Clay Farris Naff asked in the Huffington Post last week, Do We Really Want America to Be a Christian Iran? It only takes a moment’s reflection on that question to realize Naff’s sense of proportion (like Tavis Smiley’s) is tilted. Many of his “facts” and his arguments are too. It’s about the Manhattan Declaration, from which he quotes,
No one has a civil right to have a non-marital relationship treated as a marriage. Marriage is an objective reality — a covenantal union of husband and wife — that it is the duty of the law to recognize and support for the sake of justice and the common good. If it fails to do so, genuine social harms follow. First, the religious liberty of those for whom this is a matter of conscience is jeopardized…
He responds,
What a pantload! This has all the moral suasion of a claim that to salve the conscience of Seventh Day Adventists we should outlaw donating blood.
To which my first response was, Wow. I won’t respond with the same scatology, because it’s not civil—not that his claim here doesn’t reek of stinky thinking. The rest of the article is likewise distorted, but I’ll let this snippet be representative of the whole.
First, he could hardly be more wrong about the Adventists. A family friend or ours received a kidney transplant at Loma Linda Medical Center, an Adventist hospital. But that’s hardly the half of it. If they were willing to try a (well-publicized) baboon-to-human transplant, it’s not likely they would have much problem with blood transfusions. In fact, “Adventists embrace all ethical medical treatments including blood transfusions.” Maybe Naff was thinking of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a cult whose views both Adventists and I roundly reject.
Second, and more substantively, this is not about “salving consciences.” Salving is for those who feel guilty. We who have signed the Manhattan Declaration, and others who have taken a stand for marriage, are not dealing with feelings of guilt. We’re responding to social and legal attacks on a God-ordained institution. Naff’s thinking on this is sloppier than his fact-finding on Adventists.
But Naff’s most egregious distortion (at least in this snippet) is the parallel he tries to draw between outlawing gay “marriage” and outlawing blood transfusions. To put an end to blood donations would take an aggressive legal and public relations campaign, to change existing laws and practices. Where’s the parallel? Are Christians doing anything remotely like that?
No, not Christians. Here we see the magnificently mixed-up success of the gay rights PR machine. They’ve maneuvered the public into believing we’re making some kind of assault on gay marriage. We’re doing no such thing. We couldn’t; it would be strictly impossible for us to do that. You see, “marriage” in same-sex context really belongs in quotes. Marriage is “a covenantal union of husband and wife.” There is no such thing as gay marriage. There never was. There’s nothing there for us to campaign against.
Really, Tom? Then why all the fuss? Why write it into this Declaration? Here’s why: a legal and social assault has indeed been launched. But we didn’t launch it: they did. They’re the ones campaigning to overturn historic laws, customs, and morality. They speak as if we’re the aggressors, when in reality they are. We’ve had to take up a defensive position, to protect an institution as old as recorded history. We didn’t pick this fight, the other side did.
Let me re-emphasize: there are those in Western culture who have mounted an offensive. It’s not the Christians who have taken the aggressive stance, though; it is the gay rights activists.
It pays to stay aware of what’s really going on. Regardless of what some PR machine may be trying to sell you.
Cross-posted from Thinking Christian
June 2nd, 2010 | 8:27 pm | #1
Tom Gilson makes too much of which side is assaulting the status quo. That’s a red herring. What he needs to give is an actual defense of the status quo–to give the argument for why the status quo isn’t a proper target for assault. But, of course, that’s a more difficult task.
The scant defense Gilson does give for legislating a ban on gay marriage shares at least this with the hypothetical ban on blood transfusion: both defenses rest on distinctively religious premises. As each might put it, both bans are “God-ordained.”
The point is presumably that, unless more can be said, such a defense can’t be given too much weight in a pluralistic democracy.
June 2nd, 2010 | 8:45 pm | #2
Nice post, Tom. Naff misses the analogy. Those who do not find SSM remotely plausible will be seen by our intellectual masters as nothing more than receptacles of the “pantload.”
That means we are not owed respect, deference, kindness, generosity, or the benefit of the doubt. Since it is our approval they want, they will not rest until we are completely silenced, humiliated, and coerced to bless what we cannot bless. This is why all the talk of “tolerance” was the bait in the cultural bait and switch. To request tolerance of me is to allow me to say you are wrong. For I am not tolerant of what I agree with. I embrace it.
So, it is they (us) who are the poor slobs at the JW hospital needing a blood transfusion.
The examples are a-plenty that SSM will mean that those of us who truly want to live a life of tolerance will be banned from doing so. Christian academic institutions, for instance, will likely lose their tax exempt status (e.g., Bob Jones case on the matter of race). Small businesses that deal with the accoutrements of weddings, e.g., private clubs, gown shops, photographers, will have to acquiesce to the new regime, even if they believe that doing so is in violation of that their moral theology demands.
Having said that, I confess that I wish I did not hold the views I hold. But I cannot ignore reason, revelation, and reflection which, in combination, demand that I believe that it is marriage and marriage alone–the one flesh communion between man and woman–that connects me to both by progeny and patrimony. It is not the state or its laws that provide to me an understanding of where I situate myself in the river of life. My parents are my parents, not because the state assigned them to me. But because they participated in the sacrament that allowed them to give of and to each other the fullness of their love. I was not a product of their wills; I was begotten by their love. The Church and its
For Naff, it’s all just a “pantload.” And the pantload begot…..?
June 2nd, 2010 | 8:58 pm | #3
Janice:
Your position assumes that it is wrong to presume the correctness of the status quo. I don’t see any reason why I or anyone else should accept that. To many of us, it is obvious that marriage is a sui generis institution in which the two halves the human race should be wed. In fact, we do not believe it is possible for two people of the same gender to wed, just as it is not possible for the lung to read or the eye to breathe.
That is, we begin with common sense and go from there. That’s the not “the status quo,” that’s just what seems prima face right to us. And it is not simply our religion that tells us that (which is a crude, though common way, of putting it). We believe that our religion merely confirms what was obvious to everyone on Earth since the dawn of time about men and women. In my faith, Catholicism, marriage is a sacrament. And, with no intent to offend Jehovah’s Witnesses, it is laughable to compare marriage to their one verse taken out of context in the late 19th century by Charles Taze Russell. Marriage, in the Christian tradition, is analogous to the relationship between Christ and His Church. The Church is the Bride of Christ. The New Testament uses this wording because the nature of marriage was universal. Everyone knew what it meant.
To ask us to change our view of marriage is literally like asking us to give up our faith in Christ. There can be no compromise here. If it means punishment by the thought-police, then so be it. Our Savior was crucified by the Roman Empire. So, better people than us have suffered under greater enemies of the Gospel than you. I like our odds.
June 2nd, 2010 | 8:58 pm | #4
“…those of us who truly want to live a life of tolerance will be banned from doing so.”
Beckwith sure lays it on thick. Imagine the Jehovah’s Witness emergency room physician complaining of rules that require her to give blood transfusions. And all she wants to do is “live a life of tolerance”!
June 2nd, 2010 | 10:11 pm | #5
Francis Beckwith,
“Your position assumes that it is wrong to presume the correctness of the status quo.”
Rather: If one wishes to defend the status quo against an objection, it’s generally not enough to point out that it’s the status quo.
“To many of us, it is obvious that marriage is a sui generis institution in which the two halves the human race should be wed”
Well and good. It may likewise seem obvious to a Jehovah’s Witness that blood transfusions are sinful. What’s supposed to follow?
“Marriage, in the Christian tradition, is analogous to the relationship between Christ and His Church. The Church is the Bride of Christ.”
Why exactly does SSM threaten this symbolism? And if it does, what’s supposed to follow?
“To ask us to change our view of marriage is literally like asking us to give up our faith in Christ. There”.
Don’t worry Francis, you can keep your “faith in Christ.” No one is even requiring you to change your view of marriage. Similarly, laws against racial segregation do not require the racist to change his personal views about the appropriateness of racial segregation.
June 2nd, 2010 | 11:02 pm | #6
Clay Farris Naff: “Let’s call it what it is: Christo-fascism, the evil twin of Islamo-fascism. Like all such movements, it is founded on appeals to myth and morality. You can find a prime example, all dressed up in scholarly robes, at manhattandeclaration.org.
Make no mistake, behind the whiny plaints of victimhood is a lust for fascism. “Godly lives” is what the mullahs of Iran want everyone to live. It’s the Taliban’s big plan. And it’s what the Manhattan Declaration authors have tucked up their sleeves.”
Jus’ Un-beeee-leeee-vaaa-bull.
There is an unbridgeable divide between the Secular Left and obedient Christians who support the Sanctity of Life, Biblical marriage, and religious liberty.
Therefore, as Francis Beckwith has firmly stated: “There can be no compromise here.”
None.
I applaud all the folks who signed the Manhattan Declaration. It’s a stake in the ground against the evil of the Secular Liberal Taliban.
June 2nd, 2010 | 11:48 pm | #7
Janice: can you name any cultures from the dawn of time to the present that considered same-sex, life-long unions to be just as valid as the marital relationship between man and woman?
I can think of the Greeks, wherein orgies took place and same-sex flings occurred. That’s as close as it gets. You don’t need to reduce everything to our religion when, in fact, our religion confirms what is known through history and anthropology about homosexuality.
Don’t be hatin’.
June 3rd, 2010 | 12:00 am | #8
Gary Simmons, I’ve not investigated most of the cultures “from the dawn of time to the present.” Have you?
But suppose that the great preponderance of such cultures had very strict limitations on which sorts of individuals could marry. How exactly would that be relevant to what we should allow today? Suppose that the great preponderance of such cultures did not allow young women choice in their marriage partners,or that they did not allow dark skinned people to marry light skinned people. What would be the relevance of such facts be to our marriage laws today?
June 3rd, 2010 | 1:05 am | #9
The relevance is that it is not just “our religion,” as if we were mindless zombies with no sense of culture.
June 3rd, 2010 | 1:14 am | #10
Alright Gary, but you’ve yet to provide the needed argument.
On the one hand you back off from giving the religious defense of a sectarian. That’s progress. But you’ve yet to replace this with a non-religious argument. How are facts about the marriage customs of ancient cultures supposed to determine what our marriage laws should be today? What exactly is it about “history and anthropology” that is supposed to settle this issue?
June 3rd, 2010 | 6:45 am | #11
Janice,
I will put it plainly. There is a theological basis to my position. I’ll own up to that. If God does not exist, then I have no basis for objecting to SSM.
That’s because if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever. There is no ground for any objective morals (defined as moral values, duties, or obligations that hold regardless of anyone’s believing them to hold). If there is no God, then morality is, at best, a matter of cultural consensus.
So if there were no God then I would be wrong to say there’s anything wrong with SSM. (Note carefully what I did not say: “If I did not believe in God, then there would be nothing wrong with SSM.” The question is not my beliefs about God, but whether he actually exists or not.)
Does that seem a welcome conclusion to you? Be careful. If there is no God, there is no ground for any moral judgments you might make, either. There is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom. You would have no ground for objecting to the majority of Americans’ view that SSM is wrong.
You can disagree with us, but you cannot claim a moral basis for your objection. You don’t have any ground for any moral objection. You can’t appeal to a higher ethic, and you can’t appeal to consensus. You can say you don’t like our position but you can’t say it’s morally wrong.
You asked how this works in a pluralistic society. Honestly, apart from God, I don’t know. Apart from God, morality’s strongest possible footing would have to be in some kind of cultural consensus–notably lacking in this case. And that’s a problem.
We’ve kicked the referee off the playing field, you see; and with him we’ve also tossed out the rule book. We’re making up the game as we go along. What does that produce? Chaos. No structure. Unless one team is a lot bigger than the other—many of us can remember this kind of thing from our youth—in which case the big kids set whatever rules they see fit. Their “right” to do that comes from their power to do it, and from no other source.
If we push God out of the picture, all we can do is duke it out between the two sides. The one left standing at the end will be the winner. Ethics are decided by power. If that thought doesn’t chill you, imagine living in a world with different winners. The middle-school bully. Genghis Khan. Adolf Hitler. The Confederate South. (That last was a very, very close call–study Gettysburg and you’ll see.)
So: how then do we settle these things, realistically, in a pluralistic society? I think we have two options: we have a referee (transcendent morality) or we have ethics functionally decided by power—which I doubt you want.
Do you have a better answer?
June 3rd, 2010 | 7:23 am | #12
Well argued Tom Gilson, very well argued.
Ironically. while Clay Naff misleads folks by twisting the supporters of the Manhattan Declaration into a ridiculous caricature, it is the Manhattan Declaration which formally supports religious liberty and freedom of religious expression. He is free to promote his religion of secular liberalism. The Manhattan Declaration supports his freedom to advocate the tenets of secular liberalism in the Public Square.
While he, the hypocrite, would deny Christians the freedom of religious expression to participate in the Public Square. He and the secular liberals are the Taliban, not the Christians.
—————–
For what it’s worth, while theists appeal to a transcendent source for objective morality and non-theists don’t, and regardless of whether it’s a pluraiistic democratic society or a fascist dictator society, there will also be a struggle for power. (As Christians often say, it’s not just a war against flesh and blood, but against the unseen powers and spirits.)
Biblical arguments and natural law arguments will always contend against the secular, relativistic arguments of liberals like Naff and Janice and it will be seen as a struggle for power. And this power struggle will play right into the mantra narrative of Oppressor/Oppressed and claims of victimhood and the subjective perceptions of various social justice claimants. Bah!
June 3rd, 2010 | 7:46 am | #13
Janice says: “But suppose that the great preponderance of such cultures had very strict limitations on which sorts of individuals could marry. How exactly would that be relevant to what we should allow today? Suppose that the great preponderance of such cultures did not allow young women choice in their marriage partners,or that they did not allow dark skinned people to marry light skinned people. What would be the relevance of such facts be to our marriage laws today?”
The issue is not about who may marry whom but about the very definition of marriage itself. What is it that makes a marriage? Certainly not every relationship is a marriage. If I am living with a close platonic friend, may I call this relationship a marriage and apply for the public benefits that come with marriage? Do I not have the right to do this? If I am denied, can I charge the deniers with being unfairly discriminatory?
Where are the boundaries that separate marriage from nonmarital relationships? If sexual complementarity is dropped as a defining feature, there seems little reason not to drop monogamy, vows of exclusive fidelity, etc. What’s left after all the distinguishing features have been eliminated?
June 3rd, 2010 | 8:50 am | #14
Theo: “The issue is not about who may marry whom but about the very definition of marriage itself.”
Well, what Clay Naff and Janice and other liberals are arguing is… WHO gets to define the definition of marriage.
Tom Gilson mentions that cultural consensus in a pluralistic society is used to determine social morality. So let’s look at what has happened. In every state where the definition of marriage was voted upon by voters, the historic definition of marriage has won. Every time.
So what do the advocates of Gay “Marriage” do? They go to the courts and have it imposed by judicial fiat. Or in a few cases they have had lawmakers impose their definition of gay “marriage” without having the citizens of that state vote on it.
It is the secular liberal Taliban who is imposing their definition of marriage upon the majority of people in the United States.
The liberal Taliban’s arguments lose in the Public Square of a pluralistic society. Hence, they want to suppress the freedom and liberty of religious expression so as to keep Christians from participating in the Public Square.
June 3rd, 2010 | 10:58 am | #15
Tom Gilson: “We didn’t pick this fight, the other side did.
It’s not the Christians who have taken the aggressive stance, though; it is the gay rights activists.”
You’re absolutely right, Tom.
What’s galling is that to even just defend yourself against the aggression these gay rights activists, you’re name-called as being the aggressor/oppressor and associated with the Taliban.
The mere act of self-defense against gay rights activists makes you the aggressor in their eyes and them the victims. How loopy is that?
It’s like the liberal rapist saying that the conservative rapee is the aggressor and that the rapist is the victim. It’s completely Orwellian.
June 3rd, 2010 | 12:47 pm | #16
Tom Gilson,
“If God does not exist, then I have no basis for objecting to SSM. That’s because if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever.”
On the one hand, these statements do not yet admit the true narrowness of your own sectarian case against SSM. To make your religious case against SSM, you’ll need to posit more than the bare existence of a god, or even of a supernatural creator. So while it’s difficult enough to expect others to concede an argument that presupposes the existence of a god, you actually need others to concede much more. How much more? Well, try spelling out the rest of your religious argument.
On the other hand, these general statements that you do make are highly dubious. You claim that “if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever.” But consider the norms of logic, the norms of rationality, or the norms of arithmetic. How exactly is it is that the simple theorem “2+2=4” depends on the existence of God for its justification? Likewise, for any proposition P, it is norm of logic that “if P, then P.” How is it that this norm depends on the existence of God for its justification? Likewise, it is a norm of rationality that if you believe that P is true, then you should not also at the same time believe that P is false. How is it that this norm depends on the existence of God for its justification? I suspect that any answers that you give to these questions will be much more doubtful than the norms themselves. Still, I would love to hear your answers. Since you make your own case against SSM depend on such answers, such answers will reveal both the dubiousness of your position, and its narrow sectarian nature. (I would love to hear the anti-SSM folks make these arguments within an actual court case!)
June 3rd, 2010 | 2:01 pm | #17
Janice: “How exactly is it is that the simple theorem “2+2=4” depends on the existence of God for its justification? Likewise, for any proposition P, it is norm of logic that “if P, then P.” How is it that this norm depends on the existence of God for its justification?”
Actually, it’s not a problem at all for Christians. It’s a little involved, and any reasonably informed Christian apologist knows what I’m referring to.
And since your question is addressed to Tom Gilson, I’ll let him knock your slow pitch out of the ball park.
June 3rd, 2010 | 3:24 pm | #18
Tom, out of curiosity are you any relation to the thomist philosopher Étienne Gilson?
June 3rd, 2010 | 3:34 pm | #19
Tom, let me start off by saying that I am a Christian and I do believe that God exists–and that my comment is not directly related to SSM. But I have a question about what you say in comment #11. You say that if God does not exist then: “There is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom.” Well what about the Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Plato, who did not believe in God? They had a system of ethics and traditions. How do you explain away their beliefs with regard to morality.
June 3rd, 2010 | 9:07 pm | #20
Janice and Alison,
There are several ways to approach the question you’ve both asked, which is how it is that the existence of objective morality depends on the existence of God. I’ll respond with just one for now, and I’ll be as brief with it as I can.
Recall the definition of objective morality I used (I’m following William Lane Craig here): that there are “moral values, duties, or obligations that hold regardless of anyone’s believing them to hold.” This contrasts with current common (though unreflective) views that morality is either (a) a matter of one’s own choice or (b) a matter of societal agreement and/or cultural norms.
Craig asks us to suppose that Hitler had won WWII, and that after that victory, he convinced every person alive that the Holocaust was good and right (and killed every person who would not be so persuaded). The result would be a world in which every single person believed the Holocaust was good and right. There would be 100% social consensus on the matter. If that were to happen, would it be true that for those persons, the Holocaust was good and right? If morality depended on individual or social/cultural assent, then yes, the Holocaust for them would certainly be judged as having been good and right. But if there are objective moral values, the answer would be no: even in that case, the Holocaust would still have been wrong and evil.
Now, if you believe that Holocaust was wrong, regardless of how many or how few persons might agree it was wrong, then you believe there are objective moral values in the sense defined above. If you think otherwise, then you believe there are some social circumstances under which the Holocaust could conceivably be judged good and right; and if you believe that, then frankly you have some very sadly strange views about what might conceivably be good and right.
I take it that most people, reflecting on the thought experiment thus outlined, would agree there really are at least some objective moral duties, values, and/or obligations. That’s why I said above that it is “current, common, though unreflective” opinion that morality resides in individuals or society. Most people on reflection would agree the Holocaust was just wrong. Period. Full stop. No matter what.
But let’s take the thought experiment a step further. We’re supposing that after Hitler’s hypothetical victory, everyone thought the Holocaust was good and right. If you agree with what I wrote in the preceding paragraph, then you would also have to agree that they objectively, morally wrong to think that; and thus they were failing to fulfill some real moral duty, value, or obligation.
But what could that possibly mean? Toward what or whom would such a duty or obligation be owed? (A duty or obligation is meaningless unless it is a duty or obligation toward someone or something.) Was it toward the Jews? There wouldn’t be any Jews alive to receive the duty or obligation, in our thought experiment, so that makes no sense. Toward the memory of the Jews? That’s a fuzzy enough concept to start with; and besides, if everyone thought the Holocaust was morally fine, there wouldn’t be much point in honoring the memory of the Jews, would there? I can’t think of anyone or anything (save one, see below) to which such a duty or obligation could really be owed. Can you?
What about the idea that they were failing to fulfill some objective moral value? The question then must be, what or who would be the “valuer” that made it an objective value? Value doesn’t exist apart from persons; rocks and trees, planets and stars don’t value anything. In the case of the thought experiment, there wouldn’t be any person alive who placed value on the lives of Jews; so if that particular moral value depended on humans for existence, it couldn’t exist.
There is one exception to what I wrote in the prior two paragraphs: if there exists some moral standard or authority residing in a person who transcended humanity, then there would exist real moral duties, values, and obligations even in the case of a world where every human disagreed with some or all of those moral standards.
I could (and have done so elsewhere) argue that the only good candidate for that source of personal transcendent morality is God. Rather than extending this comment by developing that argument, though, I’ll put the ball in your court (especially for you, Janice). Maybe you would agree only God could provide that grounding for objective morality, or maybe not. If not, what alternative would you suggest?
And with respect to the parallel you proposed with logic and mathematics: do you see now that it does not hold; that there really is no parallel there? I think this is evident enough; but this is getting long, so I’ll let you work on that, and if you want me (or someone else here) to develop the thought still further, please let us know and show us why you still think so.
June 3rd, 2010 | 9:15 pm | #21
Janice, you also wrote,
But I wasn’t trying to make a religious case against SSM just by positing the bare existence of a god. I made the case of God who provides a transcendent source of morality (figuratively speaking, the referee with the rule book, in that comment).
I also made the point that absent such a God and such a transcendent source of morality, you cannot coherently say there is anything wrong with my position. You moralistically tag my view as “narrow” and “sectarian.” But if there is no God, you can’t coherently say there is anything wrong with being narrow or sectarian.
You close by saying you would love to hear us make these arguments in court. That’s tantamount to saying you would love to see us put these arguments to the test of power. Who would win? is your implied question. By positioning it that way, you demonstrate just how thoroughly you missed the closing point of my argument: if it’s about who wins, it’s about the power game. I asked you before and you didn’t answer. I’ll ask you again: do you really want to live in a world where morality is decided by who holds the most power?
June 3rd, 2010 | 9:22 pm | #22
David,
No, no relation to Étienne Gilson at all.
Oh, well.
June 3rd, 2010 | 10:15 pm | #23
A while ago Bill Vallicella blogged about about a series of top-notch thinkers, including “… Thomas, Gilson, and ….”
At first I didn’t notice the comma.
Oh, well.
June 4th, 2010 | 1:06 am | #24
Tom Gilson,
“But I wasn’t trying to make a religious case against SSM just by positing the bare existence of a god.”
Obviously. The point is that your own case against SSM will likely turn out to be highly sectarian, relying on additional religious premises besides the premise that there is a god. Recall the observation I made at the beginning: “The scant defense Gilson does give for legislating a ban on gay marriage shares at least this with the hypothetical ban on blood transfusion: both defenses rest on distinctively religious premises. As each might put it, both bans are ‘God-ordained.’ The point is presumably that, unless more can be said, such a defense can’t be given too much weight in a pluralistic democracy.”
“You close by saying you would love to hear us make these arguments in court. That’s tantamount to saying you would love to see us put these arguments to the test of power.”
Yours is a very cynical view of the sorts of arguments that hold up in court. The hypothetical JW ban on blood transfusions would not hold up in a court. But is this merely because such arguments would fail “the test of power”? Courts are far from perfect, but I’m not that cynical.
“…even in that case, the Holocaust would still have been wrong and evil…. they were failing to fulfill some real moral duty, value, or obligation. But what could that possibly mean? Toward what or whom would such a duty or obligation be owed?”
Isn’t it obvious? Each person presumably has a moral obligation not to murder innocent people. This is an obligation owed in the first place to the innocent people themselves. So, when the Nazi murdered innocent people, he violated an obligation he had to these innocent people. Are his victims now dead? Sure. But does it remain true that he has violated the obligation he had towards them? Of course. It’s strange that you find this mysterious.
“The question then must be, what or who would be the “valuer” that made it an objective value? Value doesn’t exist apart from persons; rocks and trees, planets and stars don’t value anything.”
Here you seem to be conflating a few ideas. It is one thing for something to be valuable. It’s another thing for it to be valued. It’s still another thing for it to be a valuer. Ordinary we suppose that a valuer can value something that isn’t actually valuable. It’s a debated issue whether something can be valuable even if no valuer happens to value it.
“And with respect to the parallel you proposed with logic and mathematics: do you see now that it does not hold; that there really is no parallel there? ”
Tom, earlier you claimed that “if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever.” If what you say is true, then you must think that if there is no God then the norms of logic, rationality and arithmetic would not be justifiable. Otherwise, such norms would provide a basis for objecting to whatever traditions, norms or customs stand in violation to those same norms (e.g., a tradition that denied that 2+2=4). And that would contradict your claim. So, in order for you to avoid this contradiction, you must maintain that all such norms of logic, rationality and arithmetic depend upon God for their justification. That’s a strong claim; so let’s have the argument for it. Otherwise, drop the strong claim. (As I said earlier, I suspect that any argument you give for your strong claim will be much more dubious than the very norms you are trying to justify. In fact, any argument you give will probably end up presupposing the norms you are trying to justify.)
You might, of course, scale back your claim, insisting only that moral norms depend upon the existence of God for their justification. But why should we think this? If it’s not obvious that the objectively valid norms of logic, rationality, and arithmetic depend upon the existence of God for their justification, why is it any more obvious that the norms of morality do?
June 4th, 2010 | 2:03 am | #25
“If it’s not obvious that the objectively valid norms of logic, rationality, and arithmetic depend upon the existence of God for their justification, why is it any more obvious that the norms of morality do?”
It may not be obvious to you (for whatever reason), but it’s obvious to me that the objectively valid norms of logic depends upon or presupposes the existence of a transcendent God.
———-
“Each person presumably has a moral obligation not to murder innocent people.”
This begs the question. What is the source of this moral obligation? Your presumption lacks justification.
———-
“The point is that your own case against SSM will likely turn out to be highly sectarian”
Actually, the point is that your case for SSM is just as highly sectarian as his, if not more.
June 4th, 2010 | 4:09 am | #26
If anyone shares TUAD’s concerns, please let me know; I’ll then respond. Otherwise, I’ll assume it’s best to await other comments.
June 4th, 2010 | 5:17 am | #27
Janice,
Your position rests on the premise that there is no God, that he has not spoken, or that his existence and morality are irrelevant. That’s not a religiously neutral position.
You write,
I’d like you to define “cynical” in context of this discussion. Here’s how it appears to me: you don’t take the view that courts will decide a case just on the basis of power. Then on what basis will they decide it? A higher morality? How much higher? Your refusal to be cynical could easily be based on agreement with my own belief in higher, i.e., transcendent morality. In other words, your lack of cynicism does not prima facie support your position at all. It needs further explanation at least.
Well, if I had said what you say I said, it would indeed be strange. But I didn’t say that. I was not speaking of the one who killed. I was speaking in this thought experiment of the ones after the fact who did not kill. It could apply even a generation later, to persons did nothing at all with respect to the Jewish nation except agree that their extermination had been a good thing. To whom would they owe any obligation? There would be no one there to owe it to.
Then by all means feel free to debate it. Until you do, you haven’t begun to rebut it. It’s also a debated issue whether the earth is flat. Who is debating it, and do they have a leg to stand on?
The context of course was ethical norms (relating to how persons behave), which are completely different from logical and arithmetical axioms and entailments (relating to how arguments, proofs, etc. must be evaluated). You cannot equivocate on “norm” here and force me into a position I haven’t taken up.
Well, I think these other norms depend on God for their existence too, but as you nicely put it, that fact is not as obvious; that is, it requires a more extended argument. You can see one piece of it here, but as I said, it’s only a piece of it, and the whole is quite lengthy. I think the argument with respect to morality is more accessible, more “obvious.” But really that’s beside the point. Your equivocation on “norm” is not legitimate.
And now for the third time (quoting myself now):
June 4th, 2010 | 5:34 am | #28
When you answer that question, I do hope you will do it in view of the argument leading up to it where I first asked it. It would be easy to respond to what I just wrote, “No; why on earth would I want that?!” But that would not be engaging the real question.
If you prefer you could answer this earlier question of mine instead (in context of that argument too, of course):
June 4th, 2010 | 7:32 am | #29
Thanks for your response, Tom. I appreciate the long answer. I will read it more deeply tonight. I was not trying to be confrontational; I was just unclear about your statement.
June 4th, 2010 | 8:07 am | #30
Tom Gilson,
You can assert this Tom, but it isn’t really convincing until you at least explain what you’re referring to as my position, and my argument for it. Regarding SSM, about all I’ve given is a critique of your arguments.
Recall the context, Tom. It would be cynical to suppose that the only reason that the hypothetical JW ban on blood transfusions wouldn’t stand in court is that such a ban would fail the “test of power.” Do you think that this would be the only reason for why such a ban wouldn’t stand in court? (Hint: if you don’t think so, then you can probably answer your own questions by considering the other types of reasons for why the transfusion ban wouldn’t stand.)
What could apply even a generation later? It looks like you’ve gotten a little tangled up here. In your imagined scenario, we can say that the Nazis who murdered the innocent people violated their moral obligations to these people. That fact would always remain true. As such, that fact would ground the present day judgment that the Holocaust was morally wrong. Where’s the mystery? Which other obligations are you imagining? (Try to specify them precisely and then we might discuss them.)
Tom, recall the context. You simply asserted that something cannot be valuable unless there is a valuer to value it. I’m simply pointing out that this is a debated issue (whether it’s true or not is not simply taken for granted among the people who specialize in value theory). Your claim is certainly not obvious. But if, strangely, it’s not obvious to you that your claim is not obviously true, then I’ll be happy to discuss this further.
I’m not the one equivocating Tom. You were the one who made the claim about any “tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever.” Were you unaware that ethical norms are not the only kind of (objectively valid) norms?
And what do you say about this “more extended argument”? Isn’t it just as I suspected: that it is more dubious than the very norms you are trying to justify, and that it presupposes the norms you are trying to justify? (Recall the examples of the norms I mentioned.)
Of course, this is the very claim that I’m asking you to substantiate. Still waiting.
Have you ever read anything by John Rawls?
June 4th, 2010 | 8:53 am | #31
Each person presumably has a moral obligation not to murder innocent people.
Actually, they don’t. This is a classic example of a bootstrapped argument. In the absence of God no one has a moral obligation to do anything. Moral obligations exist only if there is someone to which we owe that obligation.
A person’s “innocence” doesn’t confer such obligation. In Tom’s example, the people weren’t innocent, they were guilty of being Jewish. If there is no transcendental authority, anyone can be made to be guilty of anything the people in power want them to be guilty of. Their race, religion, social standing, lineage, eating habits, anything.
The above statement fails as basis for moral obligation because without a transcendental authority the entire concept of “innocence” is meaningless. Without a God, innocence or guilt are subjective concepts malleable by those in power. History is rife with examples.
June 4th, 2010 | 10:12 am | #32
Superb rebuttal BillT.
It’s why I called her on it immediately, hoping that she’d realize her fallacy on her own instead of having someone point it out to her.
June 4th, 2010 | 10:35 am | #33
Gay Rights: Distortion and Aggression
Here’s another example: Homosexuality and the Military, What’s Really at Stake by Albert Mohler on the likely repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy established by President Clinton.
Excerpt: “When homosexuality is normalized in the armed forces, an entire interconnected network of laws, regulations, directives, and policies will eventually shift as well. As those pushing for the normalization of homosexuality understand all too well, any policy that meets that objective will necessarily sanction personnel who do not conform to the new expectation. … Homosexuality will be transformed from something that is officially “incompatible with military service,” to a reality that must be protected by rules and regulations about discrimination, advancement, promotion, and military culture.”
Another instance of oppression by the secular liberal Taliban.
June 4th, 2010 | 2:48 pm | #34
BillT,
Bill, your claim here is very similar to the claim Tom Gilson has, up until now, unsuccessfully tried to defend. Mr. Gilson attempted two kinds of defenses. First, he tried to appeal to the strong claim that “if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever” , thereby trying to defend a dubious claim with one that was even more dubious (see comments 16 and 24 above). Second, he appealed to something like the point you’ve made: “Moral obligations exist only if there is someone to which we owe that obligation.” While this last point is quite plausible, it doesn’t show what you want it to show—that in the absence of God, no one has a moral obligation to do anything. It’s quite a leap to go from “moral obligations only exist if there is someone to which we owe that obligation” to “moral obligations only exist if there is a God.”
It’s undoubtedly true that powerful, influence wielding people often get away with morally perverse lifestyles, excusing themselves with twisted moral thinking. But it’s not as if this shows that moral concepts are “subjective concepts.” Powerful people also manage to pass off bad non-moral arguments which violate the norms of rationality and deductive logic. Does this prove that the norms of rationality and logic are subjective? Of course not. The fact that powerful people sometimes engage in twisted moral lifestyles, twisting the norms of morality, rationality and logic may only mean that such people are violating standards which are in fact objective.
June 4th, 2010 | 3:05 pm | #35
Janice: “It’s quite a leap to go from “moral obligations only exist if there is someone to which we owe that obligation” to “moral obligations only exist if there is a God.”
No, it’s not. It’s the next common-sense step for anyone who can reason.
June 4th, 2010 | 3:14 pm | #36
Classic TUAD.
June 4th, 2010 | 3:49 pm | #37
Janice, you keep answering without answering, asserting without argument. You say you don’t think our arguments necessarily lead to the conclusions we suggest, but that is all you say
June 4th, 2010 | 3:53 pm | #38
(…continuing) If you want to rebut an argument, you might want to address and engage the argument– which you may think you are doing, but you are not.
June 4th, 2010 | 4:07 pm | #39
Tom Gilson,
There are several ways to engage an argument. One way is to call into question the premises of the argument. That’s what I was doing when when I was discussing your strong claim that “if there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever” (see comments 16 and 24 above). Another way to engage an argument is to call into question the validity of the argument, showing that even if the premises are true, the conclusion may still be false. That’s what I was doing in discussing the very last arguments suggested by BillT (see comment 34).
So, while you may assert that I am not engaging the arguments, you’ve failed to make your assertion plausible. And that’s a failure to engage.
June 4th, 2010 | 4:19 pm | #40
Tom, there are a lot of questions I’ve put to you that you’ve not answered. I’d like to add one more. Have you ever taken a course in deductive logic, or read any books on the subject?
June 4th, 2010 | 4:21 pm | #41
Tom Gilson: “We who have signed the Manhattan Declaration, and others who have taken a stand for marriage, are not dealing with feelings of guilt. We’re responding to social and legal attacks on a God-ordained institution.“.
Absolutely correct, Tom!
June 4th, 2010 | 4:24 pm | #42
Here’s what we might call the cheerleading variation of the classic TUAD.
June 4th, 2010 | 5:15 pm | #43
Here’s what we might call the non-engaging ad hominem variation of the classic Janice.
June 4th, 2010 | 5:42 pm | #44
TUAD, what’s your understanding of “ad hominem”? If it upsets you that your comments #41 and #35 happen to be prototypical of all your contributions, maybe you should consider changing your style.
Just a suggestion.
June 4th, 2010 | 5:49 pm | #45
Janice,
Your claim that you are calling into “question the premises of the argument” isn’t the valid form of argument you claim it is. You fail to describe what is wrong with the arguments you criticize. You simply make the bald assertion that it doesn’t prove what it says it does. Your counter to Tom’s argument is a good example.
You state ”It’s quite a leap to go from “moral obligations only exist if there is someone to which we owe that obligation” to “moral obligations only exist if there is a God.”Really? Why? What exactly is that big leap. Simply asserting it as a big leap explains nothing. Tom’s point is valid. Obligations we have to others have no ability to bind us beyond our willingness to ignore them. Only if my obligation is to a transcendent authority can a true and binding obligation be said to exist.
Without a transcendent authority, good and evil, innocence or guilt, right and wrong, morality or immorality are all just words. They can be made to mean whatever the person using them wants them to mean unless there is some final arbiter to say no. They have no binding authority over any of us. If this is not true then explain, why I should accept anyone’s definitions or be bound by any of these concepts. Explain why I can’t just say “Sez Who?” to any definition of these ideas or obligation these might supposedly create.
If this is not to your liking, then take the affirmative. You claimed that Each person presumably has a moral obligation not to murder innocent people. Explain why? Explain to us why a person’s “innocence” creates a obligation for every person to treat them morally. Given you made that statement I gather you believe it to be true. Can you tell us the reasons for that belief.
June 4th, 2010 | 6:14 pm | #46
You appear to be governed by anger and hatred rather than rational understanding of those who oppose SSM. You have done a great job of cathartically unleashing your anger at those who oppose SSM but offer very little on why those who disagree with you are wrong and provide a rational case why you are right to the exclusion of others.
June 4th, 2010 | 8:07 pm | #47
Teleologist: “You appear to be governed by anger and hatred rather than rational understanding of those who oppose SSM.”
Teleologist, are you noticing inappropriate emoting by Janice which then colors and adversely affects her reasoning faculties?
At least she hasn’t lapsed into hysterical shrieking like some pro-gay apologist have done when they’re countered with facts and intelligent reasoning. Gotta give her credit for that.
June 4th, 2010 | 8:40 pm | #48
BillT,
An argument can only make its conclusion as plausible as its premises. So, if I point out that the premises of an argument are implausible (or more implausible than the conclusion), this shows that the argument cannot be of much help in adding any plausibility to the conclusion. And that’s a legitimate criticism, so long the argument I’m criticizing is intended show the plausibility of its conclusion.
What exactly do you have in mind as “Tom’s argument”? What exactly do you have in mind as my “bald assertion”? Tom has tried to make several arguments; I have criticized several of them.
We say, colloquially, that there it is a leap going from one claim to a second first if the first claim does not clearly secure the truth of the second claim. In the case at hand, the first claim says that, in order to have a moral obligation, there must be someone to whom that obligation is owed. This claim clearly entails, for example, that there are no moral obligations in a world in which no one exists. This is because there exists no one to whom the obligation could be owed. But suppose we are dealing with a universe in which there are people. So far as the first claim is concerned, in such a universe there are people to whom obligations could be owed. Therefore, so far as the first claim is concerned, there could be moral obligations. It would require additional premises to clearly show that the people in such a universe could not actually be owed obligations, if there is no God. That idea is not clearly entailed by the first claim.
This is the sort of strong general claim for which you ought to try to provide a defense. What is it about these specific kinds of obligations (i.e., obligations to others) that makes it the case that they cannot be binding without a “transcendent authority”. As Mr. Gilson concedes, it’s not obvious that other sorts of objectively valid norms/obligations require God in order to be binding. Why should obligations to others be any different? As I’ve pointed out, for some norms, the claim that we are bound by them is more plausible than any argument that tries to show any dependency on God, or a “transcendent authority.” For some such norms, any such argument will invariably presuppose the bindingness of the norms in question.
(More to follow, but in the meantime please feel free to engage with this discussion. And feel free to answer the questions.)
June 4th, 2010 | 8:53 pm | #49
Correcting some typos from the midsection of post #48:
Quoting BillT:
We say, colloquially, that it is a leap going from one claim to a second if the first claim does not clearly secure the truth of the second claim. In the case at hand, the first claim says that, in order to have a moral obligation, there must be someone to whom that obligation is owed. This claim clearly entails, for example, that there are no moral obligations in a world in which no one exists. This is because there exists no one to whom the obligation could be owed. But suppose we are dealing with a universe in which there are people. So far as the first claim is concerned, in such a universe there are people to whom obligations could be owed. Therefore, so far as the first claim is concerned, there could be moral obligations. It would require additional premises to clearly show that the people in such a universe could not actually be owed obligations, if there is no God. The truth of that idea is not clearly secured by the first claim.
Get the idea?
June 4th, 2010 | 10:11 pm | #50
Teleologist, what exactly is the offense in asking Mr. Gilson if he’s ever studied, as a subject, deductive logic? (Not everyone has; it doesn’t mean your a bad person if you haven’t; and I certainly don’t hate those who haven’t!)
June 4th, 2010 | 11:51 pm | #51
So as to escape the little echo chamber that is Evangel blog, I’ll make a proposal for Tom Gilson, BillT, TUAD, teleologist, et al.
A number of you continue to resist my claim that it is a leap to infer the second of these claims directly from the first:
So here’s my proposal. Find a thinker you respect (a W.L. Craig, an Alvin Plantinga, or someone who has taught logic would be ideal) and present them with claims (1) and (2), exactly as stated. Then, ask this person the following question: is it a leap to directly infer claim (2) from claim (1)?
(For extra credit, you might ask them to read my comment #49 and have them explain it to you.)
June 5th, 2010 | 12:22 am | #52
“Teleologist, what exactly is the offense in asking Mr. Gilson if he’s ever studied, as a subject, deductive logic?”
Okay. May I ask if you’re a lower-division undergraduate currently? Not that it matters too much because I’ve seen tenured professors make remarkably bad arguments, but it seems to me that you think too highly of your own rhetoric, perhaps even taking a measure of pride in what you might think is cleverness, while others, like myself, see a pouting juvenile throwing out terms of logic, but unable to marshal a coherent response.
It’s like you’re playing a game to just offer a response, and it doesn’t matter if your response is any good, you just want to have the last word. It’s both juvenile and comical.
Hence I was wondering if you’re a lower-division undergraduate that’s just taken a lower division course in elementary logic.
June 5th, 2010 | 12:25 am | #53
Taken in isolation it is not offensive. Have you attended an anger management class before? Have you ever been tested for bipolar disorder? Have you ever check if you have any symptoms of psychological disorder?
June 5th, 2010 | 12:38 am | #54
The answer to your questions, TUAD and Teleology, are “no” (x4). But before drawing all such conclusions about offensiveness and game playing, why didn’t one of you rather ask me why I put that question to Mr. Gilson?
And wouldn’t it still be nice if Mr. Gilson answered some of the questions I’ve put to him?
June 5th, 2010 | 12:51 am | #55
TUAD and Teleologist, it might a good time for the two of you to have a crack at the question I posed to TUAD in #44:
What’s your understanding of “ad hominem’?
June 5th, 2010 | 1:03 am | #56
When did I make any conclusion of offensiveness? What game am I playing?
June 5th, 2010 | 1:15 am | #57
From Webster
1 : appealing to feelings or prejudices rather than intellect
2 : marked by or being an attack on an opponent’s character rather than by an answer to the contentions made
June 5th, 2010 | 1:20 am | #58
Teleologist, re-read comments 46, and 53-54. Also, feel free to interchange “anger and hatred” with “offensiveness.”
June 5th, 2010 | 1:23 am | #59
or rather, comments 46, and 52-53.
June 5th, 2010 | 2:19 am | #60
Why should I? I never used the word offensive in my original comment. If I had wanted to use the word offensive instead of “anger and hatred” then I would have used it.
You talk about logic and rationality. These are based on precise definition of terms, yet you are so careless with your terms. This does not bode well for your logic and reasoning skills.
Why don’t you show your ability in logic and rational thinking and make your case for SSM to the exclusion of this OP?
June 5th, 2010 | 2:30 am | #61
Teleologist, I’ll make the exchange for you:
Before drawing all such conclusions about “anger and hatred” and game playing, why didn’t one of you (TUAD or Teleologist) rather ask me why I put that question to Mr. Gilson?
And did you learn anything from your investigation of “ad hominem”? (Did re-read comments 46, and 52-53?)
June 5th, 2010 | 2:41 am | #62
What a fun thread. IMO Janice is cleaning everyone’s clock.
She got the better of the argument right away because as soon as the theist mixes and matches the registers of philosophy and political discourse with too much abandon, it looks as if the only arguments on behalf of traditional ethical positions the theist can offer are those specific to her or his theological tradition.
But reasons that make perfect sense within the bounds of a particular theological tradition are not great cards to play in political discourse in a pluralistic democracy. Laws are the product of political negotiation. It’s self-defeating not to make arguments that appeal to those outside of one’s religious circles.
A work of translation is necessary. After all, we live in a land in which the Supreme Court has stated that to be constitutional, a law has to have “a secular legislative purpose” (Lemon v Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
To be sure, originalists might argue, and I would concur, that “secular” must mean some sort of Deism at least, of the kind some of the framers of Constitution found congenial.
Furthermore, one might add, within the realm of political discourse, Kant’s argument for the existence of God from the possibility of ethics is compelling. Kant certainly thought so, and thought the fact had relevance to public affairs. Yes, it is now understood that Kant was a theist as opposed to a deist, and certainly not a closet atheist. But atheists often pay him a fine compliment by treating him as one of their own, since they find so many of his arguments compelling.
I agree with Janice that the theists on this thread have their work still cut out for them. She is also right IMHO that TUAD is making a classic fool of himself.
On the other hand, since she has been so kind as to offer excellent questions for the theists – which they have yet to answer – perhaps she can begin to help us all to find common ground in the public square at the intersection of ethics and law and offer up “secular” reasons for a host of laws that relate to the realm of the social construction of sexuality. I would ask her to defend laws against (1) polygamy; (2) incest; and (3) consensual man-boy intercourse. She would advance the discussion by offering examples of the kind of reasoning she finds congenial in cases like the one at hand.
I am a theist with traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior. I can think of plenty of “secular” reasons for my stance – secular in the sense of covertly theist, of the kind that litter American public discourse, as Steven D. Smith argues in his brilliant recent book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse.
But before presenting such secular reasons, I would rather hear Janice justify some of the laws of this land in accordance, not only with the rules of deductive logic (and yes, I took a course in that, and loved every minute of it), but also, secular reason.
Here’s hoping for an open and vulnerable discussion, not a narrowly polemical one, as has been the case to a large extent so far.
June 5th, 2010 | 6:15 am | #63
Francis Beckwith, #3: “We believe that our religion merely confirms what was obvious to everyone on Earth since the dawn of time about men and women.”
Quite so. Dr. Francis Beckwith has also written a book, Politics for Christians: Statecraft As Soulcraft.
Product Description: “Politics is concerned with citizenship and the administration of justice–how communities are formed and governed. The role of Christians in the political process is hotly contested, but as citizens, Francis Beckwith argues, Christians have a rich heritage of sophisticated thought, as well as a genuine responsibility, to contribute to the shaping of public policy.
In particular, Beckwith addresses the contention that Christians, or indeed religious citizens of any faith, should set aside their beliefs before they enter the public square. What role should religious citizens take in a liberal democracy? What is the proper separation of church and state? What place should be made for natural rights and the moral law within a secular state?
This cogent introduction to political thought surveys political science, politics and government while making the case for how statecraft may genuinely contribute to soulcraft.”
Excerpt of one reviewer’s comment:
“Several arguments in favor of secular liberalism are also tackled and found inadequate. I found his treatment of Robert Audi’s secular reason argument to be particularly helpful. The division of reasons into the categories of “secular” and “religious,” of which the former is treated as fact and the latter is treated as mere subjective opinion, is illusory. “At the end of the day, a reason is weak or strong, true or false. Thus, `religious’ and ‘secular’ are not relevant properties when assessing the quality of reasons people may offer as part of their arguments.” Highlighting a point made by Thomas Aquinas, Beckwith writes that “The difference between objects of faith and objects of reason… is not in their status as objectives of knowledge, but in how the knowledge is acquired by the human mind.”
Finally, Beckwith ends with a great chapter on the moral argument for the existence of God, which serves as a handy apologetic for the Christian faith.“
June 5th, 2010 | 6:23 am | #64
Janice,
I only know your position as far as you have stated it here, and that is all I have responded to, Janice. Your position (as you have stated and I have responded) is that a non-religious argument is required (comment #10, #16, #24); that history is irrelevant (comment #8); that there is some relevant parallel between miscegenation laws and SSM (comment #8); that “sectarian” arguments are “narrow,” implying that defeats or degrades them in some way (comment #16); that ethical norms parallel arithmetic or logical “norms” (comment #16); that the ethical obligation not to murder is “obvious” apart from any apparent grounding for that obligation (comment #24).
That’s an outline of some of your key assertions. As for your arguments for your position, I’m afraid that’s up to you, not to me. I don’t see any arguments for those assertions.
And really, Janice, at each point where I have responded to your assertions, I have tried to treat them according to what you have explained about them. If I’ve missed some of what you would want said about them, then please clarify what you want me to understand. Some supporting arguments would be most helpful to that purpose.
Janice, when you said that you would love to see anti-SSM advocates make their arguments in court, that’s equivalent to saying you would love to see them put to the test of power. I stand by that. Here’s why. Arguments can be made anywhere: in a journal, in an open forum, in a blog like this one. What’s the difference in doing them in court? Two things only: one is that the courts have imposed some restrictions on religiously-based arguments. The other is that the courts have power to impose their decisions on others. The first is a restriction of argument, which is a matter of power. The second is even more obviously a matter of power. (If your intent is to win the legal battle, the courts are one place to go. If your desire is to support and explain the reasonableness of your position, the courts’ necessity to come to a decision in a defined time frame, their situatedness in a particular cultural context, and the potential vagaries based on who the judge may be, add up to their not being as appropriate for the purpose as debate outside the courts may be.)
You said “recall the context, Tom.” I call on you to recall the larger context, Janice. In that larger context I asked you to reflect on whether you would want to live in a world where ethical decisions were made and enforced by those who hold the power. (And please, if you want to respond to that question, by all means do so, but do it in context of the fuller presentation I made earlier, not the quick summary here.)
Your response to this was to say, “I’m not so cynical.” That’s fine, and in fact it’s commendable; but it’s a statement about your personality or disposition, not about the issue or the arguments.
That’s true in my view, except that your fact that would ground the present day judgment is itself grounded in the moral character of God. You say it’s a fact that Nazi moral violations were wrong. Wrong with respect to what? I say God’s character; I don’t know what you would say. I’d like to know.
I extended that statement, Janice. Here it is:
If you think value can exist apart from persons, please feel free to explain how that can be. Value is an attitude, a state of mind directed toward some valued object. I don’t see how that could exist apart from some entity capable of directing such an attitude toward some object. It’s your turn, not mine.
You are equivocating, Janice. The word “norm” can be applied in various contexts, but it doesn’t have the same meaning in each context. I gave you an extended reason behind my statement that you were equivocating, and you did not respond to it; you just say “weren’t you aware?” Well, of course I know “norm” has various references, and in fact I dealt with that fact previously.
I say that it is long, extended, forceful, convincing, but also tangential to the current discussion so I’m not going to follow that trail any further.
Of course I’ve read Rawls. My discussion with you began with me stating the necessity for God as a grounding for morals. Rawls provides a decent statement of how to understand what ethics are and how they are to be applied, but not for where they come from.
I have studied deductive logic, too. Why would my educational history have anything to do with this, though? It’s no more relevant to the argument than your non-cynical disposition. It’s not an offense (ref. your comment #49), it’s just a distraction. I recommend everyone drop the subject.
Strong agreement with BillT in #45! You respond to him,
That is indeed a legitimate form of criticism, if one explains why those premises are implausible. That’s what BillT and I have not heard you doing.
You wrote,
I resist absolutely nothing about that claim. To leap directly from (1) to (2) would be a long jump. If I had taken that long leap with no intervening steps it would have been pretty weak. But see my argument with reference to “the referee” in #11, and my extended argument in #20, and please quit implying that I made that leap.
June 5th, 2010 | 6:31 am | #65
Janice, in the spirit of advancing the discussion here most fruitfully, I want you to know that if you offer actual arguments for your position I will respond. But for me to respond to “critiques” unsupported by argument would not be fruitful. JohnFH has called for a discussion “not so narrowly polemical,” and it seems to me that the quality of this discussion would improve if we could engage more in discussing the issues and the arguments behind our positions.
June 5th, 2010 | 6:32 am | #66
JohnFH,
You write,
You are correct in terms of the immediate political process. In my original post here I was speaking about the current cultural environment, but in this discussion with Janice I drilled down to a more fundamental level of discussion. It’s not very practical in the short-term, and I’ll confess to veering off the point of the OP. But her charge that opposing SSM is “sectarian” seemed to call for a reasoned defense of keeping God in the discussion, not just secular-shared values.
June 5th, 2010 | 6:43 am | #67
JohnFH: “I am a theist with traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior.”
Are you against same-sex marriage, JohnFH?
June 5th, 2010 | 9:17 am | #68
JohnFH has reminded me I’ve allowed this to go off track. The OP was about gay-rights advocates initiating change while posturing it as if defenders of marriage were the aggressors, and about Naff’s inadequate argumentation for that change.
It seems to me, Janice, that you think there is good reason for that change to be initiated. You also apparently think that the decision should be made on non-sectarian, non-narrow grounds. I don’t think you’ve defined what you mean by “narrow,” so this would be an opportunity for you to explain it.
If I have interpreted your position correctly, then you represent a group that is trying to initiate large-scale changes in our culture. Because you are the initiators, the burden of persuasion for change really ought to rest upon you. (Chesterton explains why, in his usual pithy manner.)
Can you, then, give us an argument in favor of same-sex marriage that meets your own criteria: religiously-neutral, and not “narrow” by your own interpretation of that term (which I trust you will provide)?
June 5th, 2010 | 10:13 am | #69
Hi JohnFH!
‘I would ask her to defend laws against (1) polygamy; (2) incest; and (3) consensual man-boy intercourse.’
Should a defence preferably include an explanation why (1) polygamy was practised by Old Testament figures and is arguably allowed by Islam/some Mormons, (2) Egyptian Pharaohs intermarried, (3) consensual man-boy intercourse was apparently practised in ancient Athens?
June 5th, 2010 | 10:39 am | #70
I won’t try to defend systems I think are wrong (Islam, LDS, ancient Egypt or Greece). As for the OT, though, what you see is progressive revelation happening. Polygamy was practiced, but it was never endorsed and it never came out well. Not once. There was conflict, jealousy, and hatred at best, sometimes murder at worst. There was an implicit message in that, which God made explicit later.
June 5th, 2010 | 12:47 pm | #71
Tom Gilson to JohnFH: “If I have interpreted your position correctly, then you represent a group that is trying to initiate large-scale changes in our culture.”
I should like to know if Tom has interpreted JohnFH correctly also. For JohnFH has written, “I am a theist with traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior.”
And traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior is that it is sin. And if something is sin, then a theist knows, or should know, what that presupposes.
And so the question remains for JohnFH to answer simply:
Are you against same-sex marriage, JohnFH?
June 5th, 2010 | 2:04 pm | #72
Oops, that was a side reference to JohnFH I was making; I intended that comment to be directed toward Alison. The position referenced here is the one I think Alison holds. My apologies for not making that clear.
June 5th, 2010 | 4:30 pm | #73
In this thread, I have pressed the following thesis:
Responding to (a), Mr. Gilson claimed the following:
Somewhat more to the point, another response also began to appear:
Now for a little commentary on this broad outline. Response (b), by Mr. Gilson, was a misstep for two reasons. First, it is highly doubtful that (b) can be established on broad, non-sectarian grounds. Second, even if (b) could be established on broad, non-sectarian grounds, it wouldn’t do much to show that Mr. Gilson’s defense of a SSM ban wouldn’t be narrow and sectarian—since the latter defense would have to stipulate a lot more than the bare existence of a norm-legislating god. These two reasons are why it would be so entertaining to see proponents of a SSM ban appeal to (b) in an actual court case.
Response (c) is something of a concession. Rather than challenging (a) directly, it seeks to shift the burden of proof back to the opponent of the SSM ban, asking first for a demonstration that the opponent’s case is also not narrow and sectarian. It’d be an excellent topic to pursue in a new thread.
So here’s my suggestion for Mr. Gilson: start a new thread that begins as follows:
Defenses of a SSM ban rely on narrow and sectarian premises. However, I believe that any reasonable opposition to a SSM ban would be as equally narrow and sectarian. Hence, it is not a decisive fault against a SSM ban that such a ban can only be defended on narrow and sectarian grounds.
Note that I myself do not endorse the italicized sentences above. It seems to me, however, that this is the position that certain of the contributors here find plausible, if not actually endorse. Others may not even find the position plausible, but may still like to the opportunity to think about it.
Also, I’d suggest gleening some of the insightful remarks from JohnFH’s post (it’s a shame we can’t discuss his entire post). This bit, for example, would fit quite nicely:
Finally, on yet another post still, it’d be fun to further to analyze Tom Gilson’s strong claim, “If there is no God, there is no basis for objecting to any tradition, norm, or custom whatsoever.” He seems to use this claim as a sort of “nuclear option” defense of theism. If Mr. Gilson is willing to make this claim the topic of its own post, it’d be a lot of fun to make him try to defend it.
June 5th, 2010 | 5:26 pm | #74
Janice,
If you think it’s highly doubtful (b) can be defended, then by all means mount an argument against it. You seem to think you have done so already, but you have only asserted without argument (as again here) that you find it hard to accept.
If you think the burden rests upon me to mount a “defense of a SSM ban,” then please re-read the OP and my most recent comments.
If you think that defenses of an SSM ban “rely on narrow and sectarian premises,” then you have misunderstood three things:
1) To rely on the existence of the God of the universe in determining ethics is not “narrow and sectarian.” His existence is all-encompassing.
But you probably would deny that he exists, so I move on to:
2) It has not been my primary purpose to defend an SSM ban in this post. It has been my primary purpose to demonstrate that supporters of SSM have been the aggressors. As the culture-change aggressors, the burden of proof rests with them, not with defenders of marriage.
3) What I have written here, where it has been a defense of an SSM ban, has certainly not been intended to be the entire defense. It has been partial and incomplete (for it was never the primary topic of the post). It is incorrect for you to conclude that what I have written is essential and exhaustive for defending an SSM ban. Therefore it is more than passing strange you would conclude from what I’ve written that defenses of a SSM ban depend on anything at all. It should be clear that there could be other reasons for banning SSM than what I’ve written.
I said that if there is no God, there is no basis for any moral position. But I take it that there is a God, and there is thus a basis for morality. I also take it that given that morality can be understood and communicated in many ways—ways that I have not attempted to express here.
Finally, with respect to ethics and the existence of God, it is indeed an interesting topic, and in previous blog discussions elsewhere I have had lots of fun defending it. I may decide to bring it up again here. In the meantime I’ll refer you to other related links, listed here.
June 5th, 2010 | 5:39 pm | #75
To repeat the request I made in #68: the burden of proof is on you, Janice. Can you, then, give us an argument in favor of same-sex marriage that meets your own criteria: religiously-neutral, and not “narrow” by your own interpretation of that term (which I trust you will provide)?
June 5th, 2010 | 6:58 pm | #76
Janice: “So here’s my suggestion for Mr. Gilson: start a new thread that begins as follows …”
Janice seems to be following a pattern here:
Erroneous statement
Refutation
Reworded erroneous statement
Refutation
Reworded erroneous statement
Repeat until thread plays out
Recommence in next related thread
June 5th, 2010 | 10:32 pm | #77
Back online after a day with family.
I remain unhappy with the style of argument on this thread. It is too contrived and too combative. TUAD in particular seems to delight in a form of intellectual terrorism in which he throws Molotov cocktails at his opponents. I don’t see that as a way of winning friends and influencing people.
Argument in the public square – a register I think very few evangelicals have mastered – is not about pirouettes of deductive logic, shifting the burden of proof, and other defensive strategies. If it is to be constructive with a view to political negotiation, it is going to be about captatio benevolentiae, a horizon of hope, the assumption of common grace, appeal to natural law overtly or covertly, and detailed, substantive argument.
It’s going to be about intellectual humility and the search for common ground, not about burning bridges.
As noted by Richard Garnett over at “Law, Religion, and Ethics” and “Mirror of Justice,” the brilliant Christian sociologist Don S. Browning passed away earlier this week. Go to my website for a tribute.
Browning was a liberal of the kind evangelicals might learn from. In general and in particular. In particular, he made a “Liberal Case against Same-Sex Marriage” to which I link. He developed a fully engaged argument based on secular reasoning suitable for political discourse in a pluralistic setting (in a NYT op-ed to be exact). He was also not shy in pointing out that his reasoning has a deep theological and religious background. I agree with the form and content of Browning’s argument, though I think his arguments could be expanded on and improved. At some point, for example, it will be important to interact with the multi-sided argument contained in “Sexual Orientation and Human Rights in American Religious Discourse” (Saul M. Olyan and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
But before going down that path, I would like to hear Janice develop a defense of laws against (1) polygamy; (2) incest; and (3) consensual man-boy intercourse. I’m convinced I would learn from the arguments she finds congenial in cases at the intersection of family, marriage law, public policy, and human rights. My guess is that she will save me from falling into a pitfall or two when I in turn develop a defense of law which defines marriage along traditional lines.
June 6th, 2010 | 5:12 am | #78
JohnFH,
Let me offer an initial and tentative proposal for approaching the SSM issue, which I think might suggest something of a framework for dealing with stuff like polygamy and other candidate extensions of marriage.
The proposal is to focus on a few key questions, and, in answering these questions, to appeal only to considerations that we can reasonably expect/require our fellow citizens to accept (fully respecting the fact that in our pluralistic society there is extensive reasonable disagreement in philosophies, religion, etc.). Here are the key questions:
We might say roughly this: the more (and the weightier) that can be listed under i and ii, and the less that can be listed under iii and iv, the clearer it will be that banning [SSM] would be a violation of civic decency, and a violation that might just amount to a politically illegitimate law. (By changing the contents of the bracketed bits, the same procedure might be used to explore the issue of polygamy.)
Though I’ll let opponents of SSM fill in answers to iii and iv (under the stated constraints), I’ll list some stuff that I thought of in answer to the first question, about what is valuable about marriage (much of it simply from reflecting upon personal experience). Most of the values I list would also be extended to same sex marriages and accessible to same sex couples, if such marriages are allowed.
1. It creates stable domestic institutions for the healthy rearing of children.
2. It’s a relationship that automatically receives society’s recognition.
3. It’s a relationship that automatically receives society’s respect (though not, of course, requiring or ensuring any individual’s endorsement of the relationship).
4. Recognition and respect clears barriers to society’s appropriate support of the relationship.
5. It’s a relationship that receives a certain kind of state/ legal recognition.
6. It’s a relationship that is personally and mutually meaningful in a distinctive way.
June 6th, 2010 | 5:54 am | #79
Thank you for that, Janice; it’s very helpful. Its approach is inclusive of a broad spectrum of Americans, though many of us would extend it to include other purposes besides these. Now I’m wondering if you would mind also analyzing whether it is neutral with respect to religion. I hope you won’t mind if I use that terminology to describe the opposite pole to sectarianism, which you eschew. If you prefer another way to say it, then I’ve misunderstood what you mean by sectarianism, and it would be helpful if you would explain. Thanks.
June 6th, 2010 | 9:31 am | #80
JohnFH: “I am a theist with traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior.”
Since you’re a theist with traditionalist views on same gender sexual behavior, are you against same-sex marriage, JohnFH?
A very simple “Yes” or “No” suffices. Unless you want to elaborate.
I remain unhappy with your continued avoidance of answering this question. The condescension that you show betrays the braying of intellectual humility that you pharasaically trumpet. It’s no way to win friends and influence people.
Just answer the question JohnFH:
Are you against same-sex marriage?
June 6th, 2010 | 11:44 am | #81
TUAD, if you really want to know what JohnFH thinks, you could do as he suggested and follow the link to his website. He has told us there’s an analysis by Browning there, and that he agrees with it for the most part.
June 6th, 2010 | 8:14 pm | #82
Janice,
Thank you for a very thoughtful first comment in the direction I was seeking. I will soon respond.
TUAD,
Given that most American Christians no less than other Americans are de facto antinomians, I will take your description of me as a Pharisee as a compliment.
The trouble with “yes/no” questions like the one you posed is that they lack context. It’s as if you are unaware of what happens when absolute (look up that word and its etymology) truth and facts on the ground interact.
Here are a couple of examples. It is an absolute (very literally) truth that we are not to bear false witness. Yet the midwives bear false witness in Exodus 1 (a great pro-life passage) and God rewards them for it.
That’s because even an absolute truth when contextualized is sometimes trumped by another absolute truth. In this case, the command “thou shall not kill” trumps “thou shall not bear false witness.”
Another example. That divorce is hateful in the eyes of God and remarriage out of the question are absolute biblical truths. But I note that my father is divorced and remarried and he and his second wife are integrated without difficulty into the leadership structure of an SBT-relating SBC congregation in Texas.
Their ministry is blessed by God but since I continue to believe that the divine counsel against divorce and remarriage are absolute truths, I must assume (and rejoice therein) that this is a case of God bringing good out of evil. Sort of like Solomon, the fruit of David and Bathsheba’s relationship, becoming the designated heir.
I don’t know how the Holy Spirit gets away with it, but he does. Of course I could continue to point out to my Dad and my step mom that they are living in sin. But my father is already broken beyond repair by his divorce; what’s the point? Yet there is a balm in Gilead and I don’t want to be undoing the work of that balm.
A final example designed to bring your blood to a boil, but hey, what is the internet for?
I take it to be absolute truth that same-gender sexual orientation and homoerotic expression are intrinsically disordered; even a long term exclusive relationship between two gay men stands in contradiction with clear biblical teaching no less than divorce regardless of the degree to which the relationship founded on the contradiction nonetheless models things like temperance and fidelity.
Here’s a real life case and this time you can answer a question or two.
Suppose you know someone very well from work who is gay in a long term relationship. The sis of one of them dies young leaving three children behind. The kid’s Dad is alive but a dead beat and couldn’t care less. For years and years, the two men raise the three children with more love and tenacity that many straight parents do.
One day, the dead beat Dad of the kids, thanks to the saving grace of a new marriage, pulls himself together and wants custody of his kids. The case goes to court. Whose side will you take? Are you going to drone on about how the gay couple’s choices are in contradiction with absolute truth? Are you going to do that in front of the kids they are raising?
Three “simple” questions.
I am against same-sex marriage and don’t want to see it legalized – though I feel the force of Janice’s arguments and those of Andrew Sullivan before her.
But that does not mean that I advocate for the break-up of de facto same-sex marriages. In most cases that makes as much sense as breaking up marriages, and they are now abundant, in which it is the third time around for one and the second time around for the other.
I am after all not a brain on a stick or a block of wood but a human being simul iustus et peccator who lives in a horizon of hope in which I expect God to bring good out of evil in my own life and those of others.
Since I know the three kids and the gay couple well and am aware of the quality of the family life they have (all three kids are straight BTW, the oldest macho straight), I take their side in their custody struggle fully aware that a very difficult compromise will be imposed on them and their kids by the court – even in California, where this takes place; the dead beat Dad is from the East Coast.
Remember what Jesus said about the law of divorce God gave to Moses. “Because of the hardness of their hearts.” Or was it “your” hearts?
Regardless, Jesus held his own to a higher standard without holding those who do not follow him to the same standard.
I point these things out not to suggest that we should throw up our hands and let the world go to hell in a handbasket – the usual attitude today, the libertarian approach. I point these things out to remind us all that the intersection of law, ethics, and religious convictions is known to be a place where a lot of fender benders occur, not to mention injuries and fatalities. It is useless to pretend that there are stop-and-go lights that could be installed to solve the problem.
The hard work of political negotiation in the public square needs to be premised on an acknowledgement of said realities.
June 6th, 2010 | 10:05 pm | #83
Tom Gilson and JohnFH,
Thank you both for the new and pleasant tone in this thread. Bear with me. I apologize for past provocations.
Here I’ll reply Mr. Gilson’s question about neutrality:
Regarding neutrality, I take it that you primarily asking about the restriction I placed on the sorts of considerations that should factor into our decision about the SSM ban. It’s a great question. In trying to answering, I’ll borrow from a guy who wrote this:
The restrictions proposed are neutral in following sense: they apply across the board, and they themselves are, I think, justifiable to every citizen of our democracy who is herself willing to respect her fellow citizens as “free and equal.” As free, she must be recognized that her fellow citizens will (and must be allowed to) develop their own views about what is true and good. The predictable consequence of this will be reasonable disagreement, as citizens adopt differing religious, moral, and philosophical views and commitments. This means that we normally won’t be able to settle the big questions of political justice by appealing to any such ideology on which all citizens might be expected to agree. As equals, each citizen must recognize that her fellow citizens are in a symmetrical position with herself with regard to any entitlements to make valid claims on the other in promoting or defending one’s own peculiar views and agenda. Respecting that symmetry means placing a restriction upon the sorts of reasons that can be used to justify laws affecting the freedoms of her fellow citizens: so far as possible, these reasons should be such that she can reasonably expect those fellow citizens to accept (particularly when the more fundamental issues are at stake). This last part is particularly important if the democratic rule is to be anything more than a “play of power” (where citizens are not respectfully cooperated with as free and equals, but are rather “dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or social position”). The restriction, however, comes at this cost to individual citizens: when they exercise the coercive power of the state by promoting laws deeply affecting the freedoms of others, a citizen will sometimes be required (by civic decency) to act on what she views as the best politically legitimate reasons, rather than the best reasons in terms merely of her own particular views, particular views which, though compelling to her (and even, objectively reasonable), are not views which she can reasonably demand her free and equal fellow citizens to accept.
Such restrictions won’t, of course, strike all citizens as neutral. There are those who, for whatever reason, believe that they should not respect their fellow citizens as free and equal. There are those who, as Rawls puts it, have a “zeal to embody the whole truth in politics”, who seek to establish their religion’s hegemony. For these, he writes:
June 6th, 2010 | 11:26 pm | #84
Me: “A very simple “Yes” or “No” suffices. Unless you want to elaborate.”
JohnFH: “I am against same-sex marriage and don’t want to see it legalized – though I feel the force of Janice’s arguments and those of Andrew Sullivan before her.
I don’t feel the force of their arguments, not even a little, and looking at the New Testament apostles/writers, I don’t see them feeling the force of arguments made by false teachers either. Nor do I see Athanasius feeling the force of the Arians’ arguments either. I’m sure there was context associated with those false teachers as well.
Anyways, I’m glad that you are against same-sex marriage and don’t want to see it legalized. I totally agree with you there and that there’s a sliver of common ground that we share.
If you haven’t already, would you like to sign and support the Manhattan Declaration?
You already support biblical marriage. That’s one out of three. Just gotta support the sanctity of life and religious liberty. You do that and it’s three out of three.
;-)
June 7th, 2010 | 9:58 am | #85
TUAD,
Were the questions I posed too hard for you? It’s a problem if we are only able to deal with these issues in the abstract.
By the way you promote it you make signing the Manhattan Declaration unpalatable.
You remind me that my problem with MD is not with what it supports – a configuration of marriage, an understanding of the sanctity of life, and a concept of religious liberty none of which are “biblical” per se, but the expression of specific Christian understandings that draw from Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience – but with some of its supporters who think of the public square, not as a place to forge alliances, but as a zero-sum game in which it is all about figuring out who is “for” you and who is “against” you.
June 7th, 2010 | 1:49 pm | #86
JohnFH: “a zero-sum game in which it is all about figuring out who is “for” you and who is “against” you.”
Do you think God is playing a “zero-sum game” with His offer of Salvation through Jesus Christ, and that those who are “for” Christ are in Heaven while those who are “against” Christ are in Hell?
By the same measure of reasoning that you use, there are some liberal views that I might otherwise adopt, but I am so repulsed by the liberal left’s behavior that the idea of endorsing their policy recommendations becomes utterly unpalatable.
June 7th, 2010 | 5:01 pm | #87
TUAD, what exactly do you take to be “the same measure of reasoning” that JohnFH uses? Is it possible that you’re distorted his measure of reasoning by over-simplifying it? Have you dealt forthrightly with the scenario he presented a couple comments ago (#82)?
I’m obviously no fan of SSM, but I’m also no fan of careless thinking that cuts short meaningful engagement with real-life complexities.
June 7th, 2010 | 5:01 pm | #88
Janice, I’m taking time to think through your last comment. I’ll be back before too long.
June 7th, 2010 | 6:41 pm | #89
JohnFH: “A final example designed to bring your blood to a boil, but hey, what is the internet for?”
I ignore questions from people with such ill intent.
Unless they apologize, I see no point in answering their questions.
June 8th, 2010 | 11:14 am | #90
Janice, how do you distinguish between your theory of neutrality based on your particular understanding of “free” and “equal” and ideologies embodying “the whole truth in politics” which you criticize. Isn’t your theory just another ideology you demand everyone must submit to or else, as you quote Rawls, be dominated or exhausted?
I realize you want to describe your belief as “neutral,” but that seems misleading because there are reasonable people in our democracy who do not agree with your particular substantive conception of freedom and equality.
I guess the problem is that for you “neutrality” is actually agreement with you:
So you have asserted that “neutrality” requires (among other things) agreement with your particular beliefs. This makes as much sense as a theocrat saying that neutrality consists at least in part that everyone agrees with him.
Your substantive positive content may even be right; but why do you use the word “neutral”?
In my opinion, the first step in helpful discussion is to realize that all our beliefs are precisely non-neutral, not to claim to have found some neutral ground, which upon closer examination, merely means “my territory.”
June 8th, 2010 | 11:47 am | #91
Janice,
Thank you again for your responses. It’s important at this juncture to recognize there are two distinct questions we could deal with: (1) What is true? (2) What is practical with respect to policy?
Both of us have listed facts with respect to this controversy. Your points 1 through 6 (and their subpoints) in comment #78 are true, and I think we can agree on them with respect to marriage (with limits, see below). I submit that what I have written in the OP accurately describes how homosexual rights advocates have been operating rhetorically, and I hope you would agree. This is in the realm of fact, not policy.
I submit to you also that it is true that sexual practices associated with homosexuality are wrong. On this we do not agree. This of course is where questions of pragmatism arise: how shall we live in this world in light of our differences? Practical policy questions are only asked where there is disagreement. (In some quarters there is heated discussion over whether we should colonize the moon. No one is debating what our policy should be toward colonizing the sun.)
With respect to homosexual rights, I could revert to a position forcefully enunciated by an African-American preacher I heard at a meeting this morning. “Let the preachers speak the truth; let the politicians compromise!” There is wisdom in this. It’s not the preachers’ job to set policy but to preach the truth without compromise. The same might be true of a Christian blogger.
But bloggers do offer opinions and advice on policy, so I will proceed headstrong, headlong.
You asked Rawls’s question, “Can democracy and comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, be compatible?” Wiser students of democracy than Rawls have answered in the affirmative. George Washington said in his Farewell Address,
John Adams wrote,
In early days, Americans were not all of one religion, but generally they agreed on the centrality of religion (in whatever form, generally Christian or a deism powerfully influenced by Christianity), and on the moral principles espoused thereby (on which there was widespread consensus). And the republic was strong with that kind of belief set at its core.
Consensus on the value of religion (and its associated moral structure) has now been lost. Rawls’s question ought not be whether democracy can survive a comprehensive doctrine—we have proved that it can—but whether it can survive differences of agreement with respect to comprehensive doctrines. That’s what’s being put to the test. Adams and Washington seem to predict that the answer is simply no. “Our Constitution … is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”
Yet here we are. What do we do? The question of symmetry arises here. Your analysis of the need for freedom and symmetry in comment #83 was quite good. I’ll lift out three central statements from that section:
and
Is there then any set of reasons and principles regarding marriage on which all citizens can be expected to agree? Your list 1-6 in comment #78 appears to be so at first blush—but it is not. It leaves out the most fundamental aspect of marriage accepted by a majority of Americans: the union of a man and a woman. We can accept your list for what it is, but if it does not include man-and-woman, we cannot call it a description of key questions with respect to marriage. It is some other kind of list—call it whatever you like—but it is not a list of principles concerning marriage, unless you take the question-begging, asymmetrical stand that marriage need not, must not be defined as man-and-woman.
Further, I would suggest that for SSM advocates to sweep that position aside as “religously-motivated” is at least as totalizing as you might think it is for us to “impose” religious values on the discussion. If our religious values are not permitted in the discussion, then our values are not permitted in the discussion. My religious values are my values. On what basis do your (non-religious or differing-religious) values get to trump my (religious) values?
The undercurrent of your comments implies that you consider the only “comprehensive doctrine” in this debate to be that of religion, as traditionally understood. But also in this debate, typically, we encounter the doctrine that all (emphasis on that comprehensive word all) lifestyle choices are to be equally valued and respected, as long as no obvious harm comes to others from them; and that to judge others’ lifestyle choices is always (another comprehensive word) wrong. I do not know if you hold that value, but I do know that it is rampant; it underlies much of the advocacy in favor of same sex “marriage.” And it is a totalizing doctrine. It brooks no dissent.
So how do we achieve symmetry? Is there a definition of marriage—or more generally, a statement of moral values—we can advert to in this debate that would satisfy all parties, without imposition? I don’t know. In fact I doubt it. At the end of comment #11 I wrote,
I still don’t know of a third option. Adams was right, as far as I can see.
(P.S. While previewing this on the website I see Albert has preceded me with many of the same ideas I’ve written here, with the virtue of doing it in fewer words.)
June 8th, 2010 | 2:27 pm | #92
Albert: “In my opinion, the first step in helpful discussion is to realize that all our beliefs are precisely non-neutral, not to claim to have found some neutral ground, which upon closer examination, merely means “my territory.””
If Janice were to acknowledge that all beliefs are non-neutral, including hers, that would indeed be a helpful first step.
Secularism or atheism or liberalism is just as much a “religion” as Christianity.
June 8th, 2010 | 4:13 pm | #93
Tom, I did, but your response is much better and more fully articulated than mine, so I’ll step back so as not to bombard Janice with text.
Janice, feel free to ignore my comment. I’m content with reading your thoughts on Tom’s because I think he gets to the same issue that I raise (and more) and you shouldn’t have to repeat yourself.
Cheers,
Albert
June 8th, 2010 | 6:53 pm | #94
Albert and Tom Gilson,
I’m going to try to address your comments in two parts. In this post, I’ll offer mostly clarification. Because there are further important (and difficult) points raised by Mr. Gilson’s post, I’ll save these for my next post. But please, allow me to first try to clarify my position in terms of Albert’s comment.
You’re right to notice that I’m leaning on a particular sense of “free and equal,” and that I qualified the sense in which my proposal was “neutral” by conceding that it is only neutral among those who are already willing to respect their fellow citizens as “free and equal” in the senses articulated. There are certainly many conceptions of “free and equal” that cannot be taken for granted in our own society. However, the sense of “free and equal” that I have relied on is intentionally minimal, that it might have the best chance of being something that could be found within the “overlapping consensus” of a society such as our own.
Here, recall, is the minimal sense:
Free: citizens will (and must be allowed to) develop their own views about what is true and good, with the predictable consequence that reasonable disagreement will arise as citizens adopt differing religious, moral, and philosophical views and commitments.
Equal: citizens are in a symmetrical position with each other regarding entitlements to make valid claims on behalf of their own peculiar views and agendas.
Given this symmetry, citizens are not entitled to use the coercive mechanisms of the state to promote their own peculiar views and agendas simply because this happens to promote their own agendas. At least for the more fundamental issues, respecting our symmetrical position with regard to others means that we should only use the coercive mechanisms of the state to restrict the freedoms of others when this coercion is justifiable to these others under terms they can be reasonably expected to accept. That’s what it is to respect the symmetry under the condition of reasonable disagreement, i.e., disagreement arising from the fact that other citizens may (very reasonably) not share your comprehensive religious, moral or philosophical views and commitments (however reasonable, or even true and superior, your views and commitments may be).
It might be observed that the proposal relies not just on the minimal sense of “free and equal,” but also on a particular proposal about how that freedom and equality is to be respected (the particular proposal is the one marked in bold in the preceding paragraph). I think this observation is accurate. Rawls, I take it, is trying to justify this kind of proposal (in terms, the acceptance of which it is reasonable to expect) only to those who share a certain ideal for a pluralistic democratic society: the ideal of real cooperation among citizens of differing “comprehensive doctrines”—as opposed to the merely strategic calculations of power whereby the proponents of these different doctrines (religious or otherwise) are simply doing whatever it takes (within, of course, the boundaries of their own particular commitments) to gain hegemony, subjecting their fellow citizens according to their particular views regardless of whether or not these fellow citizens can be reasonably expected to accept the justification of such restrictions on their liberties.
So the proposal is not neutral with respect to these explicitly stated pre-commitments. The idea, however, is that these pre-commitments are either shared by the citizens they constrain (partly because they are so minimal, the senses of “free” and “equal” relied on here are plausibly part of that overlapping consensus shareable by widely differing comprehensive doctrines), or they are presupposed by the very problem for which the proposal is being offered as a solution. This latter consideration is what we might say about that ideal for a pluralistic democratic society which grounds that substantive proposal marked in bold above. The problem for which the Rawlsian proposal is offered as a solution is how to achieve a level of civic cooperation that takes a pluralistic democracy beyond the merely rational cooperation of interdependent factions, each merely strategizing for the dominance of their own (the “play of power,” to again use Mr. Gilson’s apt phrase). For those who don’t share this ideal, the Rawlsian proposal will naturally not carry weight (how could it?). For those who do share this ideal, the Rawlsian proposal is a candidate solution for a problem for which there are few, if any, others. And Rawls, I think, would have been the first in line to listen to any other solution for achieving a stable scheme of respectful cooperation in a pluralistic democratic society. But what are the other proposals? Since neutrality seems to come in degrees, will these proposals better achieve neutrality than the Rawlsian one? Recall that the Ralwsian proposal is simply this:
At least for the more fundamental issues, we should only use the coercive mechanisms of the state to restrict the freedoms of others when this coercion is justifiable to these others under terms they can be reasonably expected to accept.
June 8th, 2010 | 11:10 pm | #95
(Part II)
Tom Gilson and Albert,
Here I make some further clarifications in light of Mr. Gilson’s last post. I’ll need to add one more post to address one last tricky issue Mr. Gilson raises.
It will be good to add to these two further distinct questions: (3) What is reasonable? (4) What is it reasonable to expect a fellow citizen to accept?
The reasonable encompasses more than the true. In their times, both Newton’s and Leibniz’s views of the world were both reasonable, even if it was clear they couldn’t both be true. It’s fine and to be expected that citizens will regard their own views as true; problems arise only when they also regard every other view as unreasonable. We should acknowledge that there is a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious and otherwise). This fact, I take it, sets limits on what it is reasonable to expect a fellow citizen to except.
The crucial question is whether this idea that homosexual sexual practices are wrong is an idea that we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept as true. It seems to me that we should allow that there are reasonable moral doctrines according to which some such sexual practices are morally permissible. Allowing this isn’t incompatible with your own commitment to the fallaciousness of such moral doctrines, and to the falsity of certain of their particular claims.
These are important points. The restrictions I’ve been discussing are most importantly not restrictions on what a preacher or a blogger can preach or write. The restrictions rather regard a narrow aspect of a citizen’s political life. To quote Rawls, the idea public reason “is a view about the kinds of reasons on which citizens are to rest their political cases in making their political justifications to one another when they support laws and policies that invoke the coercive powers of government concerning fundamental political questions” (italics mine).
It would be a bad thing if any of my proposals entailed the destruction of “Religion and Morality,” or if the Rawlsian limits on politically legitimate law required a legal scenario in which no one could act on those motives of Religion and Morality which are so indispensable to American democracy, as it currently exists. As for SSM, it’s an empirical question whether “political prosperity” or the adequacy of “Our Constitution” depend upon (or even just plausibly depend upon) a ban on SSM. If this dependency could be shown, this would certainly be a salient factor, and one which ought to be listed under my “key question iv.”
Rawls’s question is about democracy given the presence of disagreements due to different comprehensive doctrines (religious or otherwise).
June 9th, 2010 | 1:23 am | #96
(Part III)
Here I respond to more of Tom Gilson’s comments. I was going to address some deeper issues, but now I’m thinking it’s best to hold off (to avoid unnecessarily complicating the discussion). I think I should now await feedback.
By this point, it should be bountifully clear that it isn’t because a consideration is religious per se that it can’t justify the use of state power to promote laws affecting a fellow citizen’s freedoms. Whether it’s religious or non-religious, the relevant feature of a consideration is whether or not we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to accept it (and particularly those citizens who are coerced by the law that consideration is supposed to justify).
Let’s distinguish between your religious values that we can reasonably expect others to accept and religious values that we can’t reasonably expect others to accept. I suspect that some of your “religious values” are of the former sort, especially since–given your particular views about the necessity of God in grounding any values—all of your values are in some sense “religious” on your view.
And let’s be clear: the limitation restricts us both. Many of my distinctively atheistic values are not the sort of things that I can reasonably expect my fellow citizens to accept. So it’s certainly not the case that my non-religious values per se “get to trump” your religious values per se.
It should be very clear at this point that there is no such implication. (I had hoped this would have been clear from the first quotation in #83, which mentioned “comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious.”) My discussion assumes that there is a plurality of reasonable “comprehensive doctrines” both religious and otherwise.
June 9th, 2010 | 9:58 am | #97
Janice, your clarifying statements here are once again very helpful, and I appreciate the time you’ve taken with them.
Let me respond to a few details, and then end with a question that gets to the heart of the policy issue.
First, in another setting I would contest your assertion that “we should allow that there are reasonable moral doctrines according to which some such sexual practices are morally permissible.” I won’t dispute it here because it would require considerable preliminary work on what it means for a doctrine to be morally reasonable. I’ll register my disagreement and move on—although the question does arise again in a different form below, at the very end of this comment.
Second, your response to Washington and Adams was,
That response does not address their stated concern, which was not that members of a democracy like ours ought to have freedom to practice religion and morality; nor was it that religion and morality must be preserved from destruction. Certainly if either of those were at risk, they would be alarmed, but their note of caution enters much sooner than that: not that religion and morality must be permitted, but that they are indispensable; that our form of government is adequate “only for a moral and religious people” (emphasis added).
Third, you wrote,
If the question is empirical, where is your data to support your side of the issue? Where has the experiment been run? (Ancient Rome, perhaps?) Suppose we run it now in the United States. Do we know the outcome? We know that democracy can survive, built on a solid social foundation starting with biologically-based families. We first began experimenting in earnest with other types of structures about 50 years ago. I would say the results are not in yet. Now you propose adding another, much more radical experiment on top of that one. If it fails, then what? Chalk up one for empirical knowledge, at the cost of a culture.
Or, what if the question is not strictly empirical in the first place? Can philosophical/ethical considerations not tell us anything about this?
(I’m registering firm disagreement, by the way, with your language of “a ban on SSM.” We’re not “banning” anything. See the original post.)
All the above is interesting (in my view at least) and could be focal points of substantive discussion, but there is one set of questions I have for you that I think we could interact on profitably, even if we never came to agreement on any of the above. This might be the most fruitful direction for us to follow as we proceed. You have clarified your Rawlsian position and brought it to focus in the principle,
Let’s stipulate for the sake of discussion that this is the best way to handle the plurality of opinions in our country. Then,
1) Have you thought through what it means in society for a marriage to be recognized as such, and what that legal recognition requires of others who interact with one or both spouses?
2) Is it your position that for the state to recognize same-sex “marriage” as same-sex marriage, no resulting coercion would be applied to other persons that is not justifiable to them under terms they could reasonably be expected to accept?
3) Are you aware that coercion with respect to this issue has already been applied against persons who do not think it justifiable in terms they could reasonably accept? Is it possible they really are being reasonable in resisting that coercion, or would you say that their position is unreasonable? Who decides?
June 9th, 2010 | 5:05 pm | #98
Tom Gilson,
You endorsed the claim that “religion and morality” are “indispensible; that our form of government is adequate ‘only for a moral and religious people’” . Here I’d like you to clarify this claim. First, by “religion and morality,” what exactly do you mean, if not moral/religious action, practices, motivation, belief, and other attitudes? (The whole Rawlsian project is about creating a political framework in which the plurality of such things can respectfully and cooperatively coexist.) Second, for what exactly is “religion and morality” (as you define it) indispensible? Third, if the claim in bold (as you interpret it) isn’t an empirical one, then what kind of claim is it?
I mentioned that if it could be shown that the absence of SSM is indispensible to “political prosperity” or the adequacy of “Our Constitution,” then this “would certainly be a salient factor, and one which ought to be listed under my ‘key question iv.’” Assuming this is an empirical question (and if not, I put it to you: what kind of question is it?), you suggested that this claim of indispensability is salient so long as I can’t provide empirical proof to the contrary (demonstrating, you suggest, that a democracy can survive through the centuries with SSM). But all this seems a bit wrongheaded. Suppose that, as an argument against unregulated carbon emissions, I made the claim that an additional 25 ppm of atmospheric carbon would dramatically increase the number of major earthquakes. This, again, is an empirical claim. If it were true it would certainly be an important factor to consider in policy questions. But, presumably, my simply making this claim does not mean that the claim should be regarded as a significant factor in policy questions. And it’s a bit silly to insist that my claim should be regarded as a significant factor for policy issues until we have an empirical demonstration of its falsity.
The three questions you ask at the end focus on the social and legal ramifications for people who are in some way or another opposed to interacting with, living among, or providing services for married (or marrying) same-sex couples. These considerations should be articulated in terms of considerations that others could be reasonably expected to accept. Such considerations can then be listed under “key question iv” (see #78). They can then be balanced against the considerations listed under key questions i and ii. Considerations that specify merely trivial inconveniences, for example, won’t carry much weight against a reasonably defended claim that allowing SSM would, on pain of extreme difficulty, coercively require other citizens to perform services which their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines inevitably require them to regard as morally forbidden.
But those arguments need to be made. In making these arguments it needs to be remembered that interacting with, living among, and providing services for married same-sex couples usually isn’t a whole lot different than relating in the same ways to non-married same-sex couples. More importantly, it needs to be remembered that it is one thing for a reasonable comprehensive doctrine to morally forbid same-sex sexual practices—and it’s quite another thing for a reasonable comprehensive doctrine to morally forbid civic relationships to those who engage in such practices. It’s one thing to regard homosexual sex as wrong; it’s quite another thing to regard it as wrong for homosexual partners to marry; it’s quite another thing still to regard oneself as morally compromised simply because (out of civic decency) one must provide services to married same-sex couples.
June 9th, 2010 | 6:06 pm | #99
Janice, Albert, and Tom,
A very interesting discussion. I have difficulty with the Rawlsian project from a number of points of view.
It seems to me that, under the guise of offering a framework for thinking about ethics and public policy, R’s project privileges libertarian and utilitarian approaches and de-privileges traditionalist faith-based, communitarian, and conservative (as in Burke) approaches.
Furthermore, whenever I agree with people who like to argue for R’s project, and we agree often after all on specific issues, if I ask for reasons for holding a particular position, a covert metaphysics tends to surface.
A nice example of how this works in practice is cited by Stephen D. Smith in his book, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse, to which I’ve already referred. Ronald Dworkin, a member of R’s tribe (in fact D improves on R in some places IMO), said the following in the context of the debate about euthansia.
“We believe that a successful human life has a certain natural course. It starts in mere biological development – conception, fetal development, and infancy – but it then extends into childhood, adolescence, and adult life . . . It ends, after a normal life span, in a natural death.” Dworkin goes on to say that the termination of life at any stage before “natural death” is “a kind of cosmic shame.”
Three cheers for Dworkin. On that same basis – natural law in the classical framework – it makes sense to speak of abortion as a cosmic shame, not just suicide “before one’s time.”
Not that Dworkin understood that. Regardless, note that Dworkin is forced to argue from what “is” – human lives often do in fact follow a typical course – to an “ought” – as if Dworkin never read Hume.
The “natural law” framework, properly understood, is less open to criticism than D’s spontaneous appeal to a metaphysics of cosmic shame when all else fails.
So I’m very doubtful if there is such a thing as a “neutral” framework.
Still, I was hoping to converse about SSM in a more direct fashion, taking up some of Janice’s other considerations. I will try to reboot (a part of) the conversation in that sense later this evening.
June 9th, 2010 | 7:28 pm | #100
JohnFH,
I’m intrigued by your comment #99, but I don’t follow it. Let me try to convey why.
It’s one thing to claim that (a) torturing babies for entertainment is wrong; it’s quite another thing to make a claim about what (a) is true in virtue of. We’ll get overlapping consensus on (a), and that’s enough for the Rawlsian proposal about public reason. We won’t get overlapping consensus on that further claim. So, even if a particular Rawlsian holds inferior views (views more “open to criticism”) about the further claim (the claim about what (a) is true in virtue of), how would this pose a problem for the Rawlsian proposal about public reason? Even if a particular Rawlsian holds suspicious metaphysical views involving “cosmic shame,” how does this call into doubt the neutrality of the Rawlsian proposal about public reason?
Here’s my basic point: I would have thought that it is assumed that every Rawlsian holds views beyond those particular ideas of his/hers that we can reasonably expect others to accept. So, no Rawlsian would expect all the views of any Rawlsian to serve as legitimate premises for justifying the support of “laws or policies that invoke the coercive powers of government concerning fundamental political questions.”
June 9th, 2010 | 8:51 pm | #101
Janice,
You may not be following me, but I’m following you just fine. Your first point is however in tension with your second point.
At one level, for a proposal to meet the conditions of public reason, all it has to do is garner a sufficiently overlapping consensus. Even if the “in virtue of” justifications are mutually unacceptable to the various components of the consensus.
Fine, but on another level, you suggest that Dworkin did not adequately justify his view that suicide “before one’s time” is wrong because he had recourse to a concept of cosmic shame with covert metaphysical underpinnings. Tell that to Dworkin.
The fact is, D has no better or more compelling argument against suicide “before one’s time” than the one he gave. Nor do you. Right?
“Cosmic” and/or “theistic” arguments are “open to criticism,” perhaps more so than others, but they are often all we have.
Unless of course you think you can construct a body of laws and a body of ethics on the basis of utilitarian considerations alone, without recourse to concepts like distributive justice, human rights (which have a history, and are not self-evident except as metaphysical principles), the responsibility of everyone for the common weal, etc.
I wouldn’t want to assume that that is what you want to do. It is fashionable, but also quite misleading, to present arguments in the public square as if they were a matter of common sense and observation. As if they were metaphysically weightless.
Perhaps even Rawls and Dworkin are un-self-aware in this sense. Note however that Habermas is self-aware on precisely this point. I translate:
“As far as modernity’s normative self-understanding is concerned, Christianity has functioned not only as a forerunner or catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom, a common life built on solidarity, a conduct of life guided by the principles of autonomy and emancipation, the ethical stance of the individual conscience, and human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Jewish ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. In substance unchanged, this legacy has been, on a continuous basis, critically re-appropriated and re-interpreted. To this day, there is no alternative to it. Furthermore, in the light of the current challenges of a post-national configuration, we draw on this substance no less than before. Everything else is postmodern chatter.”
The German original:
“Das Christendom ist für das normative Selbstverständnis der Moderne nicht nur eine Vorläufergestalt oder ein Katalysator gewesen. Der egalitäre Universalismus, aus dem die Ideen von Freiheit und solidarischem Zusammenleben, von autonomer Lebensführunf und Emanzipation, von individueller Gewissensmoral, Menchenrechten und Demokratie entsprungen sind, ist unmittelbar ein Erbe der jüdischen Gerechtigkeits- und der christlichen Liebesethik. In der Substanz unverändert, ist dieses Erbe immer wieder kritisch angeeignet und neu interpretiert worden. Dazu gibt es bis heute keine Alternative. Auch angesichts der aktuellen Herausforderungen einer postnationalen Konstellation zehren wir nach wie vor von dieser Substanz. Alles andere ist postmodernes Gerede”.
June 9th, 2010 | 8:57 pm | #102
Janice,
Up thread you asked a number of pertinent questions about the purpose of the institution of marriage. An unstated premise of those questions is that that institution is a public good, that marriage *is* worth defending, by precept and example and through laws that privilege and protect it. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I see that as common ground on which we stand. We disagree on something else, on how best to define and defend marriage as a public good.
Your questions are excellent. I fill in the blanks more exhaustively than you did.
i. What is valuable about marriage? ii. How and to what extent would these values be extended if [a man and a man; a woman and a woman; two cousins; a father and a daughter; a mother and a son; a mother and a daughter; a father and a son; a man who wants to marry more than one woman; a woman who wants to marry more than one man; a teacher who wants to marry her/his high school student] are permitted to marry? iii.To what extent is it possible for [any of the above examples] to secure these interests if they are not permitted to marry? iv. What considerations count against allowing [any of the above examples] to marry? What harms might be done, and what values might be threatened, in allowing [same sex couples] to marry?
You went on to suggest that if [any of the above examples] can be shown to (1) instantiate the values of marriage; furthermore, that (2) the interests of those concerned would be compromised if they were denied the possibility of marriage; and finally, that (3) no sufficiently countervailing considerations exist such that it is nonetheless unwise to disallow marriage of a said type, then it would be a violation of civic decency not to allow said type of marriage.
My thesis is simple. Polygamy/polyandry (hereafter referred to as a Type A family configuration) and gay/lesbian domestic partnerships (Type B family configuration), not just traditional husband-and-wife domestic partnerships (Type C), meet conditions (1) and (2) without difficulty. Where people are bound to disagree relates to (3), whether there are sufficient countervailing considerations such that it is unwise to allow, protect and privilege Type A and Type B family configurations.
It is arguable if nothing else by the force of example that Type A and Type B family configurations have been known to create stable domestic institutions for the healthy rearing of children; to receive, de facto, de jure, or both, society’s recognition such that new expectations of temperance and fidelity are placed upon the parties concerned; to signify a situation in which the fact that one is within said configuration says to others that one is “taken.” We are certainly talking about relationships that are personally and mutually meaningful in a distinctive way.
How then shall we decide if Type A and Type B family configurations should be granted the protection of the law? Should such configurations be granted the same privileges as Type C configurations, something less, something more, or no protection at all?
In my next comment, I will address the questions with respect to Type A family configurations.
June 9th, 2010 | 9:03 pm | #103
A frequent argument of those who wish to defend a particular construction of sexuality and a particular set of rights takes as its point of departure the obvious fact that the probabilistic world in which we live is full of paradoxes in which nothing is all this way or that way, but rather, only shows a statistical preponderance this way or that way. Nonetheless, it still makes sense for a community to privilege and protect some constructions of sexuality and marginalize others.
This is true even if your basic ethical principle is, “whatever gets you through your day is all right by me.” That is a popular, minimalist approach to ethics in a pluralistic world. In a sense we are all forced to make this our bottom-line ethical principle. The world calls for a single political and civil community that nonetheless includes people, to stick to the example of sexual behavior, who abuse each other for fun (S & M); who get off on having sex with horses or dead people; or go to Bangkok to * * with 10 year old girls. See the problem?
Most people are disgusted by some or all of the above examples of sexual behavior. Quite apart from the particular gravity of each of the behaviors just noted, what they say about the people who engage in them, how anti-social the behavior is, and who is harmed and who benefits from the behavior, we formulate moral judgments about them on the basis of a complex calculus of empathy and disgust. The “yuck” factor is enormous. Not only is it perfectly human for this to be so, it is an unavoidable dimension of forming moral judgments.
Or perhaps we should try to convince people to be disgusted at nothing and think rather that in principle everything is permitted. Furthermore, what about the civil rights of the sexual consumer? This approach, while unrealistic, contains a grain of truth. It is a modern misappropriation of the moral of Acts 10:12-14 but it is nonetheless arguable that the civil rights of the sexual consumer need to be protected. Protected, however, within limits, and irrespective of their wishes and the laws of supply and demand. To be sure, with reason as the only guide, people will never agree on the details except by political negotiation.
Furthermore, there will always be room to lift up and model a more excellent way relative to less than ideal behavior in the global village. An example to think about: polygamy.
In a probabilistic world the situation is this. Even if I have compelling reasons for thinking that monogamy is preferable to polygamy; even if I have reason to believe that polygamy would not be permitted in an ideal world, or at least within the believing community of an ideal world, I cannot fail to notice that some polygamous marriages are happy and well-adjusted for all concerned whereas some monogamous marriages are a hellhole and a web of torment. Furthermore, in specific instances, it is obvious that a polygamist is a marvelous human being, a better spouse and parent, than any number of monogamists.
So I have to balance my disgust of polygamy in general with empathy for morally upstanding polygamists in particular I happen to know. I have to take a look at how things work in practice on a case-by-case basis. The example I offer is not abstract. I spent a summer in rural Syria in which I was nurtured by a village culture in which polygamy is practiced by the elite and powerful. The gifts of hospitality and loyalty my polygamist Syrian friends offered me put to shame the lack thereof that characterizes average North American monogamous families.
Nor would it be right to suggest that the monogamous families in Syria are the happy ones – the majority of families are monogamous; whoever is poor and un-influential comes from a monogamous family – and the polygamous ones, the unhappy ones. After all, wealth, higher levels of education, and decision-making autonomy naturally lead to higher levels of happiness. As the Italians say, “money doesn’t make you happy; debts, even less.” Influence, power, wealth, and access to education go hand in hand with being polygamous in Syria.
How do the above considerations play themselves out with respect to gay and lesbian couples with or without children? There are a number of stringent parallels.
At the very least, I submit, it means that, even if I think I have compelling reasons for thinking that (A) heterosexual behavior is to be lifted up as the norm over against homosexual behavior; even if I think I have reason to believe that (B) homosexual behavior stands in tension with or in contradiction with fundamental values, I will have occasion to note that many gay and lesbian couples of my acquaintance are model parents and excellent human beings, better human beings, on average, than I am.
Yet it does not follow that I should therefore regard my reasons for (A) and (B) to be unreasonable.
The facts are these. It is natural and necessary in the realm of ethics for people, societies, and affinity groups (like religious denominations) to rank, in the abstract and in the concrete, families of the following kinds: (1) polygamous one-father+one-mother arrangements; (2) same-sex two “mother/father” arrangements; (3) monogamous one-father+one-mother arrangements; (4) single-parent families, and (5) families with no parents at all. Which arrangement is preferable? Which is or should be out of the question, in my state, my country, and in the global village? Which should be permitted and at what level of cultural iconicity but nonetheless considered less than ideal, to be transformed if possible in a religious or other setting?
The answers to these questions are complex. The traditional answers offered by Judaism and Christianity of Greco-Roman antiquity, counter-cultural though it was, are well-known. The preference hierarchy went like this: first (3), then (1), then (4) and (5). Ameliorative strategies were undertaken with respect to (4) and (5). (2) was perfectly unheard of, an oxymoron for homosexuals no less than heterosexuals at the time.
We now live in a different world. It is useless to pretend otherwise. In our world, moral absolutes such as “do no harm,” “natural law,” and the “common good” help us reach answers, but they also pull us in different directions.
June 9th, 2010 | 9:26 pm | #104
To my mind, the main reason why the idea of same-sex marriage is gaining ground is because libertarianism is gaining ground. I would love to be wrong, but I think that the libertarian tide is unstoppable in the short and midterms.
People don’t seem to get how inadequate a basis libertarianism is for a life together. Thankfully, the common good continues to be a motivating factor in the lives of millions. If it were not so, libertarianism would have already destroyed everything.
Believers need to take the time to explain their “in virtue of’s” in the public square. It is possible to do this in language and with concepts which are accessible to all. Many people have a covert theistic basis for their ethics rather than an overt one. Actual and potential common ground is enormous.
Theologically-grounded sexual ethics have never been libertarian in nature. If libertarian ethics are what you are after, you will want to have as small and unassuming God as possible, one who respects your privacy as it were.
Ethics in the Bible and in Jewish and Christian tradition on the contrary are permeated by high ideals with respect to individuals, families, and societies. Said ethics touch on the most intimate aspects of life, in full awareness that sexuality is a place of great tenderness but also of great violence; of acts of inversion (masturbation being a typical example) as well as communication. In Jewish and Christian ethics, sexuality has always been understood to be a language not only of pleasure but also and especially of commitment. The language of sex is contextualized very carefully.
Furthermore, Jewish and Christian ethics have always been keenly aware of the nexus between sexuality and procreation, with the primary purpose of sex understood to be that of procreation. Sex is in this sense is seen from the same point of view that a biologist sees it. It is the means by which one generation engenders a succeeding generation. Sex in this sense is the conveyer by which patrilineage (in Jewish law, matrilineage) is vouchsafed to the next generation and to that generation’s progeny in turn. That being the case, it is not surprising that the Jewish and Christian traditions work hard at getting sex “right.” From the point of view of cultural anthropology, it would be astounding if such were not the case.
The ideal context of sex has always been thought of as the family. More exactly, a family consisting of a mother, a father, and their children surrounded by the support of an extended family. That is a sine qua non of the Jewish and Christian traditions. It is not the sine qua non of all human traditions, but it has been foundational to Western culture since forever, a fruit of its Jewish and Christian heritage for which, as the great post-Christian philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued, no alternative exists.
A variety of causes may lead to the ideal just noted not being realized. For example, a child with no effective parents, a ward of the state or the church in an institution, may nonetheless be raised better and turn out better than a child born and raised in an ideal situation. My father-in-law, an Italian Methodist pastor, is an example. I’m not speaking in the abstract. But that does not change the fact that arrangements other than the ideal are logically regarded as less than ideal.
Questions that everyone must face go like this: how does one promote ideals in a community of believers and in society, without treating as less worthy of love and respect those who have not had, and may not desire to have, the opportunity to pursue those ideals?
Furthermore, how do we deal with the fact that so many of the most creative, wonderful people in the world have the most messed-up personal lives imaginable? This, too, is a moral dilemma.
Somehow we have to find a way, for example, to appreciate a great screenwriter and film director like Woody Allen; a comic and great soul like Ellen DeGeneres; and an awesome athlete like Tiger Woods, without necessarily subscribing to the choices they have made in their personal lives.
BTW, even if the sexual lifestyle choices of all three of these individuals stand in contradiction to acceptable behavior for believers in my religious tradition, I might still rank the three just noted in terms of the character of their personal lives from a point of view within my religious tradition, in which case none would probably receive high marks, but Ellen might be deemed to be light years ahead of the other two in terms of Matthew 25:40.
It is essential, at least from a Christian point of view, and that of Levinasian ethics, to practice equal regard for everyone regardless of point of departure and/or personal choices. But it is not therefore necessary to succumb to the nonsense that all points of departure and all personal choices are equally valid or equally ideal.
June 10th, 2010 | 1:35 am | #105
JohnFH, re: #101
(I look forward to carefully considering you other posts.)
Dworkin’s wider views about the foundations of ethics still strike me as irrelevant to the Rawlsian proposal about public reason.
Let me try an interpretation of what you are suggesting. Perhaps you are pointing to Dworkin as an example of someone who cannot adequately (adequately for what?) justify his first-order ethical beliefs. Or, perhaps you are using him as an illustration of the following thesis: in order to adequately justify certain of one’s intuitively true first-order ethical beliefs, one must appeal to a more comprehensive conception of morality–and one which will inevitably entail the truth of the more contentious first-order ethical beliefs (e.g., that abortion and gay sex is morally wrong) which folks like Dworkin want to avoid.
Assuming that something like this is your claim, let me try to explain why I am not committed to much of anything here.
When I concede that Dworkin’s views about the foundations of ethics are “open to criticism,” I’m conceding that they are not the sorts of views that it would be reasonable to expect/demand others to accept (as grounds for justifying coercively enforced laws touching fundamental political questions). What I am not saying is that Dworkin’s views about the foundations of ethics are unreasonable , or that anyone else has a better alternative (although, if your characterization of Dworkin’s view is accurate, then I believe there are better alternatives). I am also not saying that Dworkin is thereby mistaken in maintaining any of his first-order ethical belief, or that the first-order ethical claims can’t meet the requirements of public reason, or that Dworkin should follow his criticizable second-order views to adopt any of the additional first-order views that his second-order views actually entail.
Let’s consider this from Dworkin’s perspective. Dworkin himself is presumably more certain about some of his first-order beliefs than he is of his second-order theories about these beliefs (theories about their normative foundations). As such, Dworkin may concede that his second-order theories are more open to criticism than certain of his first-order ethical beliefs. But, even if he doesn’t concede this, he will still presumably concede that he cannot reasonably expect everyone else to accept his second-order theory as true (this isn’t, remember, a concession that his second-order theory is unreasonable). Now, even if he makes all such concessions, Dworkin needn’t concede that those relatively certain first-order ethical beliefs of his (which may garner the overlapping consensus) aren’t the sorts of claims he can reasonably expect others to accept. Even if he doesn’t have any second-order ethical theory, he needn’t concede that.
So, with respect to expanding the sorts of first-order ethical claims available to public reason, there’s really not much that can be inferred from the fact that someone’s second-order ethical views are open to criticism.
Perhaps you understand and agree with all of this. But let me end by trying to put what I take to be the relevant point most forcefully: even if the only flawless and true justification for Dworkin’s most modest first-ethical beliefs (e.g., that it is wrong to torture unborn babies for entertainment) is a justification that also entails a moral prohibition against gay sex, this wouldn’t mean that the moral prohibition against gay sex is a truth that it reasonable to expect Dworkin (or anyone else) to accept. It wouldn’t mean that the moral prohibition against gay sex should be a part of public reason. This is because (to put it briefly) in public reason we’ve got to respect the reasonable, and the reasonable encompasses more than the true.
June 10th, 2010 | 4:27 am | #106
re: #102,
John FH,
Because I think it will preempt certain objections, let me discuss one part of your comment #102
Although I appreciate the brevity you achieve in collapsing my “key questions” ii and iii under your point (2), I prefer my four-question version for the following reasons: it’s important that the interests of the parties involved are compromised because they are denied the specific type of marriage in question, it’s important to keep track of the specific kinds of marriage-related interests involved (that we might see how they compare to the countervailing factors of key question iv), and it’s important to keep track of the degree to which the marriage-related interests of the people in question depend upon the availability of the specific form of marriage in question.
Consider these points with regard to the prospective (heterosexual) polygamist. Unless we introduce new (and possibly very significant) factors, the prospective polygamist presumably has just as much opportunity as anyone to secure in monogamous mixed-sex marriage any of the values listed under my key question i. This means that the extent to which those same values are extended (to him) by allowing polygamy is significantly diminished (key question ii). It also means that the extent to which the prospective polygamist cannot secure the marriage values apart from polygamy is also diminished (key question iii). (Notice, however, how polygamy would fare much more favorably under these key questions in a society in which, perhaps due to war, the number of marriage-seeking women far outstrips the number of marriageable men. That seems to me appropriate: the case for polygamy in such a society probably should be a bit stronger.) I use polygamy as an example; similar points should apply to many of the other candidate extensions of marriage you’ve listed.
In my list of four key questions I also take care to keep the emphasis on the sorts of values secured by traditional marriage (notice how the second and third key questions refer back to answer to key question I, which specifies the values of traditional marriage). This emphasis is intended to justify the extension of the term “marriage” to these other cases. If we don’t justify these other relational arrangements specifically in terms the values enjoyed in traditional marriage, we open the door to the criticism that we’re just changing the subject and no longer talking about marriage at all.
June 10th, 2010 | 11:14 am | #107
Janice,
My guess, with respect to “first-order” and “second-order” beliefs, is that in practice we both accept as valid appeals to either in the public square.
Most people in fact are more attached to their “in virtue of” beliefs than to the practical consequences they derive from them. You may think it preferable that people in the public square keep those beliefs to themselves, but if so I don’t think you are being realistic. As if people could sort them out from the others in the first place. It is easily shown that not even Supreme Court justices and professional philosophers succeed in so doing. As Steven D. Smith points out, people are adept at smuggling in second order beliefs. After all, they are the ones that move minds and hearts.
An example to illustrate my point. In the hubbub that followed the “coming out” of Mel White (one of Jerry Falwell’s right hand men), his mother responded to queries from a predatory press in the following manner,
“He may be an abomination, but he is our abomination.”
That was her public statement, a compelling and legitimate one in my view. She doesn’t solve any public policy issues with her statement, but she frames the discussion. She accessed two of her fundamental “in virtue of” beliefs – homosexuality is an abomination (per her affiliation with a form a traditional Christianity) and unconditional love for her son (also taught by traditional Christianity) – articulated the contradiction, and allowed the contradiction to remain unresolved. The result is that (for example) she could continue to think of same-sex committed relationships as something the state and her religious tradition should not put on a par with the default marriage configuration, yet she would remain loyal to her son in spite of the fact that he had dissolved his marriage in favor of a committed relationship with another man.
So I agree but also disagree with you on this one. It is typical of moral agents to be confident about positions they take, such as, people should not be allowed to marry a sibling, even though, if they try to come up with bullet-proof arguments in favor of said positions, they are at a loss. In reality, in articulating a set of rights and wrongs, we covertly access a cosmology – as any cultural anthropologist would point out – that rules certain things in and certain things out.
Put another way, all three components of Aristotle’s “trinity,” the true, the good, and the beautiful (aesthetics), come into play in our moral decision-making. Any attempt to disallow public articulation of one or more those components in justification of a particular policy position is bound to fail. Furthermore, our most eloquent public reasons for taking a particular position are not always those that are shared by the greatest number of people. Those are often the weaker reasons for advocating a position. So we articulate the weaker uncontroversial reasons and the stronger but more contested reasons in the hopes of covering all the bases.
June 10th, 2010 | 12:09 pm | #108
Janice,
You say:
“Unless we introduce new (and possibly very significant) factors, the prospective polygamist presumably has just as much opportunity as anyone to secure in monogamous mixed-sex marriage any of the values listed under my key question i.”
Your parentheses says it all. For example, a key good of marriage is that of an economic partnership. From that point of view, polygamy turns out to be more defensible than monogamy.
And that is exactly how it works in practice. When I was in Syria for a summer on an archaeological excavation, the laborers who worked with me were all teenagers from influential families in the village. One day Mustafa comes to work with his face looking as if someone had hit him with a ton of bricks. He wouldn’t explain why. Finally, I got it out of his cousin. At 16, his second future marriage had been arranged. That cannot feel good to a 16 year old. At that age, if a boy wants to think about marriage at all, it is going to be in terms of thinking about someone he might cherish and who might cherish him. Not about economic alliances. The thought of Hutama (Hellfire in Islam, the 7th deepest level) probably sounded better than the thought of having two wives trying to get their way with him.
You also note that polygamy is more defensible in a society that has a shortage of men. That’s true, even though a traditionalist like me would seek policy changes designed to reverse the man shortage rather than legalize polygamy.
The economic advantages of domestic partnership with pooled financial resources are undeniable. Why not allow then, brothers and sisters to marry? If biological quality is perceived as a public good (I think it is a public good, one worth protecting), brother-sister marriages might be allowed with the proviso that their children be procured at least by half from outside the marriage bond. Which is what happens among gay and lesbian couples anyway.
Furthermore, there are men shortages in our society. One that is getting a lot of press is the shortage of educated or at least not-in-prison African-American young men relative to educated African-American young women.
Since it is also known that 20% of women report experiencing same-gender sexual attraction (though less than 1%, if I remember correctly, of A-A women identify as lesbian), why not solve the man shortage that way, by encouraging and allowing A-A women to marry among themselves?
Well, why not? I want to hear the reasons.
I know what my reasons are. They are based on a commitment to a specific form and understanding of human ecology. In Jewish and Christian terms, it is not unusual to think of the matter in terms of a creation template in which a man is understood to be designed to be the partner of a woman and vice-versa.
The partnership is thought ideally to work itself out in terms of sexual exclusivity, commitment to progeny there from, a shared economy and a shared hearth.
That leads me to favor a legal framework and a system of shared values in which that template or construction of sexuality is privileged at the expense of others.
I realize that at some level we must disagree on this point.
What I ask from those who would have us rewrite the legal framework and alter consensus values such that the Type B family configuration enjoys the same privileges as the Type C configuration is the following: on what basis can that be done without opening the door to a thousand other conceivable configurations of family?
Is it really so crazy to think of the Type C configuration as the configuration above all others that society can and should protect and privilege?
I don’t think it is. But I’m curious to hear your reasons for thinking otherwise.
June 10th, 2010 | 2:20 pm | #109
“Janice, you keep answering without answering, asserting without argument.”
Ironically, this is the chief complaint that both my liberal and conservative students raise against John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. 80% of Rawls’ arguments consist of premises that are controversial and for which he offers no reasons. But this typical of many who write in this area. Take, for example, J. J. Thomson’s 1995 article in Boston Review, “Abortion.” She stipulates, without argument, this claim (which is central to her case): “severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting.” But why should I accept this premise? She does not say. And, concerning the present discussion, would not this premise apply in cases where the state requires that citizens, who believe SSM to be an ontological possibility, must acquiesce to it every turn? But, I suspect it would not be applied. We count on this happening: If they have children in public schools, they cannot tell the school to stop teaching it; if they own a business, they must provide benefits accorded to all “married couples”; and if they are a Christian school, they will lose their tax exempt status, federal funding, etc. (cf. Bob Jones case).
So, the only way that this can sustain Thomson’s (and Rawls’ similar) principle is for society to embrace the idea that it is irrational to reject SSM and all its consequences and effects.
This is why the Manhattan Declaration was necessary.
(BTW, if anyone is interested, 6 years ago I published a critique of Thomson’s argument in the American Journal of Jurisprudence, which you can find here: http://homepage.mac.com/francis.beckwith/AJJ2004.pdf
June 10th, 2010 | 3:55 pm | #110
Re: 107
JohnFH,
With regard to some second-order beliefs, certainly.
It may be that many people are “more attached” (whatever that means) to the belief that God is the foundation of morality than to the belief that lying for selfish gain is morally wrong. How is this relevant? Look, many people are obviously more passionate about, for example, the central tenants of the Christian faith than to the various elements of the overlapping consensus, most of which are by nature mundane. That’s just assumed.
The proposal doesn’t assume that a person, by himself, is able to determine which of his beliefs will withstand reasoned, public scrutiny. Public discussion is vital. Just as we’re doing here, we put our claims and theories into a public forum and then we and everyone can listen for the kinds of reasonable opposition that can be leveled against them. We listen, in particular, for this: is there reasonable disagreement regarding the claim X? That is, do people have reasonable comprehensive doctrines which render them unable to accept claim X as true?
It’s generally the results of a person’s “in virtue of” beliefs that need to pas the test of public reason. And this is often possible even if the “in virtue of” beliefs themselves cannot pass the same test. (People have many and varying explanations for why torturing dogs for entertainment is wrong; what matters is that we agree that torturing dogs for entertainment is wrong.)
But again, I don’t see how this is relevant to anything I’ve proposed.
Try to illustrate your point here with reference to the following “particular policy position”: citizens shouldn’t be allowed to torture young children for entertainment. In discussing this case, keep an eye towards this question: in order to justify the state’s coercive enforcement of this policy in terms we can reasonably expect others to accept, is it necessary to publicly uphold one’s particular moral/philosophical/religious beliefs about the ultimate normative foundations of the moral prohibition against torturing young children for entertainment?
Look, I take myself to have some fairly “eloquent” metaethical views. I also know these views aren’t shared (or even considered) by the average citizen in this country. I don’t violate any norms of civic decency in discussing these metaethical views publicly. I also don’t violate any norms of civic decency if I try to change public opinion, trying to win over the masses to my eloquent metaethical views. But, however true I believe these eloquent views to be, I also realize that people can (and do) reasonably disagree with these views—and that I therefore cannot, as of now and in any foreseeable future, reasonably expect everyone else to accept my eloquent metaethical views as a justification for coercively enforced laws affecting their fundamental freedoms. So, I cross the line of civic decency if I try to employ the coercive power of the state to deprive my fellow citizens of fundamental freedoms through laws or policies that can’t be justified to my fellow citizens in other ways, in ways that I can reasonable expect them to accept.
Let’s be really clear about this. In chafing against the Rawlsian proposal, here is the claim you are ultimately defending: on basic matters of justice, one should be able to employ the coercive powers of the state against a fellow citizen even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the justification for doing so—even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the reason for his state-coerced loss of freedoms.
This may seem fine when you are doing the coercing. But try putting yourself in the position of the coerced. What comes around often goes around—and even if it doesn’t, it’s a shame to lose the ideal of public reason and that level of respectful, civic cooperation that public reason is designed to facilitate.
June 10th, 2010 | 6:06 pm | #111
Re: #109
Francis Beckwith,
I answer this in comments #83 and #94.
Concerning the application the Rawlsian proposal to SSM legislation, see esp. #78. You should also check out the discussions of this framework in #98 and #106.
With regard to public reason, as far as I recall, no claims in this thread were made about irrationality.
June 10th, 2010 | 7:50 pm | #112
Janice,
I appreciate the conversation. I have not been arguing that it is *necessary* to articulate one’s second-order beliefs in support of one’s first-order beliefs. I have been arguing that it is often to one’s advantage to do so, precisely in the public square.
Dworkin’s appeal to the “cosmic shame” of taking one’s life “before one’s time” is after all an example of a wonderfully compact vehicle of moral persuasion.
Here are further examples of second-order beliefs that play a role in the public square, with typical policy ramifications in square brackets]:
“Let it be.” [If she wants to have an abortion, let her.]
“Nothing to kill or die for, and no religion, too.” [Anti-militarism; restriction of the public space granted to organized religion]
“Live and let die.” [To hell with Darfur]
“Drop the bomb.” [After 9/11]
“Born in the USA.” [American exceptionalism]
“All the diamonds in the world that mean anything to me.” [Capitalism with a human face; stewardship of creation]
“Fascist architecture of my own design.” [Limited government, even if that government is headed up by an enlightened philosopher]
Yes, I am a Cockburn fan.
Once again, you may choose to dispense with compact vehicles of persuasion which operate on the meta-ethical plane. Do not be surprised however that most of us will not follow you in that sense. I for one will continue to make use of them even though I am aware that agreement on them is instant with some people and out of the question for others.
BTW, I remain hopeful that you will take up the questions I posed (for example) at the end of comment #108. I’m convinced you are not a spoilsport in the mold of TUAD, who left the conversation with his blood brought to a boil. At a certain point, of course, refusal to take up questions becomes eloquent in and of itself. I would love to hear out your meta-ethical principles, which I have every reason to believe are compelling and eloquent. As of now, I detect a bundle consisting of a strong strand of libertarianism, a broad concept of human rights, and an as yet unclear concept of charity. But I also detect an indifference to truths, moral goods, and aesthetic principles many people including myself hold dear.
I accept your summary (however reductive) of my position:
“[O]n basic matters of justice, one should be able to employ the coercive powers of the state against a fellow citizen even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the justification for doing so—even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the reason for his state-coerced loss of freedoms.”
Exactly. For example, the welfare of society is being protected at a basic level by government coercion such that everyone has to put insurance on their cars. Even though I know a lot of people who will never accept the justification for doing so. According to them, that’s their business and no one else’s.
It is also a proper use of government coercion IMO to require people with sufficient net worth and/or earnings to pay their fair share of the overhead cost of the health care delivery system. A large plurality disagrees, but it is legitimate for a democracy to coerce them to do so, though not necessarily wise to coerce them to do so.
Finally, it is a proper use of government coercion to deny people the right they feel they have to (for example) engage in sex with a minor, or for a brother to have children with a sister. It is also a proper use of government coercion in my view to privilege Type C family configurations at the expense of others.
Nonetheless a host of less than ideal situations and de facto family configurations are best left without criminal consequences, such as divorce, though it is possible to make divorce too easy, and SS domestic partnerships, though it is probably wise to regulate them in some way.
Still other family configurations, such as polygamy and polyandry, are best combated by legal (and therefore coercive) means, even if de facto examples thereof will not thereby be eliminated.
The calculus of moral reasoning that plays into decision making on these matters is complex, subject to compromise on the basis of meta-ethical principles in tension with one another, and up for political negotiation. I also agree with R’s project to this extent, that there are other kinds of useful moral reasoning, in which meta-ethical principles come into play covertly rather than overtly, or are packaged in a brand “X” container – this is a chief and legitimate function of civil religion. Mediating language is helpful. But it is not an either-or. It is a both-and. It may not appeal to you, but it appeals to many, even if they haven’t been in church since they were baptized, to hear something like, “God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve,” as shorthand for a meta-ethical principle which finds it appropriate for a society to privilege Adam and Eve arrangements at the expense of Adam and Steve arrangements.
For a government to “privilege at the expense of” is the opposite of leveling the playing field such that whether people partner up according to a societal ideal/biological template of the type: mother, father, and their shared biological children *or another* is a matter of legal and ethical indifference.
I’m wondering whether we can agree on that in principle, even if we do not necessarily agree on how to apply the principle on a configuration-by-configuration basis.
Finally, I would point out that I won’t take up your specific example, “torturing children for entertainment” because I think it is too contrived. The examples I have raised from the get go on this thread are, I believe, more to the point.
June 10th, 2010 | 7:51 pm | #113
Janice,
I appreciate the conversation. I have not been arguing that it is *necessary* to articulate one’s second-order beliefs in support of one’s first-order beliefs. I have been arguing that it is often to one’s advantage to do so, precisely in the public square. Dworkin’s appeal to the “cosmic shame” of taking one’s life “before one’s time” is after all an example of a wonderfully compact vehicle of moral persuasion.
Here are further examples of second-order beliefs that play a role in the public square, with typical policy ramifications in square brackets]:
“Let it be.” [If she wants to have an abortion, let her.]
“Nothing to kill or die for, and no religion, too.” [Anti-militarism; restriction of the public space granted to organized religion]
“Live and let die.” [To hell with Darfur]
“Drop the bomb.” [After 9/11]
“Born in the USA.” [American exceptionalism]
“All the diamonds in the world that mean anything to me.” [Capitalism with a human face; stewardship of creation]
“Fascist architecture of my own design.” [Limited government, even if that government is headed up by an enlightened philosopher]
Yes, I am a Cockburn fan.
Once again, you may choose to dispense with compact vehicles of persuasion which operate on the meta-ethical plane. Do not be surprised however that most of us will not follow you in that sense. I for one will continue to make use of them even though I am aware that agreement on them is instant with some people and out of the question for others.
BTW, I remain hopeful that you will take up the questions I posed (for example) at the end of comment #108. I’m convinced you are not a spoilsport in the mold of TUAD, who left the conversation with his blood brought to a boil. At a certain point, of course, refusal to take up questions becomes eloquent in and of itself. I would love to hear out your meta-ethical principles, which I have every reason to believe are compelling and eloquent. As of now, I detect a bundle consisting of a strong strand of libertarianism, a broad concept of human rights, and an as yet unclear concept of charity. But I also detect an indifference to truths, moral goods, and aesthetic principles many people including myself hold dear.
June 10th, 2010 | 9:33 pm | #114
Janice,
I accept your summary (however reductive) of my position in #110:
“[O]n basic matters of justice, one should be able to employ the coercive powers of the state against a fellow citizen even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the justification for doing so—even if it is unreasonable to expect that fellow citizen to accept the reason for his state-coerced loss of freedoms.”
Exactly. For example, the welfare of society is being protected at a basic level by government coercion such that everyone has to put insurance on their cars. Even though I know a lot of people who will never accept the justification for doing so. According to them, that’s their business and no one else’s.
It is also a proper use of government coercion IMO to require people with sufficient net worth and/or earnings to pay their fair share of the overhead cost of the health care delivery system. A large plurality disagrees, but it is legitimate for a democracy to coerce them to do so, though not necessarily wise to coerce them to do so.
Finally, it is a proper use of government coercion to deny people the right they feel they have to (for example) engage in sex with a minor, or for a brother to have children with a sister. It is also a proper use of government coercion in my view to privilege Type C family configurations at the expense of others.
Nonetheless a host of less than ideal situations and de facto family configurations are best left without criminal consequences, such as divorce, though it is possible to make divorce too easy, and SS domestic partnerships, though it is probably wise to regulate them in some way.
Still other family configurations, such as polygamy and polyandry, are best combated by legal (and therefore coercive) means, even if de facto examples thereof will not thereby be eliminated.
The calculus of moral reasoning that plays into decision making on these matters is complex, subject to compromise on the basis of meta-ethical principles in tension with one another, and up for political negotiation. I also agree with R’s project to this extent, that there are other kinds of useful moral reasoning, in which meta-ethical principles come into play covertly rather than overtly, or are packaged in a brand “X” container – this is a chief and legitimate function of civil religion. Mediating language is helpful. But it is not an either-or. It is a both-and. It may not appeal to you, but it appeals to many, even if they haven’t been in church since they were baptized, to hear something like, “God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve,” as shorthand for a meta-ethical principle which finds it appropriate for a society to privilege Adam and Eve arrangements at the expense of Adam and Steve arrangements.
For a government to “privilege at the expense of” is the opposite of leveling the playing field such that whether people partner up according to a societal ideal/biological template of the type: mother, father, and their shared biological children *or another* is a matter of legal and ethical indifference.
I’m wondering whether we can agree on that in principle, even if we do not necessarily agree on how to apply the principle on a configuration-by-configuration basis.
Finally, I would point out that I won’t take up your specific example, “torturing children for entertainment” because I think it is too contrived. The examples I have raised from the get go on this thread are, I believe, more to the point.
June 11th, 2010 | 12:39 am | #115
re: #108
JohnFH,
Ok, but the point of my remarks is that the considerations that support SSM don’t in the same way support polygamy, etc. Another case might be made for polygamy, etc. The point is, it will likely need to be a different case.
Look, that case would have to be made. But your fooling yourself if you think that economic considerations alone (or, as below, “biological quality” considerations) are going to carry the day in my #78 framework. Recall the points I made in #106—not to mention any yet-to-be discussed considerations that might arise under key question iv.
For one thing, I’m not convinced that the state should be involved in the kind of social engineering this kind of “encouraging” would imply, at least for the purposes you mention. “Allowing,” of course, is a different story. I’m in favor of that, but not for the reasons you suggest here.
It’s for questions like these that I provided the framework in #78 and explained it in #106. Carefully re-read these and ask this: why would I ever think that, within Janice’s proposed framework for deciding the SSM case, any of these other relationships would make as strong a case?
June 11th, 2010 | 12:45 am | #116
Re: #112
JohnFH,
But again, that’s not a problem. Quoting myself from earlier:
June 11th, 2010 | 1:33 am | #117
Re: #113
JohnFH,
Why think car insurance is, even plausibly, a matter of basic justice, or, as Rawls puts it in the bit I quoted earlier, a “fundamental political question”?
For the Rawlsian case for health care, check out Norman Daniels’ work, who places access to health care under the “second principle” of justice (equality of opportunity…). Daniels’ arguments (alongside Rawls’ arguments for the two principles) would be the stuff you’d want to argue against to show reasonable rejectability.
What’ s the reasonable point of view according to which people have “the right” to “engage in sex with a minor”? Is this plausibly a matter of basic justice?
I’m not disagreeing with any of this.
I’d like to agree with you, but I’m not certain I understand the sentence. Maybe you can rephrase it.
Contrived examples such as this are, like thought experiments, often very really useful for putting pressure on particular claims. The claim of yours that I’m pressing is this: “Any attempt to disallow public articulation of one or more those components in justification of a particular policy position is bound to fail.” Therefore I asked,
Now, if you’re not arguing that “one’s particular moral/philosophical/religious beliefs” are necessary in this kind of way for laws/policies (but for ones that touch matters of basic justice and fundamental political questions), then I’m not sure we’re actually in disagreement. As I’ve repeatedly tried to emphasize, the public reason related restrictions are for a very narrow aspect of one’s political life.
June 11th, 2010 | 1:18 pm | #118
Janice, I think you’re missing my point. (Most likely because I was not clear).
My point was that in order for SSM proponents to require that traditionalists acquiesce to their regime, the traditionalists’ view cannot be “reasonable.” For if it is reasonable, then no traditionalist’s child should be forced in public school to hear that sodomy is equal to intercourse; no traditionalist photographer should be coerced to work a gay “wedding”; no traditionalist business owner should be made to pay for unions she does not believe are real; no observant Catholic, Protestant, Jew, or Muslim should lose employment, promotion, or benefits if he or she is unwilling to “accept” gay unions as morally benign; no Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Muslim academic institution should lose tax-exempt status, federal funding, academic rank, etc. because it chooses to abide by standards of conduct and an understanding of family life that the prevailing academic culture rejects.
In that case, the Rawlsian shoe is on the other foot. Unless you can show that the traditionalist view is not something that reason permits, then the coercion is impermissible, since the coercion touches on something that is about as fundamental as you can get when it comes to comprehensive doctrines: philosophical anthropology and its relationship to the common good.
See my First Things piece on SSM and Justificatory Liberalism: http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2008/12/same-sex-marriage-and-the-fail
June 11th, 2010 | 1:31 pm | #119
Janice,
Lots of agreement here, but some crucial disagreement.
First of all, I agree that you can make a case for SSM based on the framework you enunciate in #78 and explained in #106. Secondly, I agree that a case could be made for polygamy, as you began to do, by adding to or adjusting your framework. Thirdly, I agree that one could also make a case for brother-sister marriage based on your overall approach.
You apparently consider the extensibility of your approach to be a feature. On my part, I consider it a bug.
I have a framework of my own. It has more elements. It permits me to rank family configurations and privilege some at the expense of others. Our fundamental disagreement depends on the fact that we prefer different frameworks.
Another area of agreement as I understand it: it is up for political negotiation how “expensive” a society wishes to make it for those who choose to pursue configurations said society (by whatever procedures it follows) regards as less than ideal or out of the question.
Less than ideal configurations may be subject to less protection than ideal ones; out of the question configurations may be given extra-legal status.
I don’t see you disagreeing with society ranking configurations through law and other forms of coercion. Your caution about the limits and dangers of coercion is well-taken, but should not be allowed to mask our fundamental agreement on this point.
Here are the questions I asked once again. Based on hints from your side, I deduce your answers. Correct me if i am wrong:
My Q: What I ask from those who would have us rewrite the legal framework and alter consensus values such that the Type B family configuration (SSM) enjoys the same privileges as the Type C configuration (OSM) is the following: on what basis can that be done without opening the door to a thousand other conceivable configurations of family?
Your presumed A: It cannot be done. The door is open and cannot be shut. There is no cultural/biological family template against which alternative family configurations might be evaluated. Rather, people can and people should claim a series of characteristics of the traditional institution of marriage as fundamental and discard the others in order to make a case for SSM, polygamy, brother-sister marriage, whatever.
My Q: Is it really so crazy to think of the Type C configuration as the configuration above all others that society can and should protect and privilege?
Your presumed A: I have not argued that it is. But I did propose an alternative approach which allows me to get SSM through the door.
June 11th, 2010 | 2:02 pm | #120
Janice,
A few loose ends.
Yes, car insurance is a matter of basic justice. If two uninsured vehicles crash and the occupants of the vehicles die or become quadriplegics, who picks up the expenses? How are the costs defrayed? If it is not a matter of basic justice, perhaps you will be happy to sent the bills.
I understand your point about your contrived example. I just don’t think it takes us anywhere. The ultimate normative foundations that allow a society to agree on the principle of not allowing people to torture children for entertainment *can* remain covert in the public square. Agreed. But that’s only because it is a relatively obvious case.
As soon as the principle of not allowing the state to torture adults for national security reasons is under consideration, guess what? I want to know all about the normative foundations for the various possible stances? Don’t you?
After all, you said that ‘the public reason related restrictions are for a very narrow aspect of one’s political life.” In highly controversial cases, I would add, the restrictions become unworkable in both broad and narrow places.
June 11th, 2010 | 3:02 pm | #121
Janice, I forgot this one. You say:
“What’ s the reasonable point of view according to which people have “the right” to “engage in sex with a minor”? Is this plausibly a matter of basic justice?”
It isn’t plausible to you and me. But it is to many other citizens, who go to Bangkok if necessary to enjoy what they consider to be their right.
You and I covertly access a cosmology when we claim, “‘having sex with a minor’” is wrong; it is as simple as that.”
Those who think there is nothing wrong with it and pay very good money to do it adhere to an alternative cosmology.
June 13th, 2010 | 12:40 am | #122
Francis Beckwith: “So, the only way that this can sustain Thomson’s (and Rawls’ similar) principle is for society to embrace the idea that it is irrational to reject SSM and all its consequences and effects.
This is why the Manhattan Declaration was necessary.
Obviously then, Thomson’s and Rawls’ similar principle should and needs to be rejected.
It’s quite rational to reject same-sex marriage and all its consequences and effects.
In fact, there’s a growing body of literature pointing to the negative consequences and effects in those countries which have adopted same-sex marriage.
I don’t know if the Manhattan Declaration is *necessary*, per se, but I am joyful in signing and supporting biblical marriage, sanctity of life, and religious liberty.
June 13th, 2010 | 4:45 pm | #123
re: #117
Francis Beckwith,
I appreciate your articulation of the problem. Your basic contention is that allowing SSM would coercively constrain traditionalists on grounds that it is not reasonable to expect them to accept. Since this was the same sort of objection that I tried to give on behalf of SSM, there is no way to decide the issue by simply appealing to the Rawlsian criterion regarding public reason (i.e., “laws and policies that invoke the coercive powers of government concerning fundamental political questions” and matters of basic justice must be justifiable on grounds which it is reasonable to expect the coerced to accept).
The weakness of your objection to my use of the Rawlsian criterion is that it is far from clear that the SSM would end up coercively constrain traditionalists on grounds which it is not reasonable to expect them to except. In other words, it is far from clear that traditionalists can reasonably reject SSM. This remains true even if we concede, perhaps generously, that the traditionalists’ comprehensive doctrines are reasonable and they contain specific teachings under which homosexual acts are sinful, morally wrong, in clear violation of God’s law, contrary to the created order, and “deeply disordered.” There two reasons for this. First, just because a reasonable comprehensive doctrine entails that gay sex is disordered and wrong, this is very far from the claim that the reasonable comprehensive doctrine entails that, in a pluralistic society, SSM must be prohibited; or that (to use your example) wedding photographers mustn’t photograph gay wedding (even granting that traditionalist wedding photographers would be legally coerced into doing so, should SSM be permitted); or that it would be sinful to render any service that might facilitate gay couples in adopting orphans and foster children; etc.
Second, even if some aspect of the traditionalist’s reasonable comprehensive doctrine is in tension with some aspect of legalized SSM, this doesn’t yet show that the traditionalist is being reasonable in rejecting the grounds upon which SSM is justified. This is a crucial point to understand. There’s no guarantee that, for every policy issue regarding fundamental political questions or matters of basic justice, there will be some way to decide the issue which isn’t in tension with at least one aspect of at least one reasonable comprehensive doctrine held by at least one citizen within the pluralistic society. This, however, does not mean that there is no way to decide the issue such that it is reasonable to expect everyone in the society to accept the grounds for that decision. Just as when there are three people who want a seat, but there is only one chair, there are often fair ways to settle such predicaments in ways such that no one can reasonably object to (even though, under the given solution, some people end up sacrificing more). When diverse and important interests are at stake (as in the case of SSM), we can characterize each citizen’s (or group’s) interests in terms that everyone can be reasonably expected to accept. We can then weigh these claims. As in the trivial seating case, sometimes there will be a clear solution that no one can reasonably reject (as when one of the three people wanting a chair is elderly and disabled, and the remaining two are youth in perfect health); in the complementary cases the three do well to utilize a decision procedure, the results of which we could reasonably expect each to accept simply because it is the result of a fair procedure (as when all three are youth and in their perfect health and they decide to draw straws for the seat).
When we characterize the competing interests surrounding SSM in terms that we can reasonably expect all to accept, I suspect that there’s going to be a relatively clear solution which no one can reasonably reject—even though the traditionalists are going to have to make some sacrifices (that is, I suspect it will be like the solution of giving the chair to the disabled elderly person). This doesn’t mean that it’s a simple task to enumerate and neutrally characterize all of the competing interests.
Let me offer an example of how one of the traditionalist concerns you mentioned might be characterized in a neutral way. You raise the issue of how, if SSM were legalized, a “traditionalist’s child [would be] forced in public school to hear that sodomy is equal to intercourse.” Since you’ve not described your concern here in any more detail, let me offer some interpretations. Perhaps your concern is that, in a high school class (“social studies” perhaps?) students will be forced to learn (on pain of a lower test score) that, in the United States, same-sex marriage is legally equivalent to mixed-sex marriage. Alternatively, perhaps your concern is that a kindergartener might discover that her teacher, Mrs. Jones, has a wife. Or, perhaps your concern is simply that the traditionalists child, little Joey, will go to school with children who have two daddies and, as a natural consequence, is exposed to the opinion of certain of his peers that gay sex is morally equivalent to heterosexual sex.
As I interpret it, the basic thrust of your concern is that the legalization of SSM will only further facilitate the cultural shift we see in attitudes towards same-sex couples, a consequence of which will be that traditionalists will not have the freedom/luxury to so easily raise their children within a society that regards same-sex marriage as a moral and legal anomaly. This may be threatening, especially since the traditionalist realizes that the new cultural norms will make it still harder to pass on the traditionalist comprehensive doctrine to the next generation, at least with regards to its teaching on the immorality of gay sex. The traditionalist might even fear that the cultural change will make a gay lifestyle dangerously tempting to his/her child.
Before considering how much weight these concerns can carry, please stop to notice how I’ve tried to put them into terms that we can reasonably expect everyone to accept. To help illustrate the sort of characterizations we’re aiming for, compare the following claims: