For anyone who thinks I have evaded the issue of “logical and psychological impossibility,” I invite you to re-read the thread, with special attention to comments 34, 40, and 43, all of which address the issue with points that C. Ehrlich has not even acknowledged, much less answered. I just pointed out this very thing in comment 49.

C. Ehrlich, if at this point you decide to go back and respond to these claims at last, it’s too late now. See the end of my previous comment for the reasons I have made that decision. Note also that while I welcome attacks on my argument—even strong attacks—I don’t care to subject myself any longer to your general rudeness in pursuit of a discussion that is going nowhere.

Tom’s latest scheme is to complain that there is “scope” ambiguity in the phrase, “there exist some views which we know to be unreasonable” (and of course we got to this claim by following Tom down one of his previous rabbit trails). When pressed, however, it turns out that what Tom really just wants is for me to identify those views which we know to be unreasonable (interesting “scope” ambiguity, isn’t it? Is this really even an “ambiguity”?). Now this question, along with Tom’s related bundle of inquiries, is really quite irrelevant to the one issue which Tom is so eager to evade (how else can we explain his behavior here?)–his claim about the “logical and psychological impossibility”. In the above discussion, this is the one issue to which I’ve repeatedly tried to return Tom’s attention.

So Tom wants some examples of views which we can know to be unreasonable. I shouldn’t answer this question, because Tom is simply dodging the issue I’ve been pressing. I can almost guarantee you that, after I answer this question, Tom will not give me any direct answer of the one issue I’ve been pressing. Answering this question will not help Tom to focus his attention. But what the heck. Here’s to following an evasive man down another rabbit trail:

One view that we know is not well reasoned is the view that, because tigers have stripes, 2 and 2 does not equal 4.

How do we decide when it’s okay to proclaim some views unreasonable? Is it something that applies only to religious claims? To fundamentalists’ claims? To claims a lot of people disagree on, or in other words to controversial claims?

Maybe you think it applies to claims on which our knowledge is not certain. That is exactly what I was saying in (a) through (f), comment #34. If so, then I’m not sure what you’re saying we disagree on.

You can see that clarifying which views is materially important. It determines, among other things, whether we even have a disagreement or not. This is hardly trivial.

C. Ehrlich, if you don’t want to answer what I wrote in comments 31, 34, 35, 40, 41, 43, and most of 47; if you only want to apply your unique style of sticking a barb into your opponent by finding one LMU that you can zero in on, regardless of the rest of the argument; if you want to continue to let my answers to your central assertions go unanswered; if nevertheless you want to continue to rely on those assertions to support your central argument (as you did in #46, and as I pointed out to you in #47); then I conclude that you are not really interested in serious discussion here. And if you’re not interested in serious discussion, I don’t see any reason to pretend that’s what this is. I’m out of here.

That’s curious. Is the scope of “no one” ambiguous? Or is it that there is ambiguity in the phrase “there are some views”?!

At risk of being overly pedantic, I wonder if this would help Tom:

There is no one on this thread who is denying the following proposition: that there exists something which is both a view and which is known to be either unreasonable or not well-reasoned.

Is someone being evasive here? (Perhaps for this question also I’d better clarify the “scope” issue for Tom: is there something which is a person, and which also is contributing to this thread, and which also is being a evasive?)

You say,

Tom, no one (obviously) is denying that there are some views which we know to be unreasonable, or simply not well-reasoned. With that clarification (I’m surprised it is necessary) try revising your argument that there is a “self-refutation” in my claims.

That is an assertion regarding scope. Note that I addressed the scope issue. Could you be more specific as to what the scope of your claim is and is not? You’ve left it rather fuzzy (your recent clarification remains unclear, and it should not be surprising that further clarification would be necessary). How do we decide when it’s okay to proclaim some views unreasonable? Is it something that applies only to religious claims? To fundamentalists’ claims? To claims a lot of people disagree on, or in other words to controversial claims?

Maybe you think it applies to claims on which our knowledge is not certain. That is exactly what I was saying in (a) through (f), comment #34. If so, then I’m not sure what you’re saying we disagree on.

I have already explained to you why I cannot accept your thought experiment in #23. You brushed my answer aside as if it were some psychological flaw, but you failed in fact to address my answer. I don’t know why you did that, but you did. So at this point, here’s where your argument in #23 stands: You made it, I answered it to say why it was inadequate, and you have not responded to my answer. As far as #23 goes, it’s dangling in mid-air, awaiting your defense. It supports nothing until you provide that defense.

Now in #38, you wrote,

That’s hard to swallow. So here is Tom’s escape: despite making claims about logical impossibility, Tom refuses to consider a thought experiment which, hypothetically, involves God revealing special knowledge in this way.

I answered this in #40, and you have not yet responded to that, as far as I can see.

You wrote further,

So here’s an easy question: is this a fact that God, at this time, knows? Well, presumably if it is a fact, then God knows about it. So, God knows that each of these views is, at this time, well-reasoned. Now here’s another easy question: does God also know which of the views is in fact true? Presumably He does. So, God accomplishes that which Tom suggests is a “logical impossibility”: He knows the truth about an issue even though He also knows that other false views about the issue are well-reasoned. Is it a “logical impossibility” for God to concede to what He knows?! Seriously, where is the logical impossibility?

I quoted this and responded to it in #40 as well.

You did not respond to this.

It will do you no good to continue pointing to arguments you have made as if they have not been responded to. I’m sure you know this (I will not engage in belittling tactics), but when an argument has been rebutted, it becomes necessary to rebut the rebuttal or otherwise support the argument. Failing that, there is no reason to doubt the rebuttal was successful. At that point it is insufficient simply to say, “This combination of views is difficult to maintain, for the reasons I have outlined previously.” I think you knew that, and I think you know now it’s your turn to take a look at my rebuttals and answer them, before you rely on arguments that have been rebutted.

The challenge I’ve put to you is rather this:

On the one hand, you want to accept this claim (as you indeed should):

(1) There are some issues for which there are multiple well-reasoned views which cannot all be correct.

On the other hand, you seem to want to defend this claim:

(2) If I know that a given view is false, then I cannot–because of “logical and psychological impossiblity”–concede that it is well-reasoned.

This combination of views is quite difficult to maintain, for the reasons outlined in comments #23 and #38.

For any view incompatible with his own, the fundamentalist so often seems to feel the need to deny not its truth, but also its reasonableness. The fundamentalist will often refuse even to consider the possibility that a point of view inconsistent with his own might in fact be well-reasoned.

And, for obvious reasons, that’s a highly unfortunate turn of mind.

In my comment #21 (and also several times since then, for what it’s worth; you can refer to subsequent comments for commentary on what I mean by “knowing” in this context) I distinguished between what we know and what we don’t know. If I know that some proposition P is wrong, then I am going to know that it is either based on false premises or else poorly reasoned.

Take, for example, the case where P is the proposition, where “that” refers to your depiction of the fundamentalist’s way of handling truth, as you stated it in the passage I have just quoted.

And, for obvious reasons, that’s a highly unfortunate turn of mind.

Consider some challenge ~P (not-P), such as,

And, for obvious reasons, that’s a highly felicitous turn of mind.

I take it that ~P expresses a view incompatible with your own. I take it, too, that you would feel the need to deny not only its truth, but also its reasonableness.

But to assert P as being obviously true is to assert that ~P is obviously false. To assert that ~P is obviously false is to deny not only its truth, but also its reasonableness. But to assert P and to deny ~P in that manner is to take up an attitude contrary to what you assert in P. You endorse P, and in the next breath you abrogate it by your own words.

Now, can you escape the self-contradiction by limiting the scope of your assertions? You had said,

That is, with regard to their own faith, or their radical or distinctive views, fundamentalists often refuse to acknowledge any room for reasonable disagreement (in the sense discussed).

I would say that since P relates to religious views, then P and ~P are within the scope of your statement. Can we limit the scope to fundamentalists? No, because I’m demonstrating to you that this approach is not particular to fundamentalists; and my demonstrating that fact is very material to the discussion. In effect, you have said, “We should not do as fundamentalists do;” what I am showing you is that you have done what you said the fundamentalists do. (“Radical” and “distinctive” do no useful logical work in this argument, being so difficult to define, and so perspective-dependent.)

Here then is the nub of it. Suppose some person S comes up to you and says,

For any view incompatible with his own, the fundamentalist so often seems to feel the need to deny not its truth, but also its reasonableness. The fundamentalist will often refuse even to consider the possibility that a point of view inconsistent with his own might in fact be well-reasoned.

And, for obvious reasons, that’s a highly felicitous turn of mind, one which should be encouraged in all persons for the good of all humanity.

Would you say to S, “Yes, I can see the reasonableness of your position”? Or would you say, “That is definitely not a well-reasoned position”? If the latter, then you are saying exactly what you have told us should not be said.

Is it logically and psychologically possible for you to accept the reasonableness of the above-mentioned geocentrists’ reasoning (including what I referred to above as the full panoply of concomitants)? If you can accept that, then I am refuted.

My point was that there are some cases in which one has enough knowledge to be able to assert that a certain opposing position is not reasonable, just because it fails to meet the standards required of reasonability. It fails on evidence, assumptions, or validity of reasoning. When one reaches that point, it is logically impossible to claim reasonableness in that opposing position, for one would have to call reasonable what one has already found to be unreasonable. It is psychologically impossible as well, for it would mean believing two opposing things at the same time: C is unreasonable and C is reasonable.

I have made it manifestly clear (see #34 and #35) that I do not say this about every viewpoint, but only about viewpoints on which one has grounds to conclude that one’s knowledge is sufficient for it.

Now, this is not the first time I’ve pointed to the geocentrists’ claim in support of my position. In other words, I’m not evading your question.

As to the “particular accusation” I have raised, which I take it has to do with your self-refutation, I will post the explanation of it shortly. If instead the “particular accusation” you are referring to has to do with your belittling behavior, that requires no substantiation.

Tom also continues to follow TUaD in raising a particular accusation without any attempt to substantiate it. This kind of accusation is cheap. About it, all I can say is what I’ve already said to TUaD (see #30).

Until Tom directly addresses the point I’ve recapped in #38 and substantiates his repetition of TUaD’s accusation, I’m bowing out. I’d be quite grateful, however, to read any independent assessments of this dialogue–especially from a Jeremy Pierce or a Craig Payne.

You wrote,

We may, after all, be talking to someone unfamiliar with the use of thought experiments (perhaps we are also talking to someone unfamiliar with the idea of logical impossibility)

and

(Let’s hope that that there isn’t any psychological impossibility barring Tom from conceding the absence of logical impossibility here.)

You’ve written those kinds of belittling remarks in the past, and we have discussed them in the past. You’ve said I was being “defensive” when I pointed it out, but you’ve missed the point: your tone of condescension is rude.

You can keep it up if you like; I can’t stop you. It’s a shame, though. You bring up really interesting, challenging ideas to discuss, and then you go and ruin your own participation in it by tossing in this catty superciliousness, as if you thought it would advance your position. I’ve got news for you (I’m sure you knew it anyway): ad hominem argument is not only unseemly, it’s also fallacious.

In fact, while I’m on the topic of valid argumentation, and since you raised the question whether we’re talking to someone familiar with logical impossibility, how are you doing with discovering that self-refutation you committed a few comments ago?

I explained to you the reasons for my unwillingness to move forward with the thought experiment you proposed. You might want to review that before you concoct some other imagined reasons for it.

You wrote,

However, and a bit surprisingly, Tom continues to maintain that, if he knows which view is true, then he cannot (on pain of what Tom calls a “logical and psychological impossibility”) also accept that the other incompatible views remain well-reasoned.

Please review my (a) through (f) outline in comment #34. You will see that I do not claim to know which view is true unless I have examined the alternative views; and that my claim to knowledge is often conditioned on how confident I am that I have done so. If I have studied the other position and concluded on well-informed grounds that it is poorly reasoned, then I have grounds for saying it is poorly reasoned. You do that too, I guarantee it. What was your response to the geocentrists? You were silent on that. I don’t think that you could accept that their views are well reasoned. Was I wrong?

This is illustrated by supposing an omniscient God stepping in and simply telling Tom which of the (formerly?) well-reasoned views is correct. If Tom were to allow this thought experiment, he would have to say that all the other views lose their status of being well-reasoned as soon as God simply reveals the truth to him…. Tom refuses to consider a thought experiment which, hypothetically, involves God revealing special knowledge in this way.

Your wording there is materially different from the way you stated it previously. I would accept this in its current form, though I could not in its previous form. It is entirely consistent with (a) and (b) in comment #34. Or do you think that “to know” requires apodictic certainty in every case? That’s not the way the term is used in philosophy generally.

Consider again the multiple well-reasoned views that aren’t all correct. Their existence constitutes this fact: each of these views is, at this time, well-reasoned. So here’s an easy question: is this a fact that God, at this time, knows? Well, presumably if it is a fact, then God knows about it. So, God knows that each of these views is, at this time, well-reasoned. Now here’s another easy question: does God also know which of the views is in fact true? Presumably He does. So, God accomplishes that which Tom suggests is a “logical impossibility”: He knows the truth about an issue even though He also knows that other false views about the issue are well-reasoned.

How do you define well-reasoned? If one includes the full panoply of concomitants to it, which includes not just the reasoning process but also the evidences and assumptions that feed that process, then God only knows of one well-reasoned version of any possible view.

If you only mean it in the sense that no logical fallacies are committed upon the given evidences and assumptions, then one could reason quite validly to the Ptolemaic cosmology. It was perfectly valid in terms of the evidences and assumptions current in its time.

So perhaps we’ve been arguing past each other. Perhaps you have been meaning “well-reasoned” in the second sense, that of reasoning without committing logical fallacies. I’ve been taking it in a broader sense, meaning, taking into account all relevant data, operating under justifiable assumptions, and reasoning validly to a conclusion.

I do think any conclusion whatsoever can be reasoned to validly, as long as one does not care what evidences or assumptions feed the reasoning process. But so what?

Also: is it really a “recap” if you ignore most of the content of the other person’s comments just prior?

Tom concedes, as he should, the possibility that on some issues there can be several well-reasoned views–even if such views can’t each be true. This means that Tom accepts that a view can be well-reasoned even though it is false.

However, and a bit surprisingly, Tom continues to maintain that, if he knows which view is true, then he cannot (on pain of what Tom calls a “logical and psychological impossibility”) also accept that the other incompatible views remain well-reasoned.

This is striking. It is striking because the movement from (a) not knowing which of the admittedly well-reasoned views is correct to (b) knowing which view is correct, may be a very small one. This is illustrated by supposing an omniscient God stepping in and simply telling Tom which of the (formerly?) well-reasoned views is correct. If Tom were to allow this thought experiment, he would have to say that all the other views lose their status of being well-reasoned as soon as God simply reveals the truth to him.

That’s hard to swallow. So here is Tom’s escape: despite making claims about logical impossibility, Tom refuses to consider a thought experiment which, hypothetically, involves God revealing special knowledge in this way. But let’s not quibble about common and usefully employed devices of philosophy. We may, after all, be talking to someone unfamiliar with the use of thought experiments (perhaps we are also talking to someone unfamiliar with the idea of logical impossibility). The point can be made without illustrations involving God:

All that is necessary is that the small step between (a) and (b) be accomplished in a way that doesn’t touch on the quality of arguments and evidences for the various contested views.

Alternatively, the point can perhaps be made on suppositions about God that Tom will accept. Consider again the multiple well-reasoned views that aren’t all correct. Their existence constitutes this fact: each of these views is, at this time, well-reasoned. So here’s an easy question: is this a fact that God, at this time, knows? Well, presumably if it is a fact, then God knows about it. So, God knows that each of these views is, at this time, well-reasoned. Now here’s another easy question: does God also know which of the views is in fact true? Presumably He does. So, God accomplishes that which Tom suggests is a “logical impossibility”: He knows the truth about an issue even though He also knows that other false views about the issue are well-reasoned. Is it a “logical impossibility” for God to concede to what He knows?! Seriously, where is the logical impossibility? (Let’s hope that that there isn’t any psychological impossibility barring Tom from conceding the absence of logical impossibility here.)