Constituting Mind

Steven Crowell ( A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy) ) gives this helpful explanation of what Husserl means when he says, counter-intuitively, that objects are “constituted” by the mind: “he means neither that the mind composes a mental representation from subjective data nor that it creates objects in a causal way. The basic idea is relatively simple. The same entity can be experienced in a variety of ways: this rock, which I kick out of the way as an impediment, is subsequently picked up by my friend in order to pound a stake into our tomato patch; it is then admired by my geologist neighbor as a fine specimen of Texas granite. The same rock is given each time with a different meaning. According to Husserl, we must attribute these differences not solely to the thing itself (though they do belong to it) but to the consciousness that experiences them in these ways, because only the conscious act explains why at this moment just these aspects of the object are experienced, why my experience has this content.”

Phenomenological method “reduces” phenomena so that the object under analysis ” ‘is’ nothing but the rule that governs the various noemata in which it can be given.” Thus, “the object is in this sense constituted by consciousness.”