Elsewhere, I rejected the contention by Michelle Goldberg and others that evangelical leaders such as Michelle Bachmann and Rick Perry are significantly influenced by the aims of the tiny Christian Reconstructionism movement. I tried to make the point that CR has a negligible political influence on evangelicals and that it is not honest to view evangelical office holders and candidates in the light of CR’s aims. The entire thing, I think, is a tar baby sort of trap in which evangelicals are supposed to come out of their corner talking very seriously about Christian Reconstructionism and Dominionism and giving legitimacy to those who have tried to raise it as an issue.
There is a simpler way to get at this thing. I’ll go ahead and concede to Michelle Goldberg and Ryan Lizza that they are correct in their assumption that it is nervous-making to have someone with different ideas and values than one’s own running for political office. This raises the spectre of having that person gain power and perhaps make policies with which one would disagree. But the simple truth is that we are all in this position all the time.
The University of Texas law professor Douglas Laycock once noted that he had some concerns about the Christian Coalition gaining political power. He quickly added that he would be equally concerned about any group with an ideological agenda (such as certain types of feminists or environmentalists) gaining power. The simple fact is that power is a feature of politics and it is unpleasant to lose and have someone else use power to impose upon you. This is very much the situation many have been through in the past two years. A great many people feel that a nationalized health care system would have disastrous effects upon our society. Nevertheless, they have had to suffer through it because the side that wanted to enact such legislation won the election convincingly.
And here’s the thing . . . It doesn’t matter what Barack Obama’s motive was in pushing for national health care. It doesn’t matter if he had a religious conviction, a secular principle, a sentimental attachment to the idea, or a desire to be the first Democrat to ever achieve such a thing. He gained power through politics and enacted his agenda.
There is no difference in anything Rick Perry, Michelle Bachmann, or any other American officeholder might do. Indeed, the likelihood is great that any laws they might enact would be far less intrusive than one mandating that every American purchase health insurance.
August 20th, 2011 | 9:29 am | #1
That seems a reasonable way to look at it. If you like what they stand for, vote for them. If you don’t, don’t. Bogeymen don’t change the situation. Unless, that is, you believe there’s some “stealth” thing going on. But that would be a rather contradictory argument in light of how the left is always going on about the “moonbat” things their supposed Dominionist targets are saying.
August 21st, 2011 | 8:02 am | #2
My concern is the association of Perry (and Bachmann, Palin and Gingrich) with people like Lou Engle who are quite clear that they believe Christians ought to be in control of government. Worse than its possible political effects, I’m very concerned that it will further muddy a proper understanding of the Christian gospel.
August 21st, 2011 | 3:03 pm | #3
Maybe if they called it “Christianism” evangelicals would have an easier time understanding the concern felt by others, provoking, as it might, a comparison to what is sometimes called “Islamism.”
Perhaps there is a more appropriate way for us to wield our political power over those who, perhaps quite reasonably, don’t share our particular religious views. Maybe we all need to think about how to respectfully cooperate with those who believe differently, given that we all have to live under government we elect, and the laws we pass. I find it hard to believe that Christian, Muslim, and non-religious citizens can’t all find more of a common basis upon which to live in civic harmony. Those who approach democracy as an opportunity for political domination for their own ideology seem never to have developed the playground virtue of playing well with others. Too much homeschooling?
August 21st, 2011 | 3:21 pm | #4
Remember Rollen,
That’s a fine ideal you’re proposing here. I’m having trouble, though, determining what it is about religious views that merits their being singled out this way. Your first sentence could end with “our particular educational views,” “our particular economic views,” “our particular views on entitlements,” “our particular national defense views,” and on and on. People believe differently (to use your words) on these crucial social/political dimensions, too.
You say “perhaps there is a more appropriate way to wield our political power…” It is the beauty of constitutional government that it prescribes and delimits appropriate ways to wield our political power. Constitutional approaches have guided America and other democracies successfully for hundreds of years. One feature of democracies is that they call for people to work together. Another feature is that they allow those who win to be the winners, to make laws, to set policy, etc., within constitutional limits. This applies to everyone.
August 21st, 2011 | 3:38 pm | #5
One critical distinction is between particular theses that depend for their justification on some more particular comprehensive systems of belief and value (think, e.g., of Catholicism, Islam, Kantianism) and particular theses that can be justified on grounds independent of a some such “comprehensive doctrine.” One can’t reasonably expect, for example, others to believe in papal infallibility, even if it might be a belief within a reasonable enough comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, if a Catholic is looking for a way to respectfully cooperate with non-Catholics, he should impose rules whose justification, in all honesty, presupposes papal infallibility–even if papal infallibility is true.
August 21st, 2011 | 3:40 pm | #6
rather, “…he shouldn’t impose rules…”
August 21st, 2011 | 3:58 pm | #7
This is the second time recently I’ve interacted with someone here who thought there might exist some political position that did not depend for its justification on some more particular comprehensive system of belief and value. The other time it was a commenter who said that political decisions could be justified only if they did not depend on any ultimate questions.
It seems to me that there is a secularist bias going on here that suggests that only religions involve comprehensive systems of belief and value. Maybe that’s not what you’re saying; maybe I’m illicitly conflating your position with the earlier one that’s still on my mind. If I’m wrong, I would welcome being corrected. But if my impression is correct, I’d be interested to know why you think that. I’d be interested to know why anyone would think it.
August 21st, 2011 | 4:02 pm | #8
The earlier comment I was referring to was at #6 here . It read,
We had some good discussion following that and ended the conversation amicably. Now it seems the same question has come up again, and perhaps there is another opportunity for me to hear someone explain how this (or something similar) could be possible.
August 21st, 2011 | 4:03 pm | #9
Kantianism isn’t a particularly “religious” doctrine, but it is (in some forms) rather comprehensive. The Kantians I know tend to be atheists.
August 21st, 2011 | 4:05 pm | #10
Good point. I missed his name in there. I’ll retract that part of what I wrote. Still, is there any political position at all that doesn’t rest on some more fundamental worldview, some comprehensive set of beliefs?
August 21st, 2011 | 4:15 pm | #11
It’s a nice question. To better gauge where you’re coming from, let me first ask this: do you think there are any propositions that don’t depend for their justification “on some more fundamental worldview”? (If so, it’d help me even more if you offered some examples of some such propositions.)
When thinking about “justification,” please take careful note of the context. In this context, there’s no need to make the idea of justification mysterious or philosophically deep. What we’re talking about is what we can reasonable expect our fellow citizens to accept as a justification, given that they, reasonable enough, may not share our particular comprehensive worldview.
August 21st, 2011 | 5:12 pm | #12
You’re answering a question with a question, I see. Fair enough I’ll go there with you at least a little way, although you ought not be surprised if I’m curious where you’re coming from now.
There are a limited set of propositions that all humans must take as axiomatic in order to do any thinking whatever. The laws of noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle come to mind first of all. (Some people deny even these, as you are probably well aware, but they have trouble doing that without affirming them at the same time.) Beyond that, persons have found ways to doubt and deny and dispute just about everything, based on their differing fundamental views of reality.
Now, can you suggest any possible political/social/policy-related proposition whose justification does not depend on some disputable and disputed worldview? To put it another way, can you offer an example of what you referred to earlier, “particular theses that can be justified on grounds independent of a some such ‘comprehensive doctrine’”?
August 21st, 2011 | 5:40 pm | #13
I ask these questions to understand where you are coming from, to establish common ground, and to help ensure that we don’t start talking past each other.
You suggest that we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept certain of these proposed laws of logic. (It might even be less controversial to say that we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept as valid the kinds of inferences that such laws usually license. Dialetheism, after all, seems reasonable enough.) I wonder if you can add any empirical propositions and any first-order normative claims. Would you agree that one can reasonable expect one’s fellow Americans to accept that the earth is round, that famines are bad, and that torturing blind people for entertainment is typically wrong?
August 21st, 2011 | 8:04 pm | #14
RR,
I would agree with your suppositions at the end of your last comment, especially when you limit it as you have: “reasonable to expect one’s fellow Americans to accept…”
I think now it’s your turn to give some sense of direction here, because the policy context of this discussion is precisely that in which reasonable Americans do not all agree. I think we can expect reasonable Americans to agree on the procedural context, that of constitutional democracy, but even that only up to a point: Americans disagree on the proper role and purpose of the judiciary, of states’ rights, of the executive branch’s powers in issuing regulations, waging war, choosing to enforce or not to enforce laws, etc.
I’m confident you are not just trying to make the trivial case that there are things Americans can agree on, yet I’m wondering by what route you’re planning to take this discussion. Where I am still heading is toward your suggesting to us (as I’ve already asked, though with a further qualification this time), some possible political/social/policy-related decision whose justification does not depend on some disputable and disputed worldview.
More specifically what I mean by decision is a point on which some non-obvious, at least somewhat disputed policy determination, of contemporary interest, must be made; one for which at least some persons would likely be asking for justification.
August 21st, 2011 | 9:06 pm | #15
When you stop to think about it, you’ll probably find that we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept a great deal of empirical and normative claims. Given our shared political culture we can expect more common ground with fellow Americans than we might expect with the subjects of, for example, Islamic states. I assume you agree.
This shared agreement is a non-trivial resource, since, if it extensive enough, it can serve as a basis for a non-trivial view about government legitimacy. For example, reasonable people (though they may disagree on the pope and on Kant) might use their shared beliefs and values to establish a range of core values to which they can then ascribe a privileged status (think basic rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunity…). Second, reasonable people might be expected to accept limitations on the sorts of legislation that touch on these shared and privileged values. Returning to the suggestion made earlier, any such legislation might be restricted by this rule: it needs to be justifiable in terms that we can reasonably expect others to accept.
I think you can see a good example of this restriction at work if you read through the transcript of Perry v. Schwarzenegger: http://www.afer.org/our-work/hearing-transcripts/
Notice the sorts of grounds that the proponents of Prop. 8 appealed to in attempting to defend. For the most part, they restricted themselves from appealing to distinctively religious justifications. So restricted, the defense of Prop. 8 was ruled to be inadequate. Now, while it may well be true that there are strong religious grounds for supporting Prop. 8, religious people do well when they acknowledge that these are not legitimate grounds for using political power to restrict the deeply valued freedoms of their fellow citizens, even when they (the religious people) believe their own religion to be true.
August 21st, 2011 | 9:24 pm | #16
So are you saying that those who opposed Proposition 8 at the polls and in the courts were innocent on what you spoke of in comment #3:
This is what I find hard to understand in what you’re saying and what Tristian was saying in the earlier discussion I mentioned here. There is an ideology at play here. Gay-rights advocacy depends for its justification (I’m referring to your comment #5 now) on “more particular comprehensive systems of belief and value;” in fact its ideological roots are equally as comprehensive and particular as any religion’s. Its underlying belief set is equally as unlikely to gain widespread agreement among reasonable Americans as any religion, and for similar reasons.
I could spell it out for you, but I want to believe that’s not necessary. It should be apparent enough. Do you see it?
August 21st, 2011 | 9:38 pm | #17
If a “gay rights” law touching basic matters of justice cannot be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept, then we violate a liberal ideal of civility when we restrict the freedoms of others through that law.
But I don’t quite see this with respect to Prop. 8. (But you are surely here in in a better position to point out something I don’t see.) Maybe you can point to something in the court transcripts that contains the sort of violation you have in mind.
August 21st, 2011 | 9:45 pm | #18
I should probably have said: “with respect to the overturning of Prop. 8″
August 22nd, 2011 | 3:45 am | #19
“What we’re talking about is what we can reasonable expect our fellow citizens to accept as a justification, given that they, reasonable enough, may not share our particular comprehensive worldview.”
Remember Rollen,
Have you read T.M. Scanlon at all? That is basically the tagline of his contractualism theory.
August 22nd, 2011 | 7:01 am | #20
Remember Rollen,
Your most recent answer has aspects to it that I find too interesting and also too complex to address via combox discussion. In the next day or two I’ll have thoughts to share in a fresh blog post on it. Thank you for the continuing conversation.
August 22nd, 2011 | 12:33 pm | #21
NV, I’m somewhat familiar with the theory you mention. It’s an adaptation of a political theory for distinctively moral questions. This, I take it, makes it less relevant for the current discussion. What are your thoughts on this author’s work?
August 22nd, 2011 | 6:29 pm | #22
One critical distinction is between particular theses that depend for their justification on some more particular comprehensive systems of belief and value (think, e.g., of Catholicism, Islam, Kantianism) and particular theses that can be justified on grounds independent of a some such “comprehensive doctrine.”
Everyone has a “comprehensive doctrine”.
The secular humanist view is identical with the Unitarian Universalist view; to the extent that humanism is not just another religion, it depends only on technicalities involved in defining the term “religion” and not in any real difference: whether you are a secular atheist or a Catholic, you are governed by a comprehensive set of beliefs which rest on articles of faith.
The major controversies of the so-called “Culture Wars” are not a contest between secular vs. Christian or religious positions. This is a popular framing – done by people who wish to portray their side as the reasonable, fact-based one – as opposed to those guys over there, who are fueled by irrational forces. It is a powerful ad hominem to draw on stereotypes of religious people as crazy and/or superstitious. But it is not true. While it is true that religious people are very upset about laws that threaten their right to their freedom of religion, there are very strong secular arguments against abortion, gay marriage, teaching sex ed in school, and so on.
Of course the humanist does not see it that way, because he is experiencing the so-called “myth of mythlessness” – that is, the belief that his particular religion is different because it is more than a mere belief system.
Perhaps there is a more appropriate way for us to wield our political power over those who, perhaps quite reasonably, don’t share our particular religious views.
Except the problem is not how Christians actually govern, but involves liberal paranoid fantasies about how they imagine Christians will govern in some dystopian future.
For example: the claim that Christians want to bring back stoning as a method of punishment.
How does one argue against that?
August 22nd, 2011 | 8:32 pm | #23
I enjoy Scanlon’s ethics immensely, though I find it has a tenuous framework supporting it. Quoting Scanlon from his work on the subject, What We Owe to Each Other:
While it’s one of the most reasonable non-theistic ethical systems I’ve heard, I’m still unconvinced. I think Scanlon correctly notes a sort of nature of moral realism, that is there is some principles that we all could not reject. He does not, I think, do well enough to explain why these principles are the way they are. They might create happiness, perhaps, but there does not seem to be a universal principle proved as to why happiness ought to be our goal. It could all get circular very fast.
August 22nd, 2011 | 8:43 pm | #24
To avoid further confusion (wrt Blake’s comment): whether or not “everyone has a comprehensive doctrine” is beside the point here. Also, for the purposes here, it is perfectly correct to regard secular and religious comprehensive doctrines alike. It will matter, however, whether or not they are, broadly speaking, reasonable.
August 22nd, 2011 | 8:58 pm | #25
NV, it is supposed to be an asset of this form of contractualism that it doesn’t explain its principles (or, for that matter, morality) in terms of the creation of happiness, well-being, etc. It is intended to be an alternative to utilitarianism.
Your main concern, as I understand it, is that Scanlon hasn’t done enough to explain why some principles are reasonably rejectable within his framework of assessing reasonable rejection. Is that right? Or, are you rather concerned with how Scanlon goes about justifying the particular framework he suggests for assessing reasonable rejection? These are two very different questions.
August 22nd, 2011 | 9:42 pm | #26
RR,
Comprehensive doctrines are by definition comprehensive, so each thinking person’s policy choices, preferences, and opinions will be a reflection of his or her comprehensive doctrine. I am convinced (and I will try to show this soon, hopefully tomorrow) that our policy-related beliefs or preferences always come out of and are dependent upon such doctrines. Therefore what you’re hoping for here…
… seems utterly impossible, at least as far as any of our more difficult national policy questions are concerned.
Now perhaps you think I’m wrong in that, and you think there’s a way to resolve serious policy disputes by reference to some grounds independent of any comprehensive doctrine. I would be most interested to hear how you would propose to do that.
August 22nd, 2011 | 9:58 pm | #27
“Comprehensive doctrine” is something of a term of the art. Here’s a canonical characterization of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine:
Obviously, there will be significant overlap among doctrines. It may be that every reasonable comprehensive doctrine acknowledges as valid (at least implicitly) the inferences typically licensed by the typically identified rules of logic. This does not mean that an appeal to any such inference rule thereby relies on some particular comprehensive doctrine (much less all of them). In that sense, an appeal to such an inference rule would be an appeal to grounds that are, for our purposes, not dependent upon some particular comprehensive doctrine.
August 22nd, 2011 | 10:06 pm | #28
I forgot to cite the source of the long quotation: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press. 2005, p. 59
August 22nd, 2011 | 11:04 pm | #29
To avoid further confusion (wrt Blake’s comment): whether or not “everyone has a comprehensive doctrine” is beside the point here. Also, for the purposes here, it is perfectly correct to regard secular and religious comprehensive doctrines alike. It will matter, however, whether or not they are, broadly speaking, reasonable.
It all boils down to the articles of faith one’s worldview relies upon, doesn’t it?
Your language of doctrines is a matter of framing: if your frame is the correct one – or “the truth” – then you are in a position above me, talking down to a less “enlightened” individual. Your beliefs are truth while mine are superstition. Am I correct in believing that is the point of bringing up all this stuff about “comprehensive doctrines” – to establish whose positions/evidence/ways of reasoning are authoritative and whose are not?
The doctrine that all humanists share involves a set of assumptions derived from the Enlightenment – starting with the idea that Christianity and other religions are “corrected” by certain assumptions, which, cumulatively, are viewed as “better” or “more accurate” ways of knowing.
The Enlightenment also gives to us certain myths regarding our origins, purpose, and future (as well as the myth that Enlightenment people started out the same as Christians and other religious people, but, by virtue of becoming “enlightened”, have now “risen above” such superstitions.)
It is possible to accept most of the beliefs of the Enlightenment and still be a Christian. The point that, I think, truly separates humanists from all the other religions is materialism – when scientific method starts becoming something capable of producing “truth”.
The assumption here being that all the assumptions of the ‘scientific method’ are not constraints on what the method can and cannot test, but are rather statements of fact.
The humanist/Unitarian Universalist (that is, the person who embraces the core assumptions of the Enlightenment as “truth” or articles of faith) tends to start thinking that whatever scientists hold to be true must therefore be true, and somehow the “if” falls out of “if X, then Y”…it becomes merely “X, then Y”.
And then they argue as if it’s demonstrable that X, therefore Y.
But ultimately, there is no way to prove anything true or false, if you are assuming certain things as true and the person you are talking to does not accept these things as true. This is what humanist/Unitarian Universalists either forget or simply don’t want to believe: all their reasoning is held up by assumptions – if the world really isn’t as the materialists assume it is, then many things they regard as givens are really not true.
It is for this reason that I do not believe humanists are ‘above’ any other religion, in terms of being able to claim any superiority in their reasoning or methods.
August 23rd, 2011 | 12:02 am | #30
Blake, One of the motivations for talking about reasonable comprehensive doctrines is to bypass the controversial question of which one, if any, is true, or even closest to the truth. That’s the sort of question which citizens of a pluralistic society have no prospect of coming to an agreement upon (as I think we must acknowledge); it’d therefore be highly unfortunate if our views of government legitimacy and our respectful cooperation with one another depended upon our coming to such an agreement.
In both of your long comments, you ran off course right from the get go. I suggest you try a new approach to this thread.
August 23rd, 2011 | 11:28 am | #31
My blog post in answer to this will probably appear tomorrow. I have it mostly written, but with not enough time to finish it off today.
August 23rd, 2011 | 11:49 am | #32
I’d be happy to review it before you publish it; this might help us to nip in the bud any significant misunderstandings (or at least any that I am responsible for).
My email address: rememberrollen [at] gmail.com
August 24th, 2011 | 2:47 pm | #33
On second thought, maybe if you just post them we can work on your thoughts via combox discussion. The traffic doesn’t seem to be too much of a problem, and anyone really interested might even profit.
August 24th, 2011 | 9:21 pm | #34
It’s up now. I’ll look forward to your responses.
August 25th, 2011 | 9:05 am | #35
Part of my problem with this discussion is that it’s theoretical, while no one is actually evaluating the “dominionists” in question, particularly the people who’ve been associated with Rick Perry – fringe charistmastics like Lou Engle and Mike Bickle. Has any evangelical scholar evaluated the theology of these men? Even by the standards of third-wave charistmaticism, these men are very extreme, and borderline crazy judging by orthodox Protestantism. I want to support Perry, Bachmann, et al, but these sorts of associations are a far, far cry from Francis Schaeffer on the Protestant end and RJN on the Catholic side.
August 25th, 2011 | 2:27 pm | #36
In both of your long comments, you ran off course right from the get go. I suggest you try a new approach to this thread.
Well, if you’re the keeper of what is reasonable, then I guess I’d better try a new approach – one that starts with your assumptions, instead of assuming equality between us.
Except that if I have to do that, then really we can have nothing to say to each other. I already understand your argument: if your assumptions are correct, then, for example, you are right in assuming that Prop. 8 is a no-brainer and you ought to simply be able to “expect” people to believe whatever you think they ought to. You assume no logical person could possibly think otherwise, perhaps. (Therefore, since I think otherwise, I must not be a logical person?)
August 25th, 2011 | 2:51 pm | #37
Blake, I think it is safe to assume that there is nothing we can productively say to each other (although not, I think, on the grounds you cite).
August 29th, 2011 | 12:16 pm | #38
[...] John Rushdoony and other theocrats. (Ryan Lizza has similar thoughts.) Hunter Baker disagrees here, here, and here. I’ve actually read Rushdoony, Greg Bahnsen, Gary North and others who are various [...]
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