Argument from Thanks

Grotius ( Defensio Fidei Catholoicae: De Satisfactione Christi Adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem , 4.10) insists that punishment of one for the “delict” of another is just, and is customary among many peoples, ancient and modern. Part of his argument turns the question upside down to point out that it is common to reward someone for the benefit does for another:

“A reward is often conferred upon the children or relatives of him who deserves it, and thanks upon the relatives of him who has rendered a service, and vengeance is often exacted from the friends of him who has committed an offense, but nevertheless they do not cease to be what they are: reward, thanks, vengeance.” It’s an argument from gratitude: If thanks can be given to someone other than the beneficiary, someone who is somehow related to the beneficiary, then so can punishment.

(Of course, the blitheness with which Grotius affirms the goodness of custom is fairly staggering. No doubt vengeance is often extracted from friends of the wrongdoer. But that says nothing about whether it ought to be.)