Gift and Justice

Thomas Aquinas argues that a return gift of gratitude must exceed the original gift. His reasoning is as follows: The original gift is gratuitous because it is not paying any debt; the return gift is obligatory because of the initial gift; but the return gift should also have a gratuitous element; and the gratuitous element is the added value of the return gift. You freely give me a silver ring; I up the ante and return a gold ring.

Why is Thomas unhappy with the asymmpetry of gift and return gift? Why can’t we just say that the gifts are inequal? Thomas can’t say this because he’s built a notion of equality into his definition of justice. Justice is giving each his due, and thus involves equality, and because of this Aquinas argues that justice, strictly speaking, can only be done between equals.

It would seem preferable to re-define justice so as to make allowance for a just but not strictly equal exchange.