Yes, according to the brilliant Sara Henary. Here is the conclusion of the fantastic talk she gave at Berry last November. Question for discussion: Does our Declaration depend on specifically Christian premises—even its theoretical core? Hint: Sara is expressing her disagreement with Michael Zuckert:
Divorced from any concept that might give one some sense of the value of other selves (e.g. divine “workmanship”), the notion of “self-ownership” is purely self-referential. It cannot establish the equality of other selves, thereby placing them in a relationship of mutual regard (or even indifference) with me. On the contrary, by drawing attention to my own capacities and powers without imposing corresponding limits on my will, it risks calling forth an assertive, blatant disregard for beings and things that might present themselves as obstacles to the execution of my projects.
This essay has explored the problem of human equality in Locke’s thought. The weaknesses apparent in the two dominant solutions to this problem point, I have argued, to a third, more plausible answer to this interpretive dilemma. While Zuckert is right to call attention to the somewhat disingenuous, political character of Locke’s religious argumentation, he is wrong to insist that Locke’s incorporation of such argumentation does not limit and shape the political vision that he is able to articulate. The implications of Locke’s strictly secular arguments do not point in the same direction as the religious premises that he adopts, at least with regard to the matter of human equality. Waldron’s argument suggests this much, though he is overly sanguine concerning the ultimate status of Locke’s religious argumentation. In the end, the idea of equality in Locke’s thought rises and falls with his willingness to argue publicly from specifically Christian premises, however minimalist or unorthodox.
