefact, through the faded beach towns of the Kentish coast.
Harrison’s prose is dissociative, elusive; it simulates description as often as it describes. Occasionally it falls into the clinical stiffness endemic to science fiction. Of a children’s party, he writes: “You could tell they were actual children, not artefacts, from the natural way they wore their copies of the parental styles. . . . The children ran about between [the adults], chanting and mimicking a popular set of gestures.” More commonly, the prose is characterized by surprising and illuminating comparisons: The artefact’s nails are “pearly and metallic at the same time, emitting the faintly perceptible inner glow of plastic.”
Where these descriptions illuminate, it is more often with the light of a screen than with the light of the sun: They supplant reality more than they reveal it. In an early passage that is echoed later in the book, in which Tennent crosses paths with a woman on the beach, Harrison writes:
They turned to face [the sea] with similar body language—expectant, alert, anxiety tempered with what could only be described as longing. For a moment Tennent had a sense that something huge was approaching over the water; something fast, which hadn’t been there—or indeed anywhere—a minute or two before. But it never arrived, and the woman shrugged.
Is this a description of something that is happening in the sea or in Tennent’s mind? In the appearance of the sea or in the sea itself? In Tennent’s and the woman’s minds as a kind of shared hallucination—one side effect of the iGhetti’s arrival—or in reality? What Harrison knows is that, with words, he does not have to say.
This scene—ominous, anxious, ambiguous—comes to represent the characters’ attitude toward the iGhetti. They are perhaps not quite real; near the end of the book, they are described as no more than a mirage, a refraction of something beyond the horizons of our knowledge. And even this beyondness is in doubt. Some believe the iGhetti emerged from the internet. Everyone wonders whether we brought them upon ourselves. The name iGhetti is reminiscent of an Apple device: part of the amorphous threat they stand in for is contemporary digital technology. As the artefacts assume more human behavior, they begin to sound like AI assistants.
But the iGhetti’s roots go back farther—hundreds of years, in fact, to a time when they appear as translucent jelly on vegetation, though it is not until the 1980s that they really begin to be noticed. They are explicitly tied to global capitalism and its baleful ecological effects: One early theory is that they emerged from pollutants cast off by the cosmetic and medical industries. They first occupy the City of London and remain headquartered there; the artefacts, and the natural world they slowly take over, are described in terms reminiscent of plastics and petroleum.
Harrison mines twentieth-century visual art and architecture for analogies, vocabulary, and settings. The novel’s attitude toward that art is ambivalent; it finds beauty there but also superficiality or rootlessness. Whatever the iGhetti are, they belong to the avant-garde, a movement bound up—intellectually and institutionally and in the backstory of the characters—with a capitalism that sweeps away all fixed, fast-frozen relations. The name iGhetti also recalls the great twentieth-century oil magnate J. Paul Getty, and the deconstructed travertine office park of an art museum that he endowed.
The iGhetti embody threats—digital, financial, ecological, cultural—against which the traditional state is entirely impotent. There is a perpetual war, or perhaps an unending pantomime of war, against the iGhetti in London, but it effects nothing. The generals are a century out of date, fighting the last war; to fight a war at all is to fight the last war. They would do better to read their Baudrillard. But here Baudrillard’s theory of simulation has grown more malign: We find ourselves not in the weightless, even playful hyperreality at the end of history but in the suffocating simulacra at the end of the world.
By the end of The End of Everything, we cannot be sure which of the characters we have encountered are human, or if they remain so. The artefacts have taken over, less from without than from within. Perhaps the only reliable sign of humanity throughout the book is a startling capacity for violence. Speculative fiction has to decide which present trends to accelerate into the future, and the most striking cultural acceleration here is a callousness toward human life by other humans, juxtaposed with the care exhibited by the artefacts. Nothing sacred is left: There is casual child murder, patricidal body horror, suggestions of cannibalism, perhaps a whiff of incest. The intuition here is a remarkably traditionalist one, the obverse of Pope Paul VI’s prescience: that just as removing the production of human life from sex leads to the cheapening of sex, so removing sex from the production of human life leads to the cheapening of life. If our artifacts can be human or very nearly human, if we can 3D print something more or less like a baby, then our brutalities will become as promiscuous as our intimacies.
I do not know that Harrison shares such old-fashioned intuitions. But one feature of the world as he describes it is that he himself cannot limit the lessons we take from it. There are some things one cannot say directly but must indicate indirectly through the insufficiency of language, as the monotheistic traditions know; but as they also know, this makes it difficult to circumscribe acceptable interpretations. There is a bien-pensant reading of this book as a lament for Brexit, for a Britain cut off from the Continent, and isolation is indeed one of the harms that Harrison describes. But the book can just as well be read in the older left-wing tradition of Jeremy Corbyn’s Euroscepticism or Bernie Sanders’s concern about immigration: The artefacts come from the sea to live among us, do our menial jobs, become superficially like us, make us more than superficially like them. They undermine first-world infrastructure but seem to have little effect on other cultural forms. The name iGhetti in Italian literally means “the ghettos.”
From what I can tell, this does not reflect Harrison’s views on immigration, nor does it much reflect my own, which are roughly those of the Catholic hierarchy, a guarded and prudential approval. But that is only to say that the book he has written should trouble both our thoughts. The solidarities that give us everything that matters—family, friendship, neighborhood, nation—are under attack from a complex of technology, finance, and elite culture in which immigration is not an innocent factor.
This recommends the book to a certain kind of reader. But the larger point should give that same reader pause. For it is the very amorphousness of the threat that makes their prescriptions as suspect as everyone else’s. The Brexiteer reading can slide quickly into something darker: The Italian ghettos housed not blacks or South Asians but Jews, and there is the old and poisonous story about a corrupting foreign presence radiating out from the world’s financial centers. Read this as a book about protecting our small solidarities, and someone else will just as well read it as a book against cosmopolitanism.
If Harrison is expressing a view at all, it is that no single view adequately captures the threat he describes, and that each can tip very quickly into something worse. It has been often remarked that our common goods have grown more indistinct in recent years—our sense of belonging to family, to nation, to the human race—but Harrison makes clear how indistinct also are the threats to those common goods. There is this difference, however, to which Harrison also seems alive: The common goods are made weaker by their indistinction—every family dissolved into the human family, every town turned into an indistinct copy of its neighbor—but the threats are made stronger. How does one fight . . . everything?
The world of this book—our world—ends by losing its definition, its boundaries. Whether invaders mine the walls or inhabitants let them waste away, whether with a whimper or with a bang, is beside the point; even the boundary between invader and inhabitant is one that is passing away. One thing that is helpful about framing artificial intelligence as demonic—Harrison favors the New Age language of an astral plane, but the first part of the book has the Miltonic title “War in Heaven”—is how much demonic agency can overlap with our own. This is a world possessed in some indistinct sense, where the indistinction is precisely one feature of the possession. It is a world in which we have an ever-harder time understanding what is harming us, an ever-harder time understanding the us who is harmed.
The epigraph of The End of Everything could as well be Pascal’s epitome of the human condition: “inconstancy, boredom, anxiety.” And Pascal spells out the politics to which this condition tends: submission to arbitrary and imperfect order, because the alternatives are much worse. If our century is the end of everything, still it is rather more pleasant than the wars of Pascal’s century; we could do worse than a quiet dissolution. Harrison seems unable to offer anything better; he has too much realism to be optimistic and too little theology to hope. Martin Heidegger, concerned about many of the precursors to the iGhetti, famously said that only a god can save us, only some new disclosure of Being from outside our technological enframing. The iGhetti are something like that god, something that undermines “our scientific episteme,” as one of the characters says. Only, they do not save us. If they dissolve the self, it is not Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, with its openness to Being, and even less Eckhart’s gelazenheit, with its merging into the divine, but something more like an extended dementia. The lesson seems clear, and is also there in Pascal: Not even a god can save us. There has always only been one wager to escape despair.
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