A Liberal Idea of Civility
A commenter who goes by “Remember Rollen” had this to say in the discussion on Hunter Baker’s article on dominionism:
If a “gay rights” law touching basic matters of justice cannot be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept, then we violate a liberal ideal of civility when we restrict the freedoms of others through that law.
But I don’t quite see this with respect to [the overturning of] Prop. 8. (But you are surely here in in a better position to point out something I don’t see.) Maybe you can point to something in the court transcripts that contains the sort of violation you have in mind.
There is an attractive sort of ideal expressed there, one that I could really appreciate, if only it could work. Yes, let’s let our policies be guided by what we can reasonably expect others to accept. Since this came up in the context of dominionism, I take it that for Remember Rollen, this is one of the best ways to head off dangers of the sort represented by dominionism. (Whether there’s anything there that needs heading off is a different question. I do not know where Remember Rollen stands on that question, but it seems he is at least concerned about dangers of the sort that dominionism is supposed to present. I will refer to him as “RR” here, and I’ll accept the risk that I might be wrong in using the masculine pronoun.)
His point in that passage is this: if we can find a way to limit our public policy decisions to principles that can “be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept,” then we can be assured no one’s freedom will ever be limited, except in ways they could reasonably be expected to agree with. That certainly sounds consistent with Western democratic principles. Unfortunately, working out that ideal presents problems that may be insurmountable.
Comprehensive Doctrines
To see why that is the case, let’s take a further look at what RR has to say. How can we identify “terms we can reasonably expect others to accept”? His approach to that relies on the concept of comprehensive doctrines. He presents a full definition of comprehensive doctrines in comment #27 on that thread. The following presents the concept by way of an example:
One can’t reasonably expect, for example, others to believe in papal infallibility, even if it might be a belief within a reasonable enough comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, if a Catholic is looking for a way to respectfully cooperate with non-Catholics, he should not impose rules whose justification, in all honesty, presupposes papal infallibility–even if papal infallibility is true….
What we’re talking about is what we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept as a justification, given that they, reasonable enough, may not share our particular comprehensive worldview.
Again, this seems an attractive ideal. All of us would strongly prefer that our freedoms not be impinged upon by doctrines we don’t agree with. Religious beliefs are the obvious, prime examples of comprehensive doctrines on which not everyone can be expected to agree. Therefore it follows that we might want to maintain a safe and protective distance between religious belief and public policy. Referring now to RR’s first quote above, we can draw a clear application: if non-religious beliefs are insufficient to justify laws against gay “marriage,” then it is illiberal to have such laws on the books.*
Two Key Assumptions Behind the “Liberal Idea of Civility”
Unfortunately there’s more going on in this than may be immediately obvious. What if there is some unrecognized comprehensive doctrine at play in the push to change marriage law—one that we can’t all reasonably be expected to accept? I believe there is such a doctrine. Though it is virtually invisible to public consciousness, it is the ideological powerhouse behind the gay “marriage” movement. Homosexual advocacy is just one piece of it, though, a particular expression of it, if you will; for it is larger—more comprehensive—than that. This doctrine rests at the conceptual core of a movement that appears more like an irreligious analogue to “dominionism”—with aspirations as totalizing as any imagined theocracy—than a liberalizing movement of freedom.
And with that I’m in danger of sounding as much a conspiracy theorist as the dominionismists. Before you conclude I’ve joined the list of the loonies, let me explain what I mean. I’ll continue to use the marriage issue for purposes of illustration. Obviously America is embroiled in a heated dispute over what marriage is and should be. RR’s position appears to be that any law that restrict homosexuals’ freedom to marry each other could be—and probably is—a gross violation of civil liberty. It seems to me, however, that he has missed two key assumptions on which his argument depends. I haven’t asked him whether he accepts those assumptions as his own, but it seems to me it would be hard for anyone to affirm his position without them.
These two critical assumptions are:
- The definition of marriage is expandable to include same-sex unions
- That expansion can be accomplished through the law
It should not be hard to see how crucial these assumptions are to his position. He has said that it is (or at least it could be) a violation of civil liberty to enact laws that restrict persons’ freedom to marry. But if the definition of marriage were fixed and not susceptible to being changed (Assumption 1), or even if it were expandable but not expandable through law (Assumption 2), then it would be impossible for laws based on traditional marriage, or the enactment of such laws,** to be responsible for any violation of civil liberties, as RR says they might be. Absent these assumptions, marriage is what marriage is, and no law could possibly do anything to change it. We do not hold agents responsible for circumstances over which they have no power. If law cannot define marriage, then it cannot be held to blame for what marriage is or is not. You might as well call the law illiberal for not letting us all do slam-dunks like LeBron James. Apart from Assumptions 1 and 2, we could never sensibly suppose that “we violate a liberal ideal of civility when we restrict the freedoms of others through that law.”
Obviously same-sex “marriage” advocates accept Assumptions 1 and 2. I’d be willing to bet most of them do so implicitly. (I am speaking generally of same-sex “marriage” proponents now, not of RR in particular.) Believing as I do that these are implicit and thus unexamined assumptions for many of them, I also think it likely that few have recognized the possibility that others might not likewise share these assumptions implicitly. Regardless of whether they hold these assumptions implicitly or not, they take it that the form that marriage takes depends on nothing but human choices endorsed through man-made law. “Traditional” marriage is just that: traditional; and traditions are human-determined things. Same-sex “marriage” would on that view be a different thing, but no less and no more human-determined.
Thus (on that view) the struggle over marriage is between two human-defined, legally-endorsed conceptions of marriage. It is just human conception against another. Therefore the most rational principle for settling the marriage question seems to be that of liberty and freedom. It ought to be quite simple, in those terms. No one could see it otherwise unless they were insecure in their sexuality, a hater, a hide-bound traditionalist, or some other form of annoying irrationalist.
And Another Comprehensive Doctrine
From where do these assumptions come, however? Is there some comprehensive doctrine underlying them? I think there is, and ironically it bears striking relationship to Christian doctrines of dominion. I’m not talking about dominionism now, but Christian understandings of the term “dominion” in Genesis 1:26, 28. The term is interpreted in various ways by various Christians. Typically these interpretations start from what it is to be human: that we are a special, unique kind of being, created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27, sandwiched between the two references to dominion.) Though interpretations of dominion differ, they all feature some aspects of reality over which humans are understood to have stewardship or control, and other aspects over which we do not.
The assumptions underlying same-sex “marriage” advocacy also hang on what we understand it is to be human, and what it is we may or may not control. It is of course a secular conception. It tells us in the first place that we are evolved creatures; or more precisely, evolving creatures. Therefore humanness (what it means to be human) has no fixed nature. There is no such thing as the essence of humanness, for evolution does not produce essences, it produces populations in the process of change. What we are is we have evolved to be, but that is only a snapshot along the road. To speak of an evolved species like homo sapiens as if it is some permanent thing is to deny the core of evolutionary theory. Crucially, this is true both for physiology and behavior. Therefore marriage, being a product of evolved and evolving humans, must be an evolved and evolvable institution. There is no fixed nature or essence of marriage.
Now, somehow along the way we humans developed a unique capacity to recognize and thus direct the course of evolution, especially that of human behavioral norms and institutions. This evolutionary insight informs us that marriage is what we humans have defined it to be, and nothing else than that. That being so, we have the freedom to define it differently if we want. It is no stretch of language to say that we have dominion over the definition of marriage. That freedom, that dominion, is limited only by the practical necessity of coming to social agreement on what marriage is, and to enforce that agreement to whatever extent we might find useful. We do that through the law. Therefore marriage is what the law says it is.
It’s About Marriage and More
It’s not just marriage, by the way. It’s also family, and it’s maleness and femaleness. These are no more fixed, unalterable concepts than humanness is. If the law lets you choose your gender, then you can choose your gender, regardless of what the old biology books might tell you about your body. If you want to throw off all concepts of male and female entirely, then you can do that too, as long as the law allows; for these things are in eternal flux, and what authority is there to restrict you from adding your own impetus to that flux?
Let’s put this in context. Assumptions 1 and 2 are absolutely necessary for gay-rights advocacy to make sense; but they in turn require some underlying theory, some doctrine to justify them. They find this in the pervasive Western doctrine of the unfixed, ever-changing biology and behavior of the human species, as described in evolutionary theory. It is a comprehensive doctrine, for mainstream science (the arbiter of such decisions for Western society) has decreed that it is the explanation for all of biology and all of behavior.
Whether It Is True or Not
I do not present this as an anti-evolutionary screed. That’s not the point. RR said that Catholicism should not be imposed upon those who disagree with it “even if papal infallibility is true.” In the same way, we could say that evolution-based views of humans should not be imposed on others, even if it is true. Actually, I don’t claim to know for certain whether evolutionary theory is necessary to ground Assumptions 1 and 2; nor do I need to know for my purposes here. It’s possible there could be other systems of thought that would justify the two assumptions. At the same time, though, it can hardly be denied that given evolution’s widespread hegemony, in practical terms it is the doctrine that actually does support these assumptions.
In summary, then, RR’s proposed resolution of the gay-rights issue, as stated in the first quote above, makes sense only in light of Assumptions 1 and 2; and without those two assumptions, laws that limit marriage to a man and a woman could not possibly be unjust. Assumptions 1 and 2 rest on a comprehensive doctrine; therefore same-sex “marriage” advocacy rests on a comprehensive doctrine.
The Reasonability Clause
But that is not the end of the story; we’re only partway there. RR has not rejected all comprehensive doctrines; he merely says we should not base public policy on any comprehensive doctrine that cannot be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept. (Another version suggests we limit policy to doctrines that reasonable persons are not likely to reject.) Obviously, in light of that, there remains the issue of reasonability. Granted that we all might hold to some comprehensive doctrine or other; the point is to find one upon which we can agree, or at least one to which no one could reasonably object. We can’t expect to agree on all of our beliefs, as RR rightly tells us; but maybe we can find something to work with anyway.
One of the motivations for talking about reasonable comprehensive doctrines is to bypass the controversial question of which one, if any, is true, or even closest to the truth. That’s the sort of question which citizens of a pluralistic society have no prospect of coming to an agreement upon (as I think we must acknowledge); it’d therefore be highly unfortunate if our views of government legitimacy and our respectful cooperation with one another depended upon our coming to such an agreement.
At this point I turn from analysis to question-asking. If it is true, if I am correct, to suggest that:
- Same-sex “marriage” advocacy depends rationally upon Assumptions 1 and 2, and
- Assumptions 1 and 2 depend (practically, at least, if not necessarily) upon the belief that humanness is essentially an unfixed, ever-changing concept, and
- This belief regarding humanness serves is founded upon and serves as part of a comprehensive doctrine,
… then is this a comprehensive doctrine we can reasonably expect others to accept? Is it one to which no reasonable person could ever be expected to object?
I think my answers to those questions should be obvious. If we take it as a standard for liberty that no law should be based on a comprehensive doctrine to which persons might reasonably object, then laws supporting same-sex “marriage” fail the test. It imposes itself on others who might reasonably think that male is male and female is female, that what marriage has been for thousands of generations is what marriage is, and that there are good reasons beyond the mere inertia of tradition to think so. In RR’s terms, it’s a clear violation of civil liberty.
A Couple of Loose Ends
Before I close I want to wrap up what I was saying about secular dominionism and its totalizing aspirations. I hope it’s clear that I’m using dominionism analogically. I’m not trying to force-fit theologically-derived language onto secularists, and I’m certainly not a conspiracy theorist. On the other hand, if you are a secularist who thinks I’m going over some kind of lunatic line by applying the term “dominionism” to non-religious theories, you might be getting a sense of how we feel when some secularists use it for people like Nancy Pearcey or Francis Schaeffer. It doesn’t fit them, either. And the “dominionismists” are ringing their alarmist warnings without caution, without nuance, and apparently without much fact-checking.
I’ve heard stories (perhaps you have too) of secularizing conspiracy groups, but I’m not much persuaded of them, and that’s not what this is about in any case. The “totalizing aspirations” of which I speak are also something analogical or metaphorical: not the dictatorial intent of some sinister cabal, but rather the pervasive secular mindset of our culture, without which Assumptions 1 and 2 could not function effectively as unconsciously accepted guiding principles.
*I believe “same-sex marriage” is a contradiction in terms. I prefer not to write in contradictions, so I use quotes around “marriage” in that context. I know some people object to that as tendentious. Take it for what it is, please. I do not use the quotes as scare quotes or for rhetorical effect, but just to maintain personal integrity regarding what I hold to be true.
**I use this language guardedly. I do not mean to support the popular misconception that the reason homosexual “marriage” is illegal is because laws have been enacted against it. Until recently it has simply been regarded as impossible because it is a self-contradictory concept.
Also posted at Thinking Christian
August 25th, 2011 | 12:01 am | #1
I admire your efforts here, Tom, especially as these ideas are somewhat challenging. While I stand by the three quotations you’ve extracted, I’d take issue with many of your characterizations and paraphrases of my position. Here, however, let me simply answer your helpful 3-part question and make a recommendation.
Regarding your first claim, I don’t quite see that these “two assumptions” are necessary for “same sex marriage advocacy.” Let me suggest two alternatives: (1) The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions. (2) This rendering of the legal definition more determinate can be accomplished through amending/clarifying the laws governing marriage policy.
These two alternative assumptions strike me as more plausible, and more plausibly critical to SSM advocacy (although I still doubt whether such assumptions are in any way necessary for SSM advocacy).
I don’t find your assertions in your 2nd and 3rd questions at all plausible, particularly when we make the suggested changes to your proposed “assumptions”.
Before we run down a rabbit trail while debating any of these points, let’s consider the larger argument. To challenge my position, you obviously need to do more than show that there is some assumption that is both necessary to SSM advocacy and (to use your phrase) is “in practical terms” supported by a particular secular doctrine which certain religious people reject. (If this is not obvious, we’d better clear up several issues before going any further.)
Generally, I think it would be good for you to articulate an answer to two questions. First, exactly which thesis(es) of mine you are trying to undermine? Second, what precisely do you need to show in order to succeed?
.
August 25th, 2011 | 6:48 am | #2
Thank you, RR.
The thesis I am trying to undermine is best summarized in, “If a ‘gay rights’ law touching basic matters of justice cannot be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept, then we violate a liberal ideal of civility when we restrict the freedoms of others through that law.” Of course that’s not the whole of what you had to say on that; you expanded and explained that statement, and I tried to address those key points in the course of arguing against that thesis of yours.
Meanwhile I attempted to establish the thesis that the theory of comprehensive doctrines applies to same-sex “marriage” advocacy at least as much as it does to religions.
Concerning the two assumptions, I argued that you cannot draw the conclusions you have drawn absent the belief that the law has the power to restrict the freedoms you have in mind. As I wrote, we do not say call it a violation of civil liberty that the law prevents us from doing slam-dunks like LeBron. That’s because we know it is not the law that has done that restricting. The reason you can think the law can violate civil liberties by restricting marriage is because you think the law has it in its power to restrict marriage in that way. Granted, it is such a deeply, implicitly held assumption that most people who support gay “marriage” would have trouble imagining it could be otherwise than that; but if it were, then I’m sure you would agree that they would have no reason to work the issue through legal means, any more than they would petition the courts to let them do slam-dunks.
Your alternative assumptions are also essential to same-sex “marriage” advocacy, but they draw inexorably on the two more basic assumptions I gave. The reason is because they implicitly assume that the legal definition of marriage controls or rules over the most relevant definitions of marriage. That could never be the case, absent the two prior assumptions.
Concerning your second-to-last paragraph, I think your position is successfully challenged if the charge of a violation can be successfully turned back upon same-sex “marriage” advocacy. The result of that would not be that one position (for or against) would be vindicated; rather it would be to show that your theory cannot do what you hope it can do. Specifically, based on your theory you would be unable to say that laws against same-sex “marriage” are unjust.
A final note: the “dominionism” theme in here wasn’t really directed toward you, as I hope I successfully communicated to you; but this discussion did come up in that context, so I brought it in. For those who think the dominionist charge against certain Christians has any merit, I hope this will lead them to think twice.
August 25th, 2011 | 12:25 pm | #3
Here is my question: name one law in the history of mankind that was universally agreed upon by every rational person. I’ll bet that if you looked hard enough, you could even find someone out there who opposes basic laws against murder, and who can present a very rational (albeit misguided) reason for his position.
This is why the “everyone can agree with” theory falls apart when implemented, and inevitably becomes a smokescreen for one particular party’s philosophy of what is reasonable. It is rhetoric that can sugar coat either the tyranny of the majority or of the minority as simply an exercise in passing laws that everyone can “reasonably” agree to. These are slippery words to be used by humans who are bringing their respective intellectual and emotional baggage to the table of public discourse.
August 25th, 2011 | 1:00 pm | #4
Interesting points, Anthony, though I think there might be a bit of an overstatement on anyone’s being able to state perfectly rational reasons not to have laws against murder. That’s speculative enough not to matter much, though. More importantly I wonder whether RR might want to step in and let us know whether he really meant his standard to be that laws would be universally agreed upon by every rational person. That’s considerably different than the way he stated it. I hope I didn’t say anything to lead to a misinterpretation on that point. I’ll just acknowledge that and let him decide whether he wants to do anything about it.
RR: further on the assumptions, and hopefully simpler than what I wrote last:
Let’s call your set of assumptions rA and mine tA. The question is whether rA and/or tA is rationally necessary for same-sex “marriage” advocacy, which I’ll call SSMA. Actually there is no question about SSMA’s dependency on rA; we’re agreed on that. My position is that rA itself stands or falls with tA. So I would say (as in the very old Certs commercials), “stop, you’re both right!” Both rA and tA are essential for SSMA. If I’m right, then it seems to me you really do need to deal with Assumptions 1 and 2, and with their implications—either to accept them or to explain why not.
August 25th, 2011 | 1:34 pm | #5
Good points, Anthony. You’re right that one insurmountable problem is what determines what counts as “reasonable” enough to everyone.
Who is this “reasonable person” whose judgment and beliefs we rely on as to justify whether a law is legitimate?
It’s unclear to me why we should expect all reasonable persons to believe the positive claim that marriage is purely a human legal construction, rather a previously existing reality that laws merely recognize but do not somehow construct.
It seems what is going on, in the time-honored liberal tradition, is the defining of people one disagrees with as “unreasonable” and therefore disenfranchising them from political discourse. Equality of all persons comes with the caveat that “reasonable” people must determine who counts as persons; that’s where the trick is. This is most clear in the defining of unborn children as non-persons. We can claim equal protection of all persons by simply defining certain classes as non-persons.
But this tactic can also be used to define “unreasonable” people, whose views “reasonable” people cannot be expected to listen to and therefore don’t count in politics.
August 25th, 2011 | 1:55 pm | #6
Tom Gilson, I appreciate your willingness and your efforts to clarifying the point of contention. Let me try to take this work a step further.
To show SSM advocates have violated the suggested ideal of civility in opposing Prop. 8, you try to show:
Stage 1. SSM can only justify their opposition to Prop. 8 in terms of a certain special assumption (all you need, I take it, is show one).
Stage 2. Being what it is, this special assumption shows that any such opposition to Prop. 8 is not justifiable in terms that we could reasonably expect others to accept.
It strikes me as a difficult challenge to find any one assumption that will fit the bill, enabling sound arguments for both stages. The assumptions you initially suggest strike me as replaceable by the alternatives I offered (if replaceable, your assumptions clearly wouldn’t satisfy stage 1). With such alternatives assumption, however, I don’t see how you can make good on stage 2 arguments.
August 25th, 2011 | 2:08 pm | #7
Because of the apparent temptation to think that “universal agreement” is the relevant criterion, I’d better clarify a few things.
To say that a proposition is justifiable in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept is not, I take it, the same as saying that proposition is something that we can reasonably expect the others to accept as true. Consider a case of reasonable disagreement. Two paleontologists, Alice and Bill, can reasonably disagree about the truth of asteroid collision theory (a theory to explain the extinction of dinosaurs). Despite Alice believing the theory to be true, and Bill believing the theory to be false, each can recognize the other’s position as reasonable (even while believing the other’s position to be false). More to the point, Alice may be able, in good faith, to offer a justification for the collision theory in terms that she can reasonably expect Bill to accept. In response, Bill (again in good faith) might say this: “while I accept the considerations you point to and I acknowledge their bearing on the issue, I simply disagree that they substantiate the collision theory. I think that a stronger case can be made for the Deccan Traps theory.”
The examples illustrates a distinction: Alice can, in good faith, offer for her theory a justification, the terms of which she can reasonably expect Bill to accept. Alice can’t, we might well assume, reasonably expect Bill to accept her theory as true.
August 25th, 2011 | 2:45 pm | #8
Regarding your first claim, I don’t quite see that these “two assumptions” are necessary for “same sex marriage advocacy.” Let me suggest two alternatives: (1) The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions. (2) This rendering of the legal definition more determinate can be accomplished through amending/clarifying the laws governing marriage policy.
The problem with this is that marriage includes procreative aspects.
So to “expand the policy” necessarily means changing the nature of what marriage is – specifically: forbidding people from using definitions and institutional functions that are important to them.
The difference between a marriage (which includes a procreative aspect) vs. a mere civil union is like the difference between a driver’s license vs. a state ID: both are used the same way, but the driver’s license includes the privilege of driving, and thus only people qualified to drive a car get one. A marriage license includes the state’s recognition of a right to found a family, and should only go to couples who are qualified for that right.
The reason this matters is because there are legal and social ramifications involved here.
For one thing, there are benefits which are explicitly procreative in nature which are part of marriage.
Another way of saying this would be to ask, if gays want to be married “just like heteros”, are they willing to submit to the same constraints on adultery and sexuality – even if we were to pass strict anti-adultery laws that would forbid adultery as a means of reproduction, and make it a criminal act to attempt to use the rights of marriage to claim a child as your own that you know is not biologically related to you?
What if even if the “child’s best interest” standard were to be prioritized over the gay person’s “right” to have someone else’s child?
Gays want recognition for their union, and that seems fair enough to me. But they also want something more: they want the law to equate their relationship with a procreative one – to grant them, as a couple, the right to found a family.
The problem here is that there are other rights that are in conflict with this. The one of greatest concern to me is the recognition that granting this right to gays means overturning the entire concept of adoption – from the current situation, where adoption is defined as being about finding a home for a child that needs one, to a new understanding of adoption – one that is primarily about finding a child for a home that needs one, even when the child’s best interests are sacrificed rather than served by the custody decision. Granting to gays the right to be viewed as identical to other couples necessarily involves moving the child’s rights downward on the hierarchy of priorities – so that the parent’s needs (to “not be discriminated against”) must outweigh the child’s best interest.
There are other concerns, as well: “gay marriage” requires the belief that the integrity of the family line is irrelevant, and that no harm is done in the act of deliberately breaking up and rearranging family trees. And it also requires significant restrictions on what people of every religion other than humanism believe on the nature of sexuality, the sacred, family, existence, and purpose.
The institution of marriage is either what humanists believe it is or what Christians believe it is. It can’t be both. I have yet to see any compelling evidence supporting the core assumptions upon which the humanists’ contentions are based.
Or, to put it another way, it is not clear to me why your position is self-evidently the “reasonable” one and mine is not.
August 25th, 2011 | 2:50 pm | #9
R.R.
I see what you are saying. That is a somewhat different criteria. But I think the main problem that I was trying to explain remains a problem. Someone still has to agree on what is “reasonable,” and if the issue is particularly contentious, the chances are likely that “reasonable” and “unreasonable” will be more or less synonymous with “my side” and “the other side”.
Why, to use your previous example, is papal infallibility not reasonable, while the asteroid theory is? Can’t a protestant or even an atheist agree that the theory of papal infallibility, though wrong, is at least reasonable? As you can see, it’s a very loaded question. Indeed, the question of reasonableness is perhaps as controversial as the concrete questions that we are trying to resolve amicably through the criteria of reasonableness. Thus, nothing really gets solved.
August 25th, 2011 | 3:41 pm | #10
Anthony,
You are perfectly right to worry about the idea of the reasonable. The concept is obviously doing a lot of work here. I suspect that it is also serving multiple tasks.
One task regards the greater promise we have in reaching a consensus about the reasonable than we have on reaching a consensus about the true (since the reasonable is typically broader than the true). Here the distinction is between the reasonable and the true. This is the sense of “reasonable” most prominent in the idea of a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine,” characterized in a previous thread.
Another task regards the idea of what we might call “reasonable cooperation,” in contrast to what we might call “rational self-interest.” This sense of “reasonable” appears here in the idea of “reasonable person”:
I suspect I’ve sometimes been guilty of blending together these two senses of “reasonable.” I suppose, however, that in practice they are not entirely distinct. In other words, in trying to determine what terms or justifications we can reasonably expect others to accept, we might want to appeal to both senses of “reasonable.” That is, one has to be reasonably cooperative (in the goal of finding a common basis for respectful cooperation in politics) as we consider which comprehensive doctrines to regard as reasonable in the first sense, and as we interpret these reasonable comprehensive doctrines to consider which sorts of justifications we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept.
I think we would therefore want to say that Roman Catholicism can be a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. As such, a Catholic might be entirely reasonable in subscribing to any of Catholicism’s more essential doctrines. These would constitute, I take it, restrictions on what we can reasonably expect a Catholic to accept.
August 25th, 2011 | 4:45 pm | #11
RR,
I don’t know what to make of your assertion that you can simply replace my assumptions with yours. I have now argued twice, in two different formats, why that is not the case.
As it stands, I have a position for which I have presented an argument. You have an assertion supported only by “it strikes me that …”
You’ve been a reasonable interlocutor till now, so I don’t want to come to a false impression here, but if you ignore the relevant arguments you’re in no position to pronounce your position right and mine wrong, or that I haven’t laid a foundation for the Stage 2 arguments. If you ignore what I write, you’re in no position to say anything at all about it.
I think you probably intend to do better than that.
August 25th, 2011 | 5:00 pm | #12
Tom Gilson, I appreciate your generosity here. But perhaps you can help me even further. Consider these two propositions side by side:
(tA1): “The definition of marriage is expandable to include same-sex unions.”
(rA1): “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions.”
What (of necessity to the justification for opposing Prop. 8) is lost when we move from tA1 to rA1?
August 25th, 2011 | 7:32 pm | #13
Quick answer on my mobile: you add the word “legal,” as if the legal definition of marriage was equivalent to the definition of marriage. That is your assumption, the very one I’m trying to help you see as such. You assume that the definition of marriage is capable of being decided by law.
August 25th, 2011 | 8:45 pm | #14
For those who saw it before I edited it: my mobile phone changed the spelling of one of the words I apparently mistyped in my previous comment. It stood that way a little over an hour. It was either a humorous change or an embarrassing one, depending on one’s perspective. I’ve got to learn to watch out for that!
August 25th, 2011 | 10:16 pm | #15
One might more cautiously assume that the legal definition of marriage is just equivalent to the legal definition of marriage. I don’t see why someone who talks about the legal definition of marriage must be making any assumptions about other possible definitions, or even of whether or not there is something that is “the definition” of marriage, much less of whether any equivalency relation holds between such definitions.
Consider an analogue. The state of California has, I assume, a legal definition of assault. Californians can talk about that definition without assuming that other states should recognize it as “the definition” of assault. They can sensibly seek to clarify the state of California’s legal definition of assault while withholding judgment about its equivalency to any other definition of assault (whether that other definition be that of another state, that of Merriam Webster, that of Jesus, that of realm of platonic forms, etc.).
August 26th, 2011 | 7:23 am | #16
Do you still not see how everything you say depends in one way or another on one of the stated assumptions?
You are assuming now it is possible to speak of marriage as having no definition that is the definition of marriage. Of course it’s possible to talk about it that way. But in all of this you cannot escape concluding, or at least assuming, that Christian theism is wrong where it says there is a timeless and unchanging definition of marriage. You keep averting to alternative assumptions without even noticing that they’re in contradiction to a comprehensive doctrine reasonably held by many millions of people. Do you see that?
Or to put it another way, here’s how we could re-word your assumptions: “I don’t see why we couldn’t just assume that the Christians are wrong. Then we can move forward successfully to define liberty and justice on that basis. Thank whomever that in the process we’re not basing our decisions on any comprehensive doctrine that we couldn’t reasonably expect others to expect.”
August 26th, 2011 | 8:48 am | #17
I’m reluctant to enter this debate, since Tom and RR are both making good points, and I’m skeptical that I can add more than a marginal contribution. But I think that RR’s analogy, that we cannot force others to be Catholic, is fair. Let me expand, a little, on this.
We live in a pluralistic society, obviously. No one religion is considered, by the state, to be THE TRUE religion. Now, obviously, this in no way means that there is not a true religion (or no religion is true). But, since we cannot conclusively, to every rational individuals satisfaction, decipher which is the true faith, and, even if we could, respecting every one’s freedom would necessitate not forcing others to believe, we settle for letting each person make her own choice.
Similarly, the gay rights debate, cannot be settled, to the satisfaction of all rational people. Some, using respectable arguments, assert that, being gay/lesbian, is not a normal variant, but a disorder of a sort, with the corollary being that gay marriage cannot be allowed, because, by definition, it’s not a marriage at all. Only a man and a woman can get married, anything else cannot fit the definition of marriage.
Those on the other side, will say, homosexuality is not disordered, but is a normal variant. (I believe that this argument is ultimately more persuasive). And, that marriage is simply a union, between two consenting adults, who make a life long commitment, based on love.
Who’s right? One side is right, and one side is wrong. Will we convince everyone, that one side is correct? Not likely, to say the least.
So what compromise position, should we come to, then? Something similar to what we’ve done with religion.
We should allow individual choice. Those who believe that marriage is between a man and a woman, only, should be respected, namely, they should never be forced to accept, or be complicit in a gay/lesbian marriage. Any religion that, on the basis of its teachings, rejects gay marriages, should never be forced to accept them. Certainly, we don’t force Catholics, for example, to accept the validity of Mormon marriages, to view the Mormon conception of reality as “true”, and vice versa. And, each group cannot force the other to go their way. There’s the respect for each side’s right to believe and practice as it wishes, as long as it doesn’t infringe on others rights, to do the same.
So, allowing Gays/Lesbians to marry, is really the logical extention of the liberal/democratic experiment, that gave rise to the United States, and othe democratic republics. It doesn’t try to “settle” who’s right. It allows, pragmatically, each person to decide for herself.
August 26th, 2011 | 9:03 am | #18
Does individual choice extend to my choice to recognize no same-sex married couples as a wedding photographer, or as host of a bed-and-breakfast, or an employer? Does it extend to being given the respect that says I can have my opinion without being regarded as a hater, or as one who (as RR has implied) is violating others’ civil liberties? Will this be enforced by the same strength laws as the homosexual insurgents are trying to force upon us?
Bret, what you’re proposing here is hypocritical and unworkable unless individual choice is the standard for every decision of justice and liberty. Which it cannot be, unless you’ll grant me the above, and unless all others will too.
Nice idea, but impossible.
August 26th, 2011 | 9:34 am | #19
Hi Tom:
I understand your concerns. Some people on the pro gay marriage side (perhaps even many of them) toss the word “homophobia” around, in a rather promiscuous fashion, causing it to loose its original, genuine meaning: hatred of homosexuals. Disagreeing with gay marriage does not constitute “homophobia.”
Certainly you, Tom, and others here, do not hate homosexuals. And your basis for believing in marriage between a man and a woman only, is a principled one. One can disagree, but one must respect the rational arguments that you, and others provide.
Certainly, unfortunately, there will always be those who will not see the important nuances here: that one can be against gay marriage, ans still want the best for gay people, as you do, Tom, and others.
This should be seen as a disagreement, similar to Catholics disagreeing with Protestants, for example. to say Catholics are wrong,for example, in no way necessarily implies a hatred of Catholics, just a disagreement. Peaceful coexistence is possible, at least among rational people.
August 26th, 2011 | 9:34 am | #20
RR, so far it seems you’re not seeing that you have a set of assumptions that seem safe and uncontroversial to you, but which actually depend on a worldview which happens not to be shared by a large plurality of Americans. The interesting thing is how you have continued to suggest that these assumptions should be safe and uncontroversial in spite of my trying to show you otherwise. It may be I’m not communicating as clearly as I should be. I don’t mind it if someone tells me they can’t understand what I’m writing. But I wonder if it’s really this, quoting from my original post:
The fact is, RR, many of us do not share these assumptions, implicitly or otherwise. They only make sense from within a particular kind of worldview, and that kind of worldview is not universally shared.
August 26th, 2011 | 9:36 am | #21
Thank you, Bret. Now to the key question: are we going to enforce this ideal with the same strength laws that the homosexual insurgents are trying to force on the rest of us? Obviously not; it can’t be done, while gay “marriage” is on the social or the legal radar screen. (Much of what you’re saying here shouldn’t be enforced in any case.)
Without enforcement, then you’re only saying pretty words. There will be no protection of individual choice in the conservative marriage tradition, and your whole hope of protecting justice through individual choice will be nothing but an empty dream.
August 26th, 2011 | 11:37 am | #22
RR, earlier (#15), you wrote:
The clarity of a definition is rather irrelevant, compared to the accuracy of the definition. What if, for instance, the state of California’s legal definition of assault were “the willful act of pouring ketchup on scrambled eggs”, while the state of Oregon’s legal definition of assault were “the willful act of causing bodily injury to another person”. These definitions seem equally clear to me. Is one more clear than the other? Does it matter? Suppose some group proposed changing California’s legal definition to “the willful act of pouring ketchup on scrambled eggs or bacon“. Does the proposed change clarify the legal definition of assault? Maybe (your writings give me the impression that you think so). Does this clarification constitute an improvement over the old definition?
The far more important question is, are California’s and Oregon’s definitions equally correct (or, if you prefer, are they equally useful in preserving a just society)? Answering this question obviously requires a measuring stick. You might argue that reasonable people will agree on the Oregon’s definition over California’s. Fine, but why would they agree? Their agreement is not some bare fact, or an outcome of Newtonian mechanics. Reasonable people agree on Oregon’s definition because they use reason to evaluate the two legal definitions of assault against some more fundamental definition of what assault actually is, independent of any judicial authority.
In short, one cannot pretend to use any criterion of “reasonableness” while ignoring that the basis of reasonableness is not opinion, but reason. By definition, something cannot be accepted by “reasonable” people without being rationally evaluated, and rational evaluation presupposes the existence of some absolute standard against which to evaluate the thing in question.
August 26th, 2011 | 12:07 pm | #23
Come to think of it, RR, I’m really quite interested in the language you’ve used about legal definitions. To quote your first comment:
I’m trying to understand what you mean by “more determinate”, in this instance. Can you compare two definitions (of marriage, preferably) and explain which one is more determinate, and why? Does “more determinate” simply mean “less prone to ambiguity and misunderstanding”, or does it mean “more specific, as opposed to more general”?
August 26th, 2011 | 2:03 pm | #24
I noted earlier that when Californian’s try to clarify or amend the legal definition of ‘assault’, they need not make any assumptions about equivalencies to other definitions of ‘assault’—whether those other definitions be definitions of other states, Merriam Webster, Moses, Jesus, the realm of platonic forms, or the Kung Fu studio across town. This fact continues to be true, even if some of those who are trying to amend or block the amendment happen to have deeply religiously or philosophically motivated beliefs about the nature of definitions. That is, even if some people happen to think that there is one true definition of “assault” (perhaps in the platonic realm, or in the mind of God), most others will not share that belief. More relevantly, that judgment about the existence of the one true definition is a judgment about which other people can typically simply withhold judgment, even as they present their case for why the legal definition of ‘assault’ should be amended. As far as I can see, there is no necessary conflict between (a) thinking that a justifiable case can be made for amending the state of California’s legal definition of ‘assault,’ and (b) withholding judgment regarding the claim that there is some single true definition of ‘assault’ (in the platonic realm, or the in the mind of God).
Because this seems to be such a sticking point, I will pause here. If someone disagrees, then they should more carefully try to articulate the supposed necessary conflict just described, the necessity of which I have not been able to see nor imagine.
August 26th, 2011 | 3:37 pm | #25
RR, you wrote:
I have yet to see you give an actual argument to back up that final assertion. I strenuously disagree with it, by the way. I think everyone who debates the legal definition of assault or marriage must involve the idea of the “true” definition, either by rejecting its existence (usually as an unstated assumption, as many SSM proponents do), or by affirming a particular definition (as proponents of traditional marriage do). One cannot simply remain neutral, nor is there any common-ground position that presupposes nothing about the “true” definition (including its existence). Do you disagree? Can you articulate such a common-ground position, with respect to either marriage or assault?
I strenuously disagree with this statement, as well. I actually do think that the vast majority of people share the belief that there is one true definition of “assault”. They will disagree about what it is, but not about its existence. These days, perhaps not such a vast majority would agree that there is one true definition of marriage, but I do think these people would be at least a near-majority in America, and a majority around the world.
From my point of view, it is obvious that there is an inherent conflict between (a) and (b), but I will try to draw it out.
Presumably, the goal of amending California’s definition of assault is to come up with a better definition than the one we started with. Do you agree with this statement? If so, then how is one supposed to determine whether an amended definition is better than the original one? What metric do you propose, in order to compare the definitions and decide between them?
I think answering these questions is vital, because you need to show that you can give some metric that does not assume anything about the “true” definition (including its existence or non-existence).
August 26th, 2011 | 3:51 pm | #26
RR,
Before I respond to your latest, I would like you to respond more directly to these earlier statements of mine, taking into account their original contexts, of course:
and
August 26th, 2011 | 3:56 pm | #27
BTW: I’m in the path of Hurricane Irene. I’d appreciate everyone’s prayers for all of us on the east coast. Where I live we’re expecting tropical storm-force winds, with a small chance of winds higher than that. At some time tonight or maybe tomorrow, we’ll probably lose power here and I’ll be out of these discussions for a while.
August 26th, 2011 | 3:59 pm | #28
Bill R.,
I confess that I find your point of view difficult to understand. Do you assume that there is one “true definition” of words like “chair,” “game,” “ain’t,” ‘into”, “E-waste,” “lower middle-class”? If so, what is such a definition like, where does it exist, and how are we supposed to discover it? Are such definitions the sort of things that subject to change (or to coming in and out of existence), or have they existed for all time in a state of eternal perfection? If they can change, then what can cause one of these “true definitions” to change?
August 26th, 2011 | 4:19 pm | #29
Tom Gilson, your initial paraphrase is defective insofar as there is a difference between (a) offering a justification that one can reasonably expect a Christian to accept, and (b) just assuming that Christians are wrong.
If you want to show that, in this particular case, the justification for Prop. 8 requires assuming the negation of some Christian belief that is essential to a reasonable comprehensive (Christian) doctrine, that’s something you have to argue for. While you have attempted to make this argument, it appears that your argument depends on a denial of the point I make in comment #24. You should either clarify why this is not the case (i.e., why you can accept the main point I make in #24), or you should provide a carefully articulated argument for denying that point.
As for you second comment, it is irrelevant unless you can show that the two assumptions you refer to are indeed necessary to the justification of opposing Prop. 8. But, as far as I can see, you’ve still not made good on the task of providing that demonstration. If I follow the dialectic correctly, this is what the “sticking point” in comment #24 is all about.
August 26th, 2011 | 4:21 pm | #30
And best wishes through this hurricane.
August 26th, 2011 | 4:24 pm | #31
RR:
You are indeed having trouble finding other points of view difficult to understand. That’s quite apparent. You also have concerns about the assumptions Bill might hold.
Now, do you see that you are proving the point I’ve been trying to make all along here? People have differing assumptions. They come out of differing worldviews.
Bill:
You could explain and defend your position to RR. I’ve seen you do it elsewhere and I know you are competent for the task. Before you do that, though, I’d like to suggest you consider this. RR’s point from the beginning has been that civil liberties are violated if one’s freedoms are legally restricted by law according to a principle to which reasonable persons cannot agree. (That comes in various versions, but that’s one of them.) That is the thesis RR has tried to defend. Now he is trying to shift the burden and persuade you to defend a thesis of your own. That’s called changing the subject. It’s not a fallacy, it’s not evil or mean, but it is what it is, and it could serve to deflect the discussion such that RR would no longer have to try to defend his thesis. So I’m going to suggest you not worry about defending your position until he has defended his, or shown why his attack on your thesis contributes to a defense of his own.
But I don’t think an attack on your thesis actually does contribute to a defense of his own. I can think of a way he might try to make it work, but it would be tough. And meanwhile I have a question for him that he hasn’t answered yet.
August 26th, 2011 | 4:34 pm | #32
Thank you for answering and for the best wishes, RR.
I’m afraid I don’t follow your “sticking point” well enough myself to see how it makes any difference. Granted, some people don’t think there is a true definition of marriage. Many of us do. The difference between the two groups is a fundamental, deep divide in our worldviews, our comprehensive doctrines. Maybe I am misunderstanding you, but it seems to me that either you find yourself incredulous that anyone could think as we do, or you think that we hold such a minority position that “most others will not share that belief.” Neither one of those is an argument against th reasonability of our position.
Anyway the question, I remind you, is not who is right and who is wrong. You said so yourself in the previous thread, with respect to papal infallibility. The question is whether civil liberties can be properly determined on the basis of a test of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. My point is that reasonably held comprehensive doctrines can lead to opposite conclusions on SSM. (Though obviously I am convinced the reasoning on our side is considerably stronger, obviously.)
Therefore your statement,
… stands unsupported.
August 26th, 2011 | 4:47 pm | #33
Yes, this is a misunderstanding Tom. If you like, we can grant (just for the sake of argument) that this is a popular view about “definitions” (maybe, e.g., there are some such widespread views about the ontology of definitions, views which are rarely made explicit, defended, or even examined). The relevant questions, rather, are twofold: (1) whether the denial of such views is necessary to the justification for opposing Prop. 8, and (2) whether these views are in any sense essential to a reasonable comprehensive (Christian) doctrine.
The analogy in #24 is intended to help us address the first of these questions (and to help me to better understand where you are coming from). By addressing yourself to this analogy (and the challenge I pose there), we also have a good chance of laying some groundwork for thinking about the second relevant question (assuming it would still be relevant).
August 26th, 2011 | 6:16 pm | #34
I want to make sure I don’t head in the wrong direction from here, RR. There are a couple things I can think of you might have in mind by “such views” (either what you wrote write here, or some of the earlier conversation you have referenced here). Could you spell it out for us, please? Thanks.
August 26th, 2011 | 6:32 pm | #35
By the way, I’m not quite ready to “grant for the sake of argument that this is a popular view about ‘definitions.”" It’s not about words and definitions; it’s about the realities of male/female, of family, and of course of marriage. My belief (and the belief of many) is that there are such realities, regardless of language.
August 26th, 2011 | 7:32 pm | #36
By “such views” I mean these: the views which you have claimed to be necessarily (and problematically, in terms of the liberal ideal) denied by rA1 and rA2 (or, denied in my suggestion that tA1,tA2 are replaceable by rA1,rA2 in justifying opposition to Prop.8).
August 26th, 2011 | 9:28 pm | #37
Hi Tom,
Thanks for your confidence, and your advice. I do think I will hold off on defending my thesis about definitions for now, because I do not want to interrupt you and RR in the middle of your conversation (which I am following with interest).
My wife and I are in the middle of a study on prayer, and in the session we just finished, we meditated on God’s title of Jehovah Jira (provider) — how he provides for His children (and for those who do not even consider themselves His children), and how he delights in providing. So we prayed that He would abundantly provide for those on the East coast: shelter, running water, food, electricity, safety, and communication. I included you and your family in the prayer. I don’t know where you guys are, but we’re up in Boston, so we’re expecting the storm late Saturday or Sunday.
Hi RR,
As I said to Tom, I will refrain from what probably would have been an excessively long post defending my views about definitions, because I don’t want to derail the prior discussion between you and Tom about your thesis. I will be following with interest. Maybe, if there’s time later, we can return to our conversation.
Blessings to both of you,
Bill
August 26th, 2011 | 9:39 pm | #38
You all should really read T.M. Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other. I think it’s the best explanation of the reasonability standard as a guide for ethics.
August 26th, 2011 | 10:12 pm | #39
I second Nikolai Volk’s recommendation. I think the author’s views on the nature and the epistemology of reasons is quite compelling. I’d endorse a broadly Scanlonian answer to Bill R’s concerns about how reasonable people often “use reason” to evaluate claims without appealing to “fundamental definition.”
August 26th, 2011 | 10:49 pm | #40
This has become more than complex. It’s going to take some work to sort out all the negatives. I’ll start with the quotes, and try to rearrange them in successive passes. Now, it’s the end of a long day filled with fun stuff like tying things down, raising books off bottom shelves in case of flooding and taping windows. That’s my transparent preemptive grab at some sympathy in case I’ve confused a contraction with a contrariety or whatever here. :)
So anyway, I’m going to try to re-state your question. You might find it entertaining. Be assured I’m not implying any criticism by taking this drawn-out approach, I’m just trying to get to the question. I’ll begin with your actual words, and then continue through multiple passes at trying to arrive at an equivalent statement that has a more apparent sort of answer.
You wrote,
The relevant questions, rather, are twofold: (1) whether the denial of such views is necessary to the justification for opposing Prop. 8, and (2) whether these views are in any sense essential to a reasonable comprehensive (Christian) doctrine.
… where “such views” refers to “the views which [Tom has] claimed to be necessarily (and problematically, in terms of the liberal ideal) denied by rA1 and rA2.”
First pass at expanding and re-ordering, deleting the parenthesis for simplicity:
Is it necessary, for the purpose of justifying opposing proposition 8, to deny the views which Tom has claimed to be necessarily denied by rA1 and rA2?
Second pass, looking at rA1 only:
Is it necessary, for the purpose of justifying support for SSM, to deny the views denied by:
(rA1): “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions.”
Third pass:
Is it rationally possible to justify offering legal support for SSM without denying the views denied in, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
Excursus:
“The views denied in, ‘The legal definition of “marriage” can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions’”?
is more or less equivalent (close enough, I hope) to
The denial of, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
which in turn is equivalent to
“The legal definition of ‘marriage’ cannot, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions”
Fourth pass:
Is it rationally possible to justify offering legal support for SSM without denying that, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ cannot, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
Almost there. Fifth pass:
Is it rationally impossible to justify offering legal support for SSM while affirming that, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ cannot, for policy purposes, be made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
Finally, as Bill R. has pointed out, the word “determinate” is a strange one to use in this context. I’m going to take the liberty of dropping it.
Is it rationally impossible to justify offering legal support for SSM while affirming that, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ cannot, for policy purposes, be altered so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
Which is logically equivalent to,
Is it rationally impossible to justify offering legal support for SSM while denying that, “The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be altered so as to encompass some same-sex unions”?
Was that your question? If so, the answer is yes.
If that wasn’t your question, at least credit me for trying to figure out what it was you were trying to ask, and please take the opportunity to tell me what you really wanted to know. I think I’ll just go ahead and ask you to do that for rA2, too, rather than repeating this kind of exercise.
Your second relevant question seems moot to me. The biblical view of marriage, male/female, and family is a central feature of Christian doctrine for a large portion of Christianity. We regard it as central, core, and foundational. It is necessary just because it is central, core, and foundational. Some might disagree. That wouldn’t change the fact that it is a central, core, and foundational aspect of a certain comprehensive doctrine held by a large number of people.
August 26th, 2011 | 11:13 pm | #41
Tom, your re-statement goes awry at “Second-pass.” Before trying sorting out any further confusions, let’s just restate the issue.
You have claimed that certain important Christian views are necessary denied by rA1 and rA2 (or, denied in my suggestion that tA1,tA2 are replaceable by rA1,rA2 in justifying opposition to Prop.8). Call these views: “the supposedly important Christian beliefs.”
Step 1: Clearly restate these supposedly important Christian beliefs.
Step 2: Clearly answer this question: Precisely how are these supposedly important Christian beliefs denied by rA1 and rA2? (Or, how are they denied in my suggestion that tA1,tA2 are replaceable by rA1,rA2 in justifying opposition to Prop.8?)
Tom, if you take just these two steps, I think we’ll have the solid footing we need in order to proceed.
August 26th, 2011 | 11:22 pm | #42
The important Christian beliefs are that marriage, male/female, and (in certain contexts) have timeless meanings, in view of the fact that they were designed by the God who created us.
Your rA1 and rA2 are,
These are suggestions that the meaning of marriage is subject to human alteration. On the Christian view, you end up with something that is called marriage but is not that. rA1 and rA2 depend on a worldview that says that this Christian-based view is false and/or irrelevant; they affirm instead a worldview in which marriage, male/female, etc. are subject to human definition and design. This is clearly in contradiction to historic Christian teachings on the matter.
I could go into more detail on the implications of all that—it’s not merely a semantic matter, when it involved God’s basic design for humans—but I’ll call it a night instead.
August 26th, 2011 | 11:22 pm | #43
I don’t think I said anything just now that I didn’t say in the original post, by the way.
August 26th, 2011 | 11:59 pm | #44
Let us suppose that, for policy purposes, the legal definition of ‘marriage’ is, through legislation, made more determinate so as to encompass some same-sex unions. (Tom, you may think that this change is a mistake, but do you really want to claim that such a change is impossible?)
After this supposed change, someone could acknowledge the change in legal definition and yet still consistently affirm that God designed marriage to be between a man and a woman, and that his intentions are timeless. (This, I suppose, would be Tom’s own position, were the supposed legal change to occur.)
In other words, in this hypothetical scenario, someone can consistently acknowledge the fact that the legal definition of ‘marriage’ has changed so as to encompass same-sex unions, and that God’s “definition” remains timeless, precluding same-sex unions.
If such consistency is possible, then it is possible for a person to assume rA1 and rA2 without denying the supposedly important Christian beliefs (i.e., the belief that marriage, as defined by God, is necessarily a mixed-sex affair).
The person, therefore, who assumes rA1 and rA2 need only assume that the legal definition of ‘marriage’ is subject to human manipulation (as we will all observe, should these changes take occur). That same person can, all-the-while, affirm that God’s definition is timeless and unchangeable (she can also simply be undecided about such theological things).
The conclusion is therefore obvious: rA1 and rA2 do not necessitate the denial of the “supposedly important Christian beliefs.”
August 27th, 2011 | 4:16 am | #45
Let’s all pray and hope for the safety of everyone caught up in the hurricane. I’m lucky, being in Utah. Everyone, please be safe.
August 27th, 2011 | 7:17 am | #46
What does “more determinate” mean, RR? Hasn’t it already been determinate as it could be, for generations upon generations?
August 27th, 2011 | 10:11 am | #47
Hold on, I’m sorry, I know I said that I would step back, but I’m just a little surprised at RR’s latest post, and I have to ask a couple questions.
RR, do you really mean to say that you are merely arguing that (essentially) “it is logically possible to change some words in a law, even though some people would disagree with that change”?
If that’s what you’re saying, then I agree that it’s blindingly obvious, but it’s also completely irrelevant. You could just as easily say, “It is logically possible to change the law so that African Americans cannot vote, while not denying the supposedly important belief that people of all races have equal worth”. Does this change of voting law “necessitate a denial of the supposedly important belief in equality”? Logically: no. Morally: yes. It’s the same with rA1 and rA2, in relation to important Christian beliefs: rA1 and rA2 don’t logically deny any Christian belief, but acting on rA1 and rA2 absolutely does constitute a moral denial of core Christian beliefs.
I had assumed all along that this discussion was not about what can be done (in the sense of logical possibility), but what should be done. Presumably, you want to convince us Christians, not only that the words of marriage law can change, but that we should support a change in marriage law, even though we disagree with that change. Is that correct?
August 27th, 2011 | 1:07 pm | #48
Bill R, Here are the relevant statements (the ones we’ve been calling “rA1, rA2″):
The “can” in both cases, encompasses more than mere logical possibility (most logicians would say that it is logically possible for me to learn all the worlds languages, but this is certainly not something I can do, in the relevant sense of “can”). It would also, however, be a mistake to interchange the “can” in either place with “should,” as you seem to have been inclined. The “can” here is rather intended in the most ordinary of senses. In this most ordinary of senses, Californians can change their legal definition of ‘marriage’ whether or not they should, but it’s not the case that they can change Arizona’s legal definition of ‘marriage,’ even though it might be logically possible for them to do so. As you might notice in this last example, the ‘can’ may be allowed some normative content (a sort of legal normativity). This should clarify: Californian’s legally cannot change the the laws of Arizona, even though they might be able to by overwhelming coercive force.
Tom Gilson, just as the legal definition of “assault” can be made more determinate (or clarified), so also can the laws concerning marriage (often by implication, I suppose, this change in law would render more determinate “the legal definition” of marriage).
Bill R., notice the sense of “could” of Tom Gilson’s last question. It would be very odd to interpret this “could” as a “should.” (But perhaps now you better understand my astonishment at the opposition, from #15 on.) Since rA1 and rA2 are the center of Tom Gilson’s objections, perhaps we should also ask him to clarify the modal words (and especially what he meant by them in tA1 and tA2)
Also (to Bill R), to understand what I am trying to do here (the present task), read #41, and then learn about the relevance of rA1 and rA2 from the earlier parts of this thread. I appreciate your participation in this conversation and I hope it continues–particularly whenever you see potential miscommunication, as in the present case.
August 27th, 2011 | 2:17 pm | #49
I’m still confused as to why you would say that the laws concerning marriage could possibly be more determinate than they are. What on earth is unclear about the way they’ve been for generations now? You haven’t answered that after a couple of requests, one from Bill and one from me. It leaves me wondering why you wouldn’t just say the laws could be altered. What additional information does “more determinate” add to the statement, and why is it important to include it?
I’ll come back and respond to the rest of this later, weather permitting.
August 27th, 2011 | 2:44 pm | #50
“alter,” “amend”, “change”, “clarify”, “make more determinate”–the choice of words does not strike me as extremely important for present purposes. I sometimes use the phrase “make more determinate” simply because the relevant amendment of the law clarifies the limits of the law rather than changes those limits.
“Determinate” simply means “having defined limits”; therefore, to say that a law is made “more determinate” is simply to say that the limits of the law are made more defined.
Consider this legal definition of ‘marriage’: ‘a personal relation arising out of civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary.’ This legal definition can be made more determinate on a variety of dimensions. It could, for example, limit what is meant by ‘parties capable of making that contract’ in terms of specific ages, genders, etc. Whether or not these limits are made to be more or less expansive (than, e.g., the common interpretation, or other alternatives) the effect is to make the law more determinate.
August 27th, 2011 | 3:27 pm | #51
I can also offer these substitutes:
rA1.1,rA2.1: (1) The legal definition of ‘marriage’ can, for policy purposes, be amended so as to explicitly encompass some same-sex unions. (2) This amendment of the legal definition can be accomplished by amending the laws governing marriage policy.
The relevant terms in my previous illustrations, arguments, conclusions etc. can be similarly changed. (I offer this as a way to sidestep what is in all likelihood a distracting dispute over matters I regard as inconsequential to my main contentions.) As much as possible, let’s try not to sweat the small stuff.
August 27th, 2011 | 4:08 pm | #52
Remember, RR, that you wrote,
There is indeed a sense of normativity there. Obviously humans can change laws. I don’t know why that became the center of the question, or why you thought I thought it was. This came up in context of the justice of laws. My point all along has been that your conception of injustice in the making and enforcement of marriage laws is based on your worldview. From the point of view of another worldview, that of historic Christianity, there is no restriction of freedom under historic law. I’m going to copy the relevant paragraph from my original post in here:
August 27th, 2011 | 4:39 pm | #53
Yes, Tom, the liberal ideal of civility is certainly a normative claim. You claim that this ideal is inconsistent with opposition to Prop 8. To argue for this claim, you say that justifications for such opposition necessarily involve two assumptions which one can’t reasonably expect others to accept. These assumptions, you say, are these:
To clarify your point here in light of my discussion with Bill R., I think you should clarify the modal force of “expandable” and “can” in tA1, tA2.
This modal force should be consistent with your other terms “not susceptible,” “impossible,” “possibly” (from the passage wherein you just quoted yourself). It is only natural to interpret that modal force in these terms as similar to the force of “cannot” in your example: we cannot all do slam-dunks like LeBron James.
August 27th, 2011 | 4:58 pm | #54
That is how I intended it to be interpreted. The Christian position would be the denial of tA1 and tA2, viz,
tA1C: The definition of marriage is not expandable to include same-sex unions.
tA2C follows, of course: if the definition of marriage is not expandable, then it is not expandable through law.
What this means is that marriage is what it is, timelessly. Suppose we changed the legal definition of “marriage.” We would not have changed the meaning of marriage. We would have created something other than marriage and incorrectly applied the name “marriage” to it. That is the modal force I have intended.
Now please regard this in light of your statement that “restrictive” marriage laws produce injustices by preventing some couples from marrying. By tA1C, and by the logic of what I have written previously, that is just not the case, for it is not marriage laws that are doing the restricting. It is the nature of marriage that it is restricted, and it is so independently of any legal doctrine.
At the risk of redundancy, I will repeat that the purpose of this whole argument is to show that there is at least one comprehensive worldview under which this is false:
And it follows that if we apply this principle of yours to the marriage question:
that public policy decisions supporting gay “marriage” cannot be justified in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept.
August 27th, 2011 | 6:46 pm | #55
Three comments for Tom; one for Bill R.
(1)
Let’s call this Tom’s 1st Complaint:
We could, I think, restate this complaint in terms I think everyone can be reasonably expected to accept:
Tom’s 1st Complaint revised:
(2) I don’t know what you are referring to by “your statement that ‘restrictive’ marriages…” Did I really make such a statement? (Not that I necessarily disagree; it’s just that I don’t remember making it. And it strikes me as leaping too far ahead of where we’re at in our discussion.)
(3) Your “And it follows” claim towards the end either begs the question or it overlooks the distinction made in comment #7.
Bill R. I assume that Tom’s initial “That is how I intended it to be interpreted” statement (in response to the LeBron James example I cite) clarifies the intended force of his modal words. (And to your surprise, I expect.)
August 27th, 2011 | 7:37 pm | #56
RR, yes, you did make such a statement. You wrote, and I am now quoting for the fifth time in this thread,
Are you suggesting that does not mean, “that ‘restrictive’ marriage laws produce injustices by preventing some couples from marrying”? I mean, sure there’s a conditional clause in there that I did not repeat in my most recent reference to this statement, but surely this is the conclusion you intended us to draw, isn’t it? Or are you drawing some fine distinction between injustices and violations of civil liberty?
August 27th, 2011 | 7:54 pm | #57
Further, you wrote:
What is your assessment of the situation this then would lead to? How would you evaluate it in terms of your own standards of civil liberty?
August 27th, 2011 | 9:13 pm | #58
Tom, let’s finish these line of thought before we start others (i.e., we can take up your #57 question later). And the heavily loaded antecedent of the conditional statement you cited is rather important!
The revision of Tom’s 1st Complaint is intended to distinguish what would be necessarily involved in a justification for opposing Prop. 8 from what wouldn’t be. In other words, a justification for opposing Prop. 8 does not depend on actually denying the existence of God’s ideal for marriage. We could, however, rather say that such a justification denies that the revised version of Tom’s 1st Complaint is decisive. But that’s a rather different denial, isn’t it? It’s far from obvious that the latter denial is one which we couldn’t reasonably expect others to accept. (But that, as I say, is something we can consider later, after we sort out all this confusion on what is and what is not entailed in any justification for opposing Prop. 8.)
August 28th, 2011 | 2:33 am | #59
After all these clarifications, let’s try to finish off what has been the main line of questioning from comment #1 until now.
This main line of questioning concerns Tom’s claim that there is a set of assumptions (call them “the necessary and illicit assumptions”) that both (a) are necessary to justifying opposition to Prop. 8, and (b) entail a denial of some very important Christian belief(s).
Tom identifies these supposedly very important Christian beliefs:
What, then, are the necessary and illicit assumptions? Tom first identified them as follows:
The problem for Tom, however, is that these assumptions appear to be replaceable by these variants:
As replaceable, tA1 and tA2 are not necessary for justifying opposition to Prop. 8. Since, moreover, the replacements have been shown not to entail the denials of the supposedly important Christian beliefs (see #44), we have successfully undermined Tom’s claim to have identified any necessary and illicit assumptions. In so doing, we have undermined Tom’s argument that the justification for opposing Prop. 8 necessarily entails a denial of some very important Christian beliefs.
This as I say, represents the main line of questioning, and, as far as I can tell, its conclusion. I’ll now pause to give Tom time for objections. If he has objections, I would hope that he can make them with specific reference to what I have here presented.
August 28th, 2011 | 2:42 am | #60
Typo alert: the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph should read: “In so doing, we have undermined Tom’s argument that the justification for opposing Prop. 8 necessarily entails a denial of some very important Christian beliefs.”
August 28th, 2011 | 6:10 am | #61
Thank you for that clarification, RR, and to finish it off I have edited your comment #59 to correct that typo. I’ll be back shortly with an answer.
August 28th, 2011 | 8:17 am | #62
RR, I’m going to switch tracks somewhat by including one more assumption, as you’ll see below. It, too, is part of many Christians’ belief set. I’ll get there momentarily.
You say that tA1 and tA2 are replaceable, that they are “not necessary” for justifying opposition to Prop. 8. Let’s make sure we’re not confusing two senses of “justify” now. We have been speaking of the conditions under which civil liberties may be violated. We could have it in mind that some law or policy is justified if it violates no civil liberties (is “just” in that sense of the term), and we could also say that anyone who advocated a just law (in that sense) is justified in doing so.
But “justified” can also refer to “rationally justified,” as in, “exhibiting sound reasoning issuing from good evidence or true premises (or at least justifiable premises).” I hate to put “justifiable” in the definition, but realistically, often we have to go with our best judgment. Policy and law often rest on premises that cannot be proven. TARP was justified on grounds that a government bail-out would rescue significant portions of the U.S. economy from massive failure, and this would be good for the economy as a whole. That may or may not have been a true premise, but it was justifiable in the minds of many, and it was (part of) TARP’s justification.
It will simplify things if I distinguish these two senses of “justification.” I will use “civil justification” and “rational justification” for the purpose. I think it’s clear that no policy or law L could be civilly justified if it is not rationally justifiable. That would be tantamount to saying that we can count on L being good for the people, even though we have no grounds for supposing that L is a good idea.
Therefore I take it that persons who would advocate for some law L would have settled in their own minds that L is rationally justified (or justifiable, I’ll use the two interchangeably) on some grounds G. In the absence or contradiction of G, these advocates would have no justification for their advocacy.
Now, your assumptions rA… can be generalized to read:
This is uncontroversial for any X that has a legal definition. All it takes to change X’s legal definition is enough political wherewithal. Of course there’s only the barest and most trivial kind of justification in that, but I don’t think you were claiming there was in your rA assumptions, so no problem there.
But if some person or group (I’ll call them AG for advocacy group) were to advocate for changing X’s legal definition, the obvious question would be “why?” AG would certainly answer according to some grounds G; thus G would be AG’s rational justification for changing X’s legal definition. And clearly AG must hold the belief that G is true, and the negation of G is false. AG’s belief regarding G is necessary to AG’s advocacy.
So we have another necessary assumption:
(We both know that there are advocacy groups who conduct their politics for self-interest, and that therefore C2 is not always true, practically speaking. Unscrupulous persons advocate for change, knowing that the only “rational” justification is that it lines their pockets. But since we’re talking about the pursuit of civil justice, we can stipulate that AG is actually motivated by G. If not, then we need go no further: AG is acting unjustly, and the change in X’s legal definition is a bad idea on multiple grounds. The converse applies to AG’s political opponents, of course.)
And this brings us to some revised assumptions. If C1 and C2 are true, then we can count on its being true that opponents of Prop. 8 believe there is rational justification for their position, based in some grounds G, and that any negation of G (~G) is false. Now here is one example of a two-part negation of G:
How does this apply to Proposition 8? Let’s look at the original language:
Opposition to the Proposition began when it was at that point. There was a change in Prop. 8′s language before it went to the polls, but the above language was what opponents opposed. Now it seems obvious that opponents to Prop. 8 could justify their position rationally only by denying ~G1 or ~G2, or both. They must assume that that there is no timeless, transcendent, God-given truth that limits marriage to man and woman, or they must assume that the purpose of the legal definitions is not to reflect any such truth even if there is one. Both of these impinge on historic Christian belief.
Their denials are denials of a reasonably held comprehensive doctrine. I hope you can see this, where you did not agree with me concerning tA1 and tA2. Maybe we have accomplished (finally) the first step toward an agreed understanding.
As I close, I want to refer back to tA1 and tA2. Am I starting over again with different assumptions, and discarding the originals? For practical purposes, I think ~G1 and ~G2 will be more productive in our discussion. I could tie them to aT1 and aT2, and show that the differences between them are not so great as they might appear, but it’s not worthwhile. ~G1 and ~G2 are better in this context. I see them as the fruit of a productive discourse.
August 28th, 2011 | 8:21 am | #63
Let me add this, too. I was going to place it at the end of that last long comment but I did not want to bury it that way. This has been by far the most enjoyable and productively-conducted debate I’ve ever had with someone on this topic. Thank you!
August 28th, 2011 | 3:18 pm | #64
Tom, I appreciate your last comment and your congenial approach to our discussion. I believe that this is in fact what makes the debate enjoyable and productive.
Let me respond to comment #62 in two parts, beginning with response to “~G2″, which I identify as the significant component of the new track you’ve switched us to. (In the second part, I’ll address the idea of justification and its clarification.)
On the idea that “Legal definitions should attempt to reflect what is true.”
Instead of “legal definitions,” it will be more helpful to think of this issue in relation to state laws (it’s ultimately laws that are at issues in matters of legal definitions; deprived of their relation to laws and their interpretation, I think we largely disregard legal definitions).
So let’s consider this proposition:
More safely we might rather say this: state laws should attempt to be consistent with what is recognized by all as true (and with special concern for those who would be coerced by the laws).
Let me explain. If there is some truth (perhaps even an obviously irrelevant one) that is only known by a lonely man in northern Finland, it shouldn’t be a criterion of legitimacy for a state law of California to attempt to “reflect” that truth. At least for legitimacy, weaker standards would probably suffice.
Alternatively (and more substantively), we might say that, while laws should attempt to reflect what is true, this is not the only thing that they should attempt to do—and nor is it the most important thing. For laws (as opposed to purely theoretical propositions) the foremost consideration is legitimacy, not the illumination of the truth. As such, more important than the attempt to “reflect the truth” in law, is the attempt to construct laws that are justifiable in terms which those coerced by them can be reasonably expected to accept (particularly when these laws touch basic matters of justice).
August 28th, 2011 | 4:31 pm | #65
I said that opposition to Prop. 8 depends for its rational justification on denying either ~G1 or ~G2 or both. You are suggesting, or at least working toward suggesting, that rational justification might be found in an alteration (denial, that is) of ~G2. You have provided an illustration of my point. Two illustrations, actually: one in your ~G2.1, and another in your final paragraph. Thank you.
If you think the lonely man in Finland is an appropriate analogy to millions of Christians holding ~G2 as part of our core belief structure, please explain.
August 28th, 2011 | 6:39 pm | #66
The example of the lonely man in Finland, of course, is only meant explain why ~G2.1, as such, is highly deniable, and (as a separate point) that it would be implausible to think ~G2.1 is an essential part of any reasonable, comprehensive (Christian) doctrine. The example illustrates a rather obvious reason for why we would want to amend ~G2.1 in order to make it more plausible.
When, however, we modify ~G2.1 as suggested (or when we clarify its function so as to make it more plausible as a criterion, as alternatively suggested), then its denial is no longer essential in justifying opposition to Prop. 8. Furthermore, any affirmation of the modified/reinterpreted ~G2.1 would also not lead opponents of Prop. 8 into a denial of any very important Christian beliefs (e.g., ~G1). As such, ~G.2.1 does not serve Tom’s purposes. That is, it does not convincingly help us to identify an assumption that is necessarily and illicitly denied in justifying one’s opposition to Prop. 8.
–
Now, at risk of sidetracking us from this key point, here’s the promised clarification of the operative notion of justification. Please skip the rest of this comment if the issue does not strike you as problematic; the ideas here are somewhat tangential to main issue of our “new track”.
First, remember my brief comment in the earlier thread.
But more explanation may be in order, with respect to Tom’s remarks on the topic in #62.
What I’ve been calling the liberal ideal of civility applies to the policy questions in which these very notions of “civil liberties” and “just law”—and their boundaries—are at issue. That’s certainly not to say that our notions of civil liberties and just law shouldn’t be appealed to in offering the relevant justifications (indeed, our shared views about these notions of liberty and justice can be expected to comprise highly significant premises in any of the relevant justifications). It’s rather just to say that these justifications often won’t simply be the obvious definitional consequences of such notions.
The sense of “justified” I have in mind certainly involves the idea of “exhibiting sound reasoning issuing from good evidences or true premises.” The idea, of course, would be that the main underlying inferences, evidences, and premises would (a) be offered in good faith (the person offering them needs to believe that the justification they comprise is sound), and (b) be such that one can reasonably expect the relevant others to accept them (so, the underlying inferences, evidences, and premises shouldn’t flatly contradict any very important belief of the reasonable comprehensive doctrine to which the relevant audience subscribes).
August 28th, 2011 | 10:23 pm | #67
RR, you offered your lonely man in Finland to protect us from “some truth (perhaps even an obviously irrelevant one) that is only known by a lonely man in northern Finland.” Then you say that this showed that ~G2.1 was a bad criterion. Fine. It’s a bad criterion. But what about ~G2, which has nothing in it about irrelevant barely-known truths? Look at both halves of it and see if you still think it’s that unreasonable:
The lonely man in Finland is completely irrelevant to that.
What I find amusing here is the method by which you have attempted to defeat this point. You offered no reason to accept ~G2.1 in place of ~G2 except the not-terribly-persuasive, “it will be more helpful.” Then you offer a rebuttal of your own ~G2.1. Oh, and you also said that ~G2 is not the only relevant consideration.
So some significantly different variant of ~G2 can be undermined, and ~G2 is not the only true statement. Is ~G2 therefore false? Really?
Please feel free to bring up the other topic(s) again when we’ve settled this one, which you yourself said should remain the focus until we have done so. I thought we were going to be settled on this before now, but I was wrong.
August 28th, 2011 | 10:42 pm | #68
“There’s nothing in the least bit implausible to me in ~G2.”
This may be because your are implicitly recognizing that this aim “of reflecting truth” is, as I suggest, an highly subsidiary aim– in which case ~G2 wouldn’t have to be denied in order to avoid the denial of ~G1 in justifying one’s opposition to Prop. 8. In other words, until you render ~G2 more precise so as to preclude the interpretation I offer at the end of #64, it is simply false that “opponents to Prop. 8 could justify their position rationally only by denying ~G1 or ~G2, or both.” If, however, you do render ~G2 more precise so as to preclude the interpretation I offer, then may be difficult for you to maintain that your revised version of it comprises “a very important Christian belief”–that is, a belief that is in any way essential to a reasonable comprehensive (Christian) doctrine. As it stand, therefore, your new-track strategy just isn’t promising.
And please re-read #64 and the beginning #66 to better understand the function of the lonely man of Finland. Hint: he most definitely is not an “analogy for American Christianity.” Suppose this man’s truth regarded a highly insignificant fact about the arrangement of pebbles in his remote village. Why should California state law aim to “reflect” this irrelevant truth, even if it were practical, in this particular case, to do so? (As I say, there is good reason to amend ~G2.1 so as to avoid this absurdity.)
August 29th, 2011 | 4:31 am | #69
(If anyone found the last set of interchanges disjointed and confusing, it’s not your fault. My #68 was a response to a comment that appears to have now been deleted–and replaced by an entirely new one: Tom’s #67.)
The strategy for tomorrow will to build on Tom’s concession that ~G2.1 is “a bad criterion.” It truly is. It’s proximity to ~G2, however, should not be overlooked. Given the relation of legal definitions to laws, and of how the former have their purpose in the latter, the two criteria appear, at least to me, to stand and fall together.
August 29th, 2011 | 7:23 am | #70
My apologies for the confusion. That prior version was there for so short a time I did not think it likely it would have made it to your screen. Otherwise I would have left it there and posted a correction rather than a replacement.
August 29th, 2011 | 2:28 pm | #71
Tom rejects the following proposition as a “bad criterion”:
But let’s remind why it is bad; as we do this, we can think about how ~G2.1 relates relates to Tom’s own favored criterion, ~G2. We do this in order to see whether, and to what extent, the badness of ~G2.1 also pollutes Tom’s criterion. If enough of the badness pollutes Tom’s own criterion, then Tom’s “new-track” argument fails. It would fail because Tom’s new criterion would not be able to serve its intended purpose: that of identifying an assumption that is both very important to a reasonable comprehensive (Christian) doctrine, and necessarily denied by any justification for opposing Prop. 8. In so failing, Tom will have again failed to substantiate his enduring conviction that opposition to Prop. 8 must in some way violate the liberal ideal of civility.
~G2.1 is bad, first of all, because it is strange to think that it is the job of a law to “reflect” what is true. The world is full of truths, and most of “what is true” is entirely irrelevant to state laws. It is absurd, for example, to think that state laws should attempt to reflect what is true about the arrangement of pebbles in some village in northern Finland. Now, if this would be bad for state laws, wouldn’t it also be bad for legal definitions? Unless it touches on some legal issue, it would seem inappropriate to think that our legal definitions should attempt to “reflect” what is true about the arrangement of those same pebbles.
Happily, perhaps, we can just disregard this first part of Tom’s favored criterion. He has, after all, supplied it with another disjunct:
When, however, we look at this disjunct, we find that it also fails for Tom’s purposes. (What now follows mirrors the alternative objection I suggest at the end of #64.) In particular, the claim of this disjunct is too weak, since, in a justification for opposing Prop. 8, its non-denial is perfectly consistent with the non-denial of any of any of the “supposedly important Christian beliefs” that Tom has specified, including ~G1.
The disjunct’s weakness comes with its proviso “as closely as is practical.” Since legal definitions are needed for the clarifications of laws (and not really needed otherwise), it would often be impractical for legal definitions “to ensure that our understanding of legally relevant language reflects…what words actually mean.” It would, moreover, be impractical in those very cases in which what the relevant words “actually mean” is a matter of deep, theological contention, or of special, divine revelation from the deity that certain religions happen to identity. If the words of our legal definitions were required to match such meanings, then the formulation of legal definitions in such cases would necessarily be a theological affair. Since, however, the goal of legal definitions is not to improve our theological understandings or to illuminate truths about the universe, but rather to clarify laws—which themselves have a much more practical purpose—it is impractical to think that a state’s legal definition of “marriage” must try to “ensure” our understanding of God’s definition of “marriage” (even if we’d be willing to concede, that when God provides definitions, this fixes for all time “what words actually mean”).
So, the opponent of Prop. 8 need not deny the last disjunct of Tom’s favored criterion, ~G2. Because of the appropriate flexibility of that criterion, however, this failure to deny it would not necessitate the denial of any “very important Christian belief”—at least not any which Tom has yet been able to identify.
For Tom’s purposes, therefore, his own favored criterion is equally bad.
August 29th, 2011 | 5:27 pm | #72
I’m reluctant to enter this debate, since Tom and RR are both making good points, and I’m skeptical that I can add more than a marginal contribution. But I think that RR’s analogy, that we cannot force others to be Catholic, is fair. Let me expand, a little, on this.
We live in a pluralistic society, obviously. No one religion is considered, by the state, to be THE TRUE religion.
Except you’ve got one thing backwards.
It is the humanists who are trying to force their religion onto everyone.
They are trying to force the equation that a homosexual marriage = a heterosexual marriage.
That is analogous to a person who is not Jewish forcing an Orthodox Jew to accept that cheeseburger = Kosher.
When two things are not equal/same/identical, the only way to force people to pretend they are is by coercive force – in this case, specifically, by making it a crime to distinguish between what is kosher and what is not.
Saying that the Orthodox Jew would still have “religious freedom” means little when it’s a crime to label the foods that might qualify as kosher, and it’s a crime for people to gather together for eating kosher foods (because they’re deliberately excluding non-kosher people), etc.
We all have the right to be free from religious coercion. That includes the humanists/Unitarian Universalists, too. They are the ones trying to force their religious beliefs (specifically, that marriage is a purely ceremonial celebration of love and family is or can be a “choice”) onto the rest of us.
What would be truly “live and let live” is if gays demanded the right to recognition that the person they choose for life-partner and the person they choose to co-parent with cannot be the same person, so therefore they need the right to split the benefits of marriage – not simply strike their child’s other parent out of the family tree and “give” the baby to someone who is unrelated to the child, and then force everyone to pretend that the child has “two daddies” (when in fact what the child actually has is a father, a mother he’s not allowed to talk about, and a stepfather who is misrepresenting himself in dysfunctional, emotionally abusive ways).
August 29th, 2011 | 7:10 pm | #73
RR,
A major correction is in order. The statement of ~G2.1 to which I objected was this one:
If you did not intend that second portion to be part of ~G2.1, then I misinterpreted you, but you did say “we might rather say this.” Your addition of recognized by all to the criterion put it out of the realm of reasonability. That’s what made it a bad criterion.
But there are other distortions in your continuing argument, beginning with,
That’s no answer to
If it is legally-relevant language, then obviously it is not entirely irrelevant. That should not be difficult to agree on.
You try to find room to remove yourself from that objection by speaking of the impracticality of discovering and agreeing upon what words actually mean. What you are doing in the process is denying ~G1. Recall that I had said that opposing Prop. 8 requires denying either ~G1 or ~G2 or both. It remains true that it is impossible to support same-sex “marriage” while agreeing to these core beliefs held by a large plurality of Americans.
You say, “So, the opponent of Prop. 8 need not deny the last disjunct of Tom’s favored criterion, ~G2.” You forget that ~G2 was part of a pair of criteria.
August 29th, 2011 | 7:12 pm | #74
Good points, Blake. At some point, if we ever got to the end of this discussion over assumptions that opponents of Prop. 8 must hold, I have hoped we could move on to talking about how Christians’ civil liberties are restricted by the coercive intentions and outcomes of homosexual legal insurgency. You have anticipated that part of the discussion, which is just fine with me.
August 29th, 2011 | 7:20 pm | #75
BTW, RR, the “or” in ~G2 was not intended as a logical disjunct but as an alternative way of saying the same thing, an expanded explanation that I had hoped would reduce the possibility of misunderstanding.
August 29th, 2011 | 7:36 pm | #76
Blake,
I think the important distinction, that has to be made, is this: as long as Gay rights advocates do not insist on forcing religious people, who object to gay marriages, to recognize, or incorporate into their religious teachings, and praciticies, gay marriages, then it’s legitimate for a pluralistic society to allow for gay marriages to exist.
And, no one, to my knowledge has ever argued that religions must change their teachings to accomadate gay marriages. If they did, this would be an infringement on religious freedom.
August 29th, 2011 | 8:10 pm | #77
Bret, you have not been watching the news closely enough.
August 29th, 2011 | 9:30 pm | #78
What follows is an attempt to clarify the discussion, by rephrasing ~G2 in an easier (i.e. less prone to misunderstanding) way. Tom and RR, if you find my phrasing true and helpful, feel free to use it, but if not, feel free to ignore me.
RR, you have rightly pointed out that the law is not obligated to capture every truth (e.g. arrangements of pebbles in Finland), but do you agree that the law ought to at least be true in whatever it does say, especially when the subject is an important one*?
If you disagree, then can you at least see that ~G2.2 is part of the reasonable, comprehensive doctrine belonging to Christianity (and probably part of many other reasonable, comprehensive doctrines as well)?
And do you agree that, from a Christian point of veiw, same-sex “marriage” laws deny ~G2.2 in the arena of an important (and reasonably held) belief in our comprehensive doctrine? After all, you did imply (in #55) that “many people believe (reasonably enough)” that God’s ideal for marriage is a heterosexual union.
*We might not call a law unjust if it speaks falsely on some inconsequential subject, i.e. if it presumes an inaccurate picture of the arrangement of pebbles on a Finnish beach. But we should call a law unjust if it presumes, say, a false definition of assault.
August 29th, 2011 | 10:49 pm | #79
Tom,
I certainly reject any efforts, on the part of anyone, to force any religion to accept gay marriages. So, any who are engaged in this are clearly wrong.
But, let’s look at New York, for an example of same sex marriages being legalized. Certainly, under this law, no religion is required to sanction same sex marriages. Every teaching, of every Christian, Jewish, and Muslim church, vis a vis homosexuality, is unaltered.
August 30th, 2011 | 1:34 am | #80
I regard Bill R’s proposal (~G2.2) as a charitable improvement, and one which is at once simpler and far more circumspect than the original version. I therefore propose directing our future comments towards it. If Tom regards ~G2.2 as anything less than an improvement without loss, I think he should explain.
(My responses in the next few days will have to be a bit slower, regrettably.)
August 30th, 2011 | 8:30 am | #81
Thanks, Bill R. and RR.
One more tweak, please if you don’t mind. The standard of contradiction is rather severe. It’s at least logically possible to distort a definition without contradicting it. (That may not be true for extremely-carefully defined terms, but we don’t want to hold ourselves to that requirement.) I suggest instead,
Actually I think I prefer
But I don’t have a strong opinion on it at this point, and I’m willing to go with either one. Whichever one we choose we could label simply ~G2.3.
August 30th, 2011 | 8:32 am | #82
Bret, you’re still on the wrong track if you think religious freedom and civil liberty are strictly about religions’ teachings not being altered by the law. That’s too high a tolerance for tyranny. Is that all you intended your last comment to include?
August 30th, 2011 | 11:03 am | #83
Consider, then,
As one aspiration among others, this is a fine statement to which we can all agree. The problem arises when we take ~G2.3b as anything more than one aspiration among others. We do have, I take it, other aspirations for our legal definitions. We want our legal definition to be useful in the creation of good state laws. Since state law have their own purposes and standards, these purposes and standards will define aspirations for the legal definitions (which, let us recall, really just exist to serve such laws). What, then, if these aspirations conflict with the aspiration of ~G2.3b? What if, for example, we come to believe that the “true meaning” of the relevant term (e.g., “marriage” or “assault”—and perhaps even all of their substitutes) is buried in the mind of God, and that to discern this true meaning would require deep and religiously controversial theological investigation, which all might end in a confusing violation of standard usage and the up-ending of all legal precedent? This example, of course, is intended to be extreme, but it is meant to show why someone who affirms ~G2.3b as an aspiration could still, reasonably enough, be prepared to deny that we must always make up our minds on the “true meaning” of the relevant terms before employing them in a legal definition. (Such a person could reasonably take this position in less extreme cases as well.) Such a person may think that we sometimes must formulate legal definitions without being certain of the “true meanings” of certain of their terms (thereby, I assume, at least running the risk of “materially distorting the true meaning of relevant terms”). Since this is possible, the affirmation of ~G2.3b does not necessitate the denial of ~G2 (the very important Christian beliefs) in opposing Prop. 8.
August 30th, 2011 | 11:19 am | #84
1. Do legal definitions really exist just to serve state laws? That’s another assumption based on a particular view of reality that I as a Christian would not ascribe to. Legal definitions, like all other definitions, exist by virtue of their actually defining things.
2. Your “what if” question is an attempt to argue against the validity of ~G2.3. I’m not buying that. I’m saying that ~G2.3 is an essential feature of my worldview as a Christian. If you want to alter it, fine, but you’re still illustrating my point: if you want to support SSM, you have to deny either ~G1 or ~G2.
3. Also, your “what if” question is in the form of, “what if you as a Christian were applying your belief regarding true meanings of words to something you did not believe?” It’s a non-question, in other words.
4. I do not say that “we must always make up our minds on the ‘true meaning’ of the relevant terms before employing them in a legal definition.” Heavens. If we don’t know the true meaning of a term, we can do whatever we want with it. But if we do think we have reason to know the true meaning of a term, then our legal definitions ought not distort that true meaning. And this is about a significant plurality of the American population that is not wondering about the true meaning of the term “marriage.”
5. Even if the above were no problem, your conclusion would still depend on your denying either the truth or the relevance of ~G1. You can’t separate that from the equation.
August 30th, 2011 | 11:22 am | #85
And if legal definitions exist just to serve state laws, then for what purpose do state laws exist? Can you answer this non-circularly?
August 30th, 2011 | 12:18 pm | #86
Tom, I hesitate to say this, but I think you are misunderstanding your own argument and the task that you must accomplish if it is to succeed. Here’s how I see your main argument functioning. Correct me if I’m wrong:
You are positing ~G2 and ~G2.3b as “very important Christian beliefs,” at least one of which must be denied in any justification for opposing Prop. 8.
In #83, however, I take you into the mind of a person who reasonably affirms ~G2.3b in a way that does not lead to the denial of ~G2, even as she may support a legal definition that, as a matter fact (known by some Christians, we might say), happens to “materially distort the true meaning” of the term “marriage”. Since the justification that such a person would offer for opposing Prop.8 would not deny either ~G2 or ~G2.3b (she accepts the latter and is agnostic on the former), the point of the illustration should be crystal clear.
To resuscitate your own argument, you now need to show that my imagined opponent of Prop. 8 either (a) is being unreasonable in her approach to ~G2 and ~G2.3b, or (b) is incapable of producing any justification whatsoever for opposing Prop. 8 that does not itself contain a denial of some other “very important Christian belief.”
August 30th, 2011 | 1:39 pm | #87
What about ~G1, RR?
August 30th, 2011 | 1:46 pm | #88
Good eyes, Tom. Everywhere I typed “G.2″ in #83 and #86 should be replaced by “G.1″.
August 30th, 2011 | 1:47 pm | #89
That is, everywhere I typed “~G.2″ in #83 and #86 should be replaced by “~G.1″.
August 30th, 2011 | 2:09 pm | #90
I’m going to re-post your comment in that corrected form, for clarity’s sake.
August 30th, 2011 | 2:10 pm | #91
RR’s edited content:
August 30th, 2011 | 2:32 pm | #92
RR,
As I read #83, you take me into the mind of a person who takes ~G2.3b as an optional aspiration, one that can be downplayed and/or set aside completely if some other purpose for legal definitions conflicts with ~G2.3b. You offer as examples the case of someone who disbelieves Christian doctrine on God’s revelation concerning marriage, or who thinks that the confused outcome of theological dispute might result in a meaning that conflicts with “standard usage.” Then you suggest that this constitutes a circumstance where we might “be prepared to deny that we must always make up our minds on the ‘true meaning’ of the relevant terms before employing them in a legal definition.”
With all due respect, that’s nonsense. First of all, we are talking about someone who affirms ~G1:
This is not someone who thinks that theological dispute makes the meaning of marriage unclear, and especially not someone who disbelieves Biblical revelation.
Second, you suggest that we need not always make up our mind on the “true meaning” of the relevant terms before employing them in a legal definition. But you forget that we are talking about someone who actually has made up her mind on that true meaning—not because she has to have done so for some policy/legal purpose, but because she has relevant knowledge. She knows what the term means.
Third, you imply that if the known meaning of a term conflicts with some policy purpose, then we should change the definition. Why not use a different term?
Fourth, you haven’t answered my question in #85, a variant of my question 1 in #84.
Fifth, you haven’t answered my question in #85, point 2, where I point out that ~G2.3 is an essential feature of my worldview as a Christian.
Sixth, you really ought to take into account that defining marriage as open to same-sex couples is a very significant material distortion of historic and biblical meanings of “marriage.”
August 30th, 2011 | 2:35 pm | #93
What my argument is attempting to accomplish at this initial stage (which is—alas!—all that we have reached, unless you count the fact that I laid the whole thing out at the beginning) is to show it is impossible to affirm same-sex marriage without denying ~G1 or ~G2.3 or both. I don’t think you’ve begun to show that point fails.
August 30th, 2011 | 2:56 pm | #94
Tom, you apparently to want to imagine a different sort of person than the one I describe, with an entirely different sort of thought process. That’s fine, but you need to distinguish that person and his/her way of thinking from the one I describe in #83 and the line of thinking there described. And you also need to explain why your imagined alternative is relevant to your argumentative strategy and to the challenge to it which I’ve presented.
August 30th, 2011 | 3:14 pm | #95
This person is one who does not deny ~G1. She is relevant because of what I have reminded us of in #93. I have done the rest of what you have asked, distinguishing that person from whomever you have imagined in #83. The burden is not on me at this point.
August 30th, 2011 | 3:18 pm | #96
Need I add that the person in ~G1 takes it that the meaning of marriage is not only timeless and transcendent but also knowable through Scriptural revelation? Was I assuming too much not to have included that earlier? Since we are talking about historic/biblical revelational understandings of marriage, I would have thought that a safe and obviously relevant assumption, but I see now that I could have been more perfectly explicit.
August 30th, 2011 | 3:23 pm | #97
Explain your claim:
“First of all, we are talking about someone who affirms ~G1:”
That’s not the person I’m talking about. Who is this other person who affirms ~G1, and why is he/she relevant in the immediate context?
August 30th, 2011 | 3:50 pm | #98
Huh?
Why is this difficult??
Please re-read #93, and the other previous times that I said the same thing.
My argument is that a person who affirms SSM must deny either ~G1 or ~G2.3 or both. Suppose you find a person such as the one you have described, who can affirm ~G2.3 in the relevant SSM context. Can she do that while affirming ~G1? If she can, then my argument is undermined or defeated; but only if she can do it while affirming ~G1.
I have said from the beginning that there are two critical assumptions underlying support for SSM. Originally I stated them in positive terms, that SSM advocates must affirm both tA1 and tA2. Now I’ve re-written them negatively, to argue that SSM advocates could not simultaneously accept the two critical assumptions ~G1 and ~G2.3. I can easily imagine an SSM advocate accepting one or the other, but my point is that it’s impossible coherently to support SSM while accepting them both. Biblical Christianity does accept both.
August 30th, 2011 | 3:55 pm | #99
Is it possible that you are confusing “not deny” with “affirm”?
My person doesn’t deny ~G1. While she affirms ~G2.3b, she doesn’t affirm ~G1.
August 30th, 2011 | 4:10 pm | #100
Such a person may think that we sometimes must formulate legal definitions without being certain of the “true meanings” of certain of their terms (thereby, I assume, at least running the risk of “materially distorting the true meaning of relevant terms”). Since this is possible, the affirmation of ~G2.3b does not necessitate the denial of ~G1 (the very important Christian beliefs) in opposing Prop. 8.
The problem with this example (from #83), RR, is that you make an unwarranted leap between the first sentence (of what I quoted) and the last sentence. You basically argue that it is possible for even a Christian to be unsure of the “true meaning” of a term relevant to some law; therefore, it must be possible for even a Christian to be unsure of the “true meaning” of marriage, as revealed by God.
But just because a thing is possible in some cases, that is not an argument that it is actually possible in the case at hand.
August 30th, 2011 | 4:11 pm | #101
Sorry, that first paragraph of #100 was meant to be in block-quotes.
August 30th, 2011 | 4:27 pm | #102
Bill R., what I am challenging is Tom’s attempt to demonstrate that the denial of either ~G1 or ~G2.3b is necessary to any justification for opposing Prop. 8. All my example does is show that, for plausible reasons, there is no rational necessity tying the affirmation of ~G2.3b to the denial of ~G1 in the defense of SSM legislation. As such, I don’t see any reason for thinking that the justification for opposing Prop. 8 must depend on the denial of either ~G2.3b or ~G1. And that’s what Tom has evidently been trying to show.
August 30th, 2011 | 4:35 pm | #103
In other words, one doesn’t have to demonstrate that P is in fact possible in order to show that someone else has not demonstrated that P is impossible.
Tom’s ambition, as I understand it, is to show that it is impossible to justify opposition to Prop. 8 without denying either ~G1 or ~G2.3b.
August 30th, 2011 | 6:51 pm | #104
I hope we are making progress here. One sign of that might be another emendation, this time of ~G1, in light of my comment #96:
Now the person you have described in 83–let’s call her Jan–believes that
She also believes,
Jan’s second belief quoted here is potentially consistent with ~G1b; that is, this belief neither affirms nor denies ~G1b. One could be agnostic as to whether the term “marriage” has a knowable, timeless, transcendent meaning, while holding that we sometimes must formulate legal definitions without being certain of the “true meanings” of certain of their terms.
But what about Jan’s first quoted belief here, specifically with regard to marriage? Could Jan believe that the “true meaning” of the relevant term is buried in the mind of God while also believing that the meaning is timeless, transcendent, and knowable? I don’t see how. It’s not logically sufficient to describe her as “not affirming” ~G1b. She is actually denying it.
I will admit I have been careless about denying vs. not affirming, but I do not think you have found a way yet to rationally justify support SSM while not denying ~G1b, ~G2.3, or both.
August 30th, 2011 | 6:56 pm | #105
Let me turn this completely around and ask you a direct question, RR. Do you believe it is possible to rationally justify support for SSM (or opposition to Prop. 8, take your choice) while holding that “marriage” has a true meaning in the mind of God, that this meaning is knowable because God has revealed it, that this meaning limits marriage to male-female, and legal definitions should not materially distort the true meaning of relevant terms?
If you agree that this is impossible, then we can take that as a short-cut, at last, to the next stage in the argument. If you think there’s a way around that impossibility, then (sigh) we would have a ways to go yet.
August 30th, 2011 | 7:02 pm | #106
One last clarification.
Bill R writes:
This is not accurate. It’s unnecessary to think of this person I portrayed as a Christian; furthermore, the scenario doesn’t have to shown to be possible for a Christian. To refute Tom’s thesis, it is enough for my example that this is simply someone who is uncertain about the “true meaning” of “marriage,” but who affirms ~G2.3b and justifies the relevant legislation (or legal definition) on the sorts of grounds I suggest. We can easily provide a highly realistic scenario of this.
Finally, upon reading Tom’s responses from today, the most plausible explanation of them is that he’s just been confusing “not deny” with “affirm.” This has led, it appears, to a great amount of frustration in his comments.
August 30th, 2011 | 7:14 pm | #107
After reading this (#102)…
…in light of this (#99)…
…it strikes me that we can summarize your (RR’s) conclusion as follows:
RR, is that sentence an accurate summary of your most recent point?
August 31st, 2011 | 12:43 am | #108
This gets a few things wrong. (And I’m afraid this is going to sound tedious.)
First, the point is not about “accepting SSM legislation.” What we’re interested in is what kinds of justification can be made for SSM legislation–and whether such justification necessarily involve the denials of any “very important Christian beliefs.”
Secondly, I made no claims about what the person who affirms both ~G1 and ~G2.3b cannot accept. I don’t see why such a person per se would be relevant in this discussion.
Suppose, however, that, as Tom claims, ~G1 and ~G2.3b are both “very important Christian beliefs” (essential elements of a reasonable comprehensive religious doctrine). In such a case, it would be important to be able to consider these beliefs when thinking about the sorts of justifications they could be reasonably expected to accept. You would want justifications that didn’t themselves deny those very important Christian beliefs. (In this case, these people would affirm ~G1 and ~G2.3b, but the mere fact that they affirm such things isn’t what’s important.)
August 31st, 2011 | 2:01 am | #109
Please don’t lay the blame at Tom’s feet. He has taken the lead in doing the hard work of clarifying points that are ambiguous or unclear. You could have easily anticipated the confusion of “not deny” with “affirm” and preemptively pointed out the distinction.
On to your objections to my statement. Your first complaint:
Really? It’s not? Then why did you say, later in the same post,
Maybe you mean the legislation doesn’t have to be acceptable to Christians, but the justification for the legislation does? If so, then the burden is on you to explain why the two are different. I would think that if someone accepts the justification for a law, then they accept the law itself. I can’t think of a single existing law where I accept the justification for the law, but not the law itself. In any case, why not just amend my statement to say:
If you disagree with this sentence, then don’t just tell me it’s wrong because this or that is “irrelevant”. Rather, please be constructive and provide a positive statement, rather than just vetoing and rejecting our statements. Roll up your sleeves and help generate something.
Your second complaint:
You really need to explain yourself here. My first thought is: of course it’s important! You don’t see why an affirmer of ~G1 and ~G2.3b is relevant to this discussion, or why the affirmation of ~G1 and ~G2.3b is what’s important? Do we really need to tell you? Ok…
1) Both Tom and I are affirmers of ~G1 and ~G2.3b.
2) ~G1 and ~G2.3b are part of our comprehensive doctrine.
3) Further, it is part of our comprehensive doctrine that we must affirm ~G1 and ~G2, and not simply “not deny” them (we can’t “pretend”, in front of God, not to know what He has told us).
4) If we are required to refrain from affirming either ~G1 or ~G2.3b, in order to accept a justification for a certain law, then accepting that justification violates our comprehensive doctrine.
5) Your goal (I think) in this thread is to convince us that our comprehensive doctrine is not violated by accepting a justification for SSM legislation.
6) Therefore, you must show that someone can accept a justification for SSM legislation while affirming both ~G1 and ~G2.3b, otherwise you have failed.
That is why it is not only relevant, but absolutely central, for us to talk about “what the person who affirms both ~G1 and ~G2.3b cannot accept”.
August 31st, 2011 | 2:52 am | #110
The phase “accept the law” crucially ambiguous. It’s one thing to accept the law as legitimate, it’s quite another thing to accept law as ideal or as the best option. We might reasonably expect someone to accept the law as legitimate, but not be able to reasonably expect him to accept it as ideal. Regarding the idea of accepting a justification, be sure to read #7.
What’s missing in the clarification I do give at the end of #108?
August 31st, 2011 | 4:17 am | #111
Bill R. was on a good track when he suggested you roll up your sleeves, RR. Case in point: what’s missing in the answer he already gave at the end of #109?
August 31st, 2011 | 6:45 am | #112
RR,
It’s possible you missed my comments 104 and 105. I’d still be interested especially in what you have to say to Jan in 104. You may feel free to disregard 105 unless you think it would get us somewhere.
Somewhere along the way, #96 and #104 also got lost, however, where G.1 was amended to G.1b, adding, “This definition is knowable to humans through revelation.” I remind you that when I introduced that addition, I noted that it was not ad hoc; it was a clarification of the original intended point, based on common and historic Christian belief.
Now, your point in #106 was helpful:
Let’s spell this out. As I do so I will take the liberty of including the additional stipulation in G.1b. It comes out virtually the same either way.
a. This person (call him Jim) believes that legal language should not materially distort the true meaning of relevant terms.
b. Jim does not deny that the realities of marriage and male/female are timeless and transcendent, based in the design according to which God created all humans, and therefore the definitions of marriage, male, and female are timeless and transcendent. He does not deny that these definitions, if they existed, could include the reality that marriage is to be between man and woman. He does not deny that these definitions, if they existed, could be knowable to humans through revelation.
c. Jim is uncertain about the “true meaning” of “marriage.”
Jim could say, “maybe there’s a true meaning of ‘marriage’ out there that’s knowable, maybe there isn’t. I don’t know. If there were, we certainly wouldn’t want our legal terms to materially distort that meaning.”
Is that what you’ve been trying to communicate, RR?
August 31st, 2011 | 6:55 am | #113
A side note to my natural-law friends: when I speak of “knowable through revelation,” I have in mind both special and general revelation.
August 31st, 2011 | 7:30 am | #114
I want to take us back to #62 if I may. If the conclusion in #112 is the one you’ve been trying to steer us toward, what is its import? Recall that in #62 I wrote,
That one example became the focus of our discussion for a good while. I think you’ve shown that there could be some person (Jim, for example) who was an exception to the ~G example set. I acknowledge your correct logic there. The error was in that ~G wording.
Later in #62 I wrote,
At the time I thought this was logically equivalent to the ~G example set. That was wrong, which again I acknowledge.
It seems to me that the relevant question now is how you respond to the wording just quoted. Note that “God-given” means more than known by God; it is actually given by God. That is, humans have access to this truth. Note also that since these impinge on historic Christian belief, this question continues or else resolves some of the discussion you have been having with Bill.
I’m trusting that you’ll take into account the work we’ve done on the second half of that disjunct: that this person must assume (on that half of the disjunct) it is not the case that legal definitions should not materially distort relevant terms.
I expect you might ask whether it’s necessary for Prop. 8 opponents to assume there is no timeless etc. God-given truth. Perhaps they can just doubt that there is, or be agnostic about it, or not care whether there is. Feel free to work with that as you wish.
For my part, though, that seems to back us up toward another question. If such a one is not assuming there is no such truth, then that one either believes he or she knows there is no such truth, which is a denial of historic Christianity and is functionally equivalent (for these purposes) to assuming there is no such truth; or that one takes it as possible that there is such a truth given by God, and is willing to support legislation that possibly contradicts God’s truth. I would say that attitude reflects almost a criminal carelessness concerning what is true and real. “I know it’s possible I’m bucking truth, reality, and some good God’s design, but nevertheless I’m overturning everything historically treasured in the make-up of our families and in the preservation of our species, and everything our social structures are based on, regardless of that acknowledged possibility.” I have real trouble seeing how that could be part of a rationally justifiable civil justification for SSM.
August 31st, 2011 | 10:07 am | #115
Obviously, no law is ideal, but I think the type of criterion you’re talking about in #7 is far too broad to be useful. But let’s hold off on that topic until the several other issues at hand are resolved.
I want to give you time to deal with Tom’s #104, #112, and #114, and with my bulleted argument in the end of #109. (In answer to your question, your “clarification” in #108 was entirely lacking a logical justification for the final sentence in parentheses, and in order to really clarify it, you must deal with #109).
August 31st, 2011 | 11:59 am | #116
Tom,
My central point is that, considering the fact that we cannot conclude with metaphysical certitude, which religion is true, (if any), a reasonable pragmatic solution, in order to keep the peace, is to allow people to go their own ways, in these matters.
I doubt that tyranny is a likely outcome of allowing gay people to marry. How would this possibility come about? Considering the fact that, at least in the United States, we have an explicit portion of our constitution (i.e., the First Amendment) that protects freedom of religion, we would have to have an amendment to change this, as you know.
But considering that there would be no, and I mean no, political pressure (since most americans are religious) to amend this, it’s not going to happen.
I would have no problem with a constitutional amendment that made religions exempt from being required to accept gay marriages. This would be a reasonable compromise, in our pluralistic system. Allow gay marriages, but don’t force religions to accept them. I think that this could work.
August 31st, 2011 | 12:27 pm | #117
What does “don’t force religions to accept them” mean?
What does it mean for adherents of various religions when they encounter gay “married” couples? Can they decline to photograph their “weddings”? Can they continue to work for secular employers while disagreeing with gay “marriage”? Can they refuse to assign children for adoption to gay couples? Will they receive the protection of law for expressing their opinions on the job or on college campuses? Will they have job protection for expressing anti-gay “marriage” beliefs while off the job? Will they be constitutionally protected from having to hire gays to jobs where the person’s moral character and/or sexuality is relevant according to their own religious tenets?
If you could devise a world like that, it would provide a whale of a lot more freedom of religion than the one the homosexual insurgents are trying to build. A whale of a lot more than the one we currently live in, actually. Your idealism is endearing but disconnected from the news I have encouraged you to watch more closely.
August 31st, 2011 | 12:40 pm | #118
Further, Bret: there was peace on this topic at one time. A small minority decided to force their opinions into the legal process and thereby mangled that peace. You suggest that the way to restore peace is to allow people to go their own ways. I doubt very seriously this would be a bilateral peace. Very seriously. I doubt even in your idealism you could think it would be.
August 31st, 2011 | 1:25 pm | #119
Tom,
Thanks for your well thought comments. I certainly understand where you’re coming from. But I think that it’s fair to say that, on both sides of this issue, we have people who seem intolerant. There are, as you state, certainly those on the pro same sex marriage side, who are disrespectful of those who disagree, and will not be satisfied, unless everyone agrees that, not only should SSM’s be allowed, but gay/lesbian behavior should be completely accepted. And, there are those on the anti SSM side (or pro heterosexual marriage only side) who seem intolerent. Not you, Tom, or others on this site. But there are some, who do seem to hate homosexuals, or at least seem to want to restrict their freedoms, to some degree, anyway.
You and RR have clearly had an interesting, and intelligent conversation, on this matter. But I seriously doubt that either you, or RR, will come up with a convincing “slam dunk argument, that settles this issue, once and for all, and provides metaphysical closure to it, despite the obvious high intelligence that both you, Tom, and RR bring to it. And I doubt anyone else will either.
Sure, some will be convinced, just as the Pope is convinced of the metaphysical superiority of Catholicism, Mormons are convinced of the metaphysical superiority of Mormonism, Evangelicals are convinced of the metaphysical superiority of Evangelicalism, and so forth. But they won’t convince anyone else.
But we’re able to live together in peace, despite the inability of anyone to provide a slamdunk argument that her religion is the true one, to all rational individuals satisfaction. Certainly, when Democratic Republics were emerging, with their corresponding constitutions, or laws, allowing freedom of religion, people could be forgiven for concluding that such systems were too idealistic to work. each side, could, perhaps, plausibly accuse the other, of bigotry, or an unwillingness to compromise on issues. But, eventually, we were able to do it. We still have problems, to be sure, but we have, in general, been able to make freedom of religion work.
Similarly, we can make gay marriages work, as well. Just as we still have people who refuse to hire Catholics, if they’re an Evangelical organization (and vice versa), since these religions don’t see eye to eye on different things, we will have certain Christians who refuse to hire gay people for the same reason, or gay people who refuse to hire Christians. We can find a way to allow this, and maintain the peace. It won’t be perfect, but it can work.
It seems to be that, no one has a right to tell you, Tom, that you have to be a Catholic. As a free, autonomous person, you have every right to choose whatever religion, you deen to be correct, even if it upsets every person in america! As long as you don’t try to force others to believe as you do, you have every right to believe.
Analogously, two consenting adults, have the right to marry. You have every right to disagree, just as you have every right to disagree with Mormons, Catholics, Muslims, and atheists. But you have no right to force them to accept your metaphysical notion that marraige is ordainded of God, and only btween a man and a woman. Of course, they also have no right to force you to accept their marraige as legitimate, (you’re free to refuse to associate with them, if you wish, take pictures, etc.), or to force you to do anything else.
I know that some gay activists do want to forcew this issue, but they’re wrong. They have no right to force anyone to agree with them. But just as, as free citizens, they have a right to be Catholic, agnostic, or whatever (and even though we have militant atheists out there, who seem to want to force their views, they’re wrong to do this, but do have the freedon to be atheists), they have a right to be married, by the state, or any religion that agrees to perform the marraige.
September 2nd, 2011 | 5:11 pm | #120
I think the important distinction, that has to be made, is this: as long as Gay rights advocates do not insist on forcing religious people, who object to gay marriages, to recognize, or incorporate into their religious teachings, and praciticies, gay marriages, then it’s legitimate for a pluralistic society to allow for gay marriages to exist.
But gays do force religious people to drop the view that marriage is procreative.
Gays do force religious people to drop all ability to distinguish between things that religious people need to distinguish between.
Your argument is like saying that as long as you do not force a vegetarian to eat meat, it is perfectly okay to create a situation that makes it hostile to practice vegetarianism through laws that criminalize the act of distinguishing vegetarian products from non-vegetarian ones, and punish vegetarians who “discriminate”.
September 3rd, 2011 | 3:35 am | #121
Hi Blake, it’s good to talk with you again. I’m not arguing that anyone who views marriage as between a man and a woman, only, should not be allowed to hold that view. Of course they can. One can make a good argument, or arguments in its favor. I don’t believe that they hold up to rational scrutiny, but I certainly defend any one’s right to hold them. That’s what the first amendment is all about.
It’s about allowing choice. If two gay people decide to marry, this says nothing about others,for religious, or other reasons, believe differently. They still are able to hold their views. analogously, if a Catholic, is allowed to hold a Mass, (and, thankfully, he is!) this says nothing about the person who believes that the Catholic Church is wrong. The person, say, a different type of Christian than a Catholic, still is able to advocate that the Mass is wrong, he just cannot ban the Mass’s practice, but the priest cannot ban the non catholic from advocating that the mass is wrong.
September 3rd, 2011 | 4:34 am | #122
See #82 again, please.
September 3rd, 2011 | 4:36 am | #123
And why doesn’t it work the other way: The SSM advocate may quite legally hold his or her views; we just won’t make those views the basis for public policy.