Athens, Sparta, and the Future of Israel

We will need to develop weapons industries here. We’re going to be Athens and super–Sparta.” So said Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 15. The so-called “Sparta speech” stirred up fierce criticism among some of Israel’s tech and political elites, understandably worried about growing Israeli isolation. The usually insightful columnist Nadav Eyal, who clearly never finished Thucydides’s History, posted on X: “By the way, Sparta lost.”

As it happens, Israel in its early years was often likened to the long-surviving ancient Greek garrison city. What’s new is Netanyahu’s aspiration for a creative synthesis between the Spartan way—economic autarky and devotion to defense—with the Athenian way—rights, democracy, cultural flourishing, openness to the world, and other attributes that grant power to states and make life in them worth living.  

To balance Athens and Sparta is an accurate encapsulation of Israel’s challenge two years after October 7, which has seen both damaging decline of Israel’s standing in public opinion along with battlefield success that may have ensured the Jewish state’s survival for generations to come.  

The decline of Israel’s standing in public opinion in Europe and America looks durable. Beset by extreme social fragmentation, Western European leaders are naturally tempted to instrumentalize the cause of Palestine to win votes and deter threats of violence. As we saw last week in the Manchester synagogue attack, small Jewish communities in Europe have become even more vulnerable—without obvious remedy. As Israel’s founder David Ben-Gurion admitted, it is certainly possible, in theory, to differentiate between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. In practice, that distinction collapses amidst online and street-mob-driven politics. Besides, demographic shifts in recent years have made Israeli Jews the largest and most influential community in the world. 

Things are more fluid in the United States, which boasts a larger Jewish community, a society that, whatever its difficulties, still possesses promise for dynamic adaptation and repair. It’s easy to get lost in self-justifying myths, but the American Jewish experience really has been different: George Washington promised both Jew and Gentile the natural right of sitting under his own vine without fear. 

The dramatic generational decline of support for Israel in both parties will be incredibly difficult to reverse. A profitable online anti-Semitism business shows that the taboo against the oldest hatred has been broken. Faced with this situation, Jews ought to continue to cultivate friendships with Christians and other allies. In the foreign policy domain, Israel’s defenders can continue to advance persuasive reasons why Israel is a solid ally in a dangerous region—even where the older emotional appeals fail.

Contra some critics, I do not believe that Israel’s leadership has ignored the grave diplomatic costs of continuing the war for two years. Netanyahu’s “Sparta speech” acknowledged it. But in assessing the tradeoffs between public opinion and meeting a borderline existential military challenge, Israel decided on the latter course. One lesson of October 7 was that Israel’s overall position in the Middle East was far more vulnerable than it had appeared.

After the bruising Second Lebanon War in 2006, the consensus in Israel had been that regional threats ought to be contained rather than defeated while the state continued to build up its internal political and economic strengths. After October 7, Israel concluded that these threats had to be dismantled—as it has done astonishingly, though perhaps not completely successfully, and with terrible cost both in the Israeli domestic sphere and in sheer loss of life. Domestically, the Iranian regime is radically weakened. Its “ring of fire” around Israel’s borders is mostly gone. Hezbollah, perhaps Israel’s gravest threat, has been largely incapacitated—the prospects for a more decent Lebanon are higher than they have been in several generations. 

We do not yet know whether Hamas will be able to endure in some way. If it does, this would be something less than the “total victory” sought by the government. But Israel’s radical weakening of Hamas has already opened new diplomatic possibilities, such as President Trump’s promising twenty-point plan to end the war. Even if fulfilled only in part, we would be on the brink of a more America- and Israel-friendly Middle East.

Israel’s military successes have arguably secured the future of the state in material terms. These same successes have also opened new diplomatic possibilities, which, if fulfilled, would ultimately change opinions. Yet Israel’s standing, and the standing of Jews worldwide, has also been seriously hurt. I do not envy the occupant of the prime minister’s office. But I can see how the choices he made have been made. 

In support of the decision of Israel’s government to carry on the war to victory, one may note opinions can be more fickle than concrete political and military achievement. If, as Trump’s proposals would have it, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf States, and non-Hamas Palestinian actors can indeed collaborate on a post-Hamas Gaza future, the vitriol against Israel would lose some of its force. Successfully implemented, Trump’s plan would deepen the Abraham Accords, which, we now know, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had sought to disrupt by launching the October 7 attacks. Optimism about the political future of the Middle East has almost always been a recipe for heartbreak. After two years of Israel’s most terrible war, there may be some rational grounds for hope.