A Problem in Presuppositional Apologetics?

There is an interesting note in the current issue of Philosophia Christi (v11; n2) by David Reiter about presuppositional apologetics and its famed “transcendental argument for the existence of God” (or TAG for short). This argument claims that there is a deep metaphysical connection between the existence of God and some basic feature of reality. For example, moral laws are connected to the existence of God, and since we know moral laws exist, so does God. The same might be said about logic or the laws of nature. Reiter points to a dilemma TAG faces if it can be agreed that TAG’s form is: 

(1) p

(2) Necessarily, if p, then God exists (or G)

So (3) G 

In response, Reiter asks what exactly is the argument trying to establish? This may seem strange considering the obvious goal of any presuppositional apologist is to show that God exists, but it remains an open question as to whether God actually exists or necessarily exists. Many presuppositionalists want to make the stronger modal claim that God necessarily exists—that proof of God’s existence is entailed by the impossibility of the contrary. 



The problem is that TAG’s form is insufficient to show that G is necessary. If p is not a necessary feature of reality then neither is G. But it is precisely because of their belief that G is necessary presuppositional apologists tout the superiority of TAG to classical arguments. Classical arguments are thought to be weaker, because they simply take a form from nature or reality and turn it into an evidence for God. Such a form goes like this: 

(1) p

(2) if p, then G

So (3) G 

One thinks of the arguments from design or cosmology when using this form. These arguments have the desired goal of showing that God actually exists, but they do not show that God necessarily exists. TAG it seems is no better and no worse than the classical form since it is insufficient to show G necessarily, though it is sufficient to show G actually. 

Perhaps, then, TAG takes a different argumentative form. It may presuppose an Anselmian view of God, which is to say God exists if and only if God is a necessary being. So we have 

(1) p

(2) Necessarily, if p, then G

So (3) G

(4) G if and only if necessarily, G

So (5) Necessarily, G 

This form is deductively valid and achieves the desired results presuppositional apologetics intends. However, it does not seem to be all that radical considering that it relies on Anselm’s thought and his well known ideas about the ontological argument. Such an argument asserts that once you properly define God—when you properly understand what the name “God” means—then you can demonstrate to yourself that God exists. Yet most presuppositionalists seem to distance themselves from Anselm’s thought. 

More importantly, the classical form can be fortified with Anselm’s thought: 

(1) p

(2) if p, then G

So (3) G

(4) G if and only if necessarily, G

So (5) Necessarily, G 

Thus TAG seems to be superfluous, and the real argument needing more attention is the ontological variety.