Lakoff and Johnson make the striking claim that the notion of free will is implicated in the traditional disembodied conception of reason: “Will is the application of reason to action. Because human reason is disembodied – that is, free of the constraints of the body – will is radically free. Thus, will can override the bodily influence of desires, feelings, and emotions.”
Does this work in reverse? Does denial of radically free will, as it occurs in Augustinian theology, imply an affirmation of embodiedness? Does it create pressure toward a notion of embodied (impassioned, desiring, emotional) reason? There seems some support for this, especially in Augustine, with his strong notion that we are what we desire.
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