(a recycled post from another life)
Though a good number of modern liberals whom I’ve read make specific appeals to Schleiermacher for their sentiments about God and the nature of Christianity, few make any appeal to the origins of their ethical foundations. While many positive statements are made regarding ethical behavior, yes, may even come from relativist liberals, the ethic is generally expressed without appeal to an identifiable origin.
The sentimental approach of Schleiermacher makes for a difficult foundation for ethics as sentiments shift so easily. What appears to be the case is that late 19th century theological liberalism may be closer to being their source for ethics than those of the early 19th century; specifically, Ritschl.
Ritschl resoundingly rejects Schleiermacher’s appeal to feeling but accepts many of this other fundamental tenets, including his view of religion as a social construct (Orr, 42-43). This “fellowship” or “community” is itself the “redemption” that is the Kingdom of God (Orr, 44-45). This is a view of religion, and specifically of Christianity, which is more than troubling to anyone who holds to any historic orthodoxy. Ritschl, like Schleiermacher, here removes from Christianity its uniqueness and unique relationship with God.
One might rightly call this a relative theology because the theology itself is not merely composed of relativistic components, but is itself subject to value comparison against other theologies (religions), and against an individual’s sense of reality. Even though Christianity might be found to have positive historical value (according to Ritschl) it is left without its ontological foundations. This sense of relativism reflects Ritschl’s dependence upon Kant* in other areas.
Ritschl’s ethic is derived from a Kantian sense of greater good. It is almost purely Kantian, encouraging the individual toward making “value-judgments” (Orr, 43). This is, of course, a necessary approach, for Ritschl’s approach to the actual existence of God is, like De Wette, one of religious symbolism rather than objective existence (Orr, 46). This leaves Ritschl with a relativistic ethic that goes hand-in-hand with his relative theology.
As evangelicals we can provide a richer ethic than can the world of relativism. All you ethicists out there, take heart. We have something far better, far sounder, and far more consistent than relativism might ever provide.
*Yes, Kant was an absolutist, but reallyy of a strange sort. His views on personal knowledge certainly yielded (at least largely contributed to) the fruit of modern relativism. Likewise, though he was not a particularist, he did treat both matematics and the categorical imperative as though they are self-existing particulars. So it seems quite difficult to pin down Kant with specificity.
Orr, James, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, Second Edition, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1898
April 11th, 2010 | 2:29 pm | #1
Being generally skeptical about the rigor of modern theological ethics, I have to ask: What exactly can evangelicals provide in terms of a richer ethic? A Scripture-based divine-command perspective? Some sort of virtue-based approach? I am curious as to what you answer is to the inadequate approach that you point out, Collin.
April 11th, 2010 | 2:45 pm | #2
The reformed appeal to the character and nature of God seems strongest, imo, as it draws on the absolute of God and His character.
Specifically, a properly-fashioned pro-life ethic is far more productive than the ethic of abortion/euthanasia/infanticide. We can also confront a sibling to the death ethic, the green movement, with its very popular emphasis on dismantling today’s social structures. There are many who intend to take our industry back to 1820 levels. To do this requires a great deal of destruction.
In this light I would recommend an investigation of reformed apologetics.
April 11th, 2010 | 3:12 pm | #3
But how do we get to this absolute? Many of the liberals you have criticized would consider themselves “reformed” (e.g., Schleiermacher). They just have one way of describing this absolute and you have another. I am all for absolutes and foundations, but I don’t know that evangelicals have coherently described any ethical foundations besides “the Bible says this,” which doesn’t stand up to current hermeneutical theories (even more conservative ones) that specify at the very most a “range of meanings” for a given text. To borrow a metaphor, taking our hermeneutics back to 1530 requires a great deal of epistemic naivety; we cannot credibly take the Erasmus-Calvin humanist position on the meaning of a text in a self-evidently pluralist Christian context (i.e., there are thousands of Christian, let alone non-Christian, ways to read Scripture). So, I agree that the character of God is foundational – but how can evangelicals access that character in a non-relativistic fashion in order to shape our ethics?
Also, I’m not sure that you can claim that the green movement so much threatens destruction as opposes it. If anything, I would assume that a Christian ethic opposes the destruction of creation just as strongly (e.g., Calvin and the visible world as the “theater of God’s glory”). I would like to think that those who blame Christianity for ecological degradation are at least half wrong in doing so.
April 11th, 2010 | 3:33 pm | #4
Modern reformed (by that I mean Calvinist, rather than an appeal to historical events) apologetics (the evangelical sort) takes its cues from the nature and character of God.
The deeper question is why “the Bible says” anything. The better answers to this would avoid the Euthyphro dilemma.
Don’t think of “green” as the feel-good-and-plant-a-tree annual events. The reduction of human population is a serious concern, to them and us. The UN has a population council for this very concern. The anti-modern, anti-West movement found its worst but most effective fulfillment in Pol Pot’s attempted destruction of modernity in Cambodia.
Christianity did not create capitalism. It did not create imperialism. It did not create colonialism. Those are secular concerns arising out of the Renaissance. While many Christians mistakenly “went along for the ride”, the institutions themselves are secular.
April 11th, 2010 | 3:50 pm | #5
Collin, whose Reformed apologetic do you prefer? Kuyper’s? Van Til’s? Warfield’s? These are quite different from each other, as I’m sure you know.
April 11th, 2010 | 5:23 pm | #6
David,
Of those three I’m only familiar with VanTil, and am generally satisfied with what I read. My one reservation is with the postmill tendencies of Kuyper, Rushdooony, and (it seems) Schaeffer, though this does not show up, at least not loudly, in VanTil.
April 11th, 2010 | 6:58 pm | #7
“[Kant] did treat both matematics and the categorical imperative as though they are self-existing particulars.”
Collin, can you explain your statement?
A commenter on your other blog writes, “Incidentally I do not think you have read Kant.” I’m concerned this person might be right (or at least nearly right).
April 11th, 2010 | 7:22 pm | #8
Chris,
I anticipated you’d be trolling again soon.
The received an answer, but perhaps that escaped you. And a reference to that answer was included here.
And what’s to explain? Do you not know what particularism is? Makes me curious — what are your credentials?
April 11th, 2010 | 7:54 pm | #9
From the little I know of him, I think you are correct that Rushdoony was a postmillennialist. As far as I know, Kuyper was an amillennialist. Schaeffer I am not certain of, but decades ago I read something in one of his writings that led me to believe that he was not only a premillennialist, but a pre-tribulationist, which I had to read twice to be sure I was reading him correctly. I wish I could recall in which of his books I found this. Perhaps someone with better knowledge of Schaeffer than I can enlighten us on his eschatology.
April 11th, 2010 | 9:17 pm | #10
“[Kant] did treat both matematics and the categorical imperative as though they are self-existing particulars.”
Collin, I suspect that the problem is not with me. I’d challenge any of your readers to make heads or tails out of your statement, such that it is true to Kant.
April 11th, 2010 | 9:27 pm | #11
I don’t know what particularism is. What does that say about my credentials? Although from what I can tell, it looks like I’m not missing much.
April 11th, 2010 | 9:30 pm | #12
belief in self-existent abstract entities
Anthony,
Nothing about anyone else here. I was questioning Thompson’s credentials remarks from an earlier post.
April 12th, 2010 | 1:51 am | #13
“[Kant] did treat both matematics and the categorical imperative as though they are self-existing particulars.”
Collin, the challenge to explain and defend your statement stands. As for my credentials, you may assume that I know enough Kant to recognize baloney–at least when the baloney is this obvious.
Even if you can usually get away with such nonsense, you really ought to write under the assumption that someone who really knows the subject might stumble upon your posts. Even if you’ve grown accustomed to publicly embarrassing yourself, please consider the shame your bringing to First Things and to the larger Christian community.
April 12th, 2010 | 4:45 pm | #14
When Kant concluded that he was not ready to surrender his belief in God, he created an immediate conflict. His abstract entities became one of (a) created entities, subject to God, and therefore not self-existing and eternal (a sacrifice of all he had done to that point, which is not likely), or (b) co-eternal entities (leaving him with a form of polytheism), or (c) lesser eternal entities (reflectiong the conditions of (a) above), or (d) perhaps something else. In any case, it is now perfectly reasonable to conclude that his commitment to these entities is now qualified by his acceptance of the existence of God. (If you read Kant, that’s one thing. If you failed to see the contradiction, that is quite another.)
I do not mind difficult questions. In fact, I welcome them. My critics and opponents ought be my most affective allies. But as to your trolling, if you continue with the unnecessary condescending remarks and other similar nonsense I shall consider taking appropriate initiative regarding your access.
April 12th, 2010 | 7:08 pm | #15
Collin,
Condescension is often in the eye of the beholder. That you find my criticisms of your claims condescending has more to do with your own self-image.
Consider your original claim regarding Kant. If, as an undergraduate, you were to make this claim in any paper written for a philosophy course (at, e.g., Ohio State University), it would be straightforwardly rejected as confused nonsense. You would be told to go back and study Kant. Likewise, your “argument” in #14 would be rejected as completely confused in ways that should be obvious to any undergraduate philosophy student.
But none of this would be understood “condescending.” The reason you take these criticisms as condescending is because you like to think of yourself as more intellectually advanced than a poorly performing undergraduate. It is therefore a problem of inflated self-perception.
April 12th, 2010 | 9:13 pm | #16
If you, for example, were to present this type of subject-changing in a paper, say, in any philosophy class you might have taken, it would be laughed at as the worst of illogic. Grading would be immaterial.
I never said that your criticism of the content was condescending. It was your statements like “shame” that are typical of an antagonistic troll.
If you, say, teach philosophy at a NY university, then perhaps you would be familiar with the many and varied criticisms of Kant. For instance, there are myriad questions and discussions regarding how Kant treats God’s properties. But if you happen to agree with the Kantian perspective then so many criticisms be rejected out of hand. Seems an easy way to deal with things.
Now, if I merely insert my understanding of God into Kant’s argument then the implications might seem obvious. (Was that method not clear?) But if one were to stick with Kant’s material within itself, then the discussion would certainly change, as previously noted. Still, the criticism of his view of God (and its relationship to abstract objects) remains.
(Your statements might be acceptable if Kant were a coherent whole. But Kant is not. The only coherent systems that I’ve found have been the Bible, Aquinas, Calvin, and Hegel. You may disagree, but that’s ok.)
Now, if you have something of substance that I should consider, please bring it. But no more nonsense. You have become tiring.
April 12th, 2010 | 10:09 pm | #17
I again challenge other readers to try to make sense out of Collin’s last explanation–that is, to make Collin’s comment intelligible as any sort of clarification of his original nonsense:
“[Kant] did treat both matematics and the categorical imperative as though they are self-existing particulars.”
Anyone starting to see the pattern as we press Collin Brendemuehl to defend his nonsense?
April 13th, 2010 | 10:31 am | #18
Collin,
I won’t defend Chris’s remarks or tactics, but it does seem a bit odd that you would claim that “The only coherent systems that I’ve found have been the Bible, Aquinas, Calvin, and Hegel.” I don’t get how “the Bible” is more coherent than, say, Aristotle or Marx. You might agree with the Bible and disagree with Marx, but that doesn’t make him incoherent or make the Bible coherent as a “system.”
As for Kant, I think the problem Chris has is that you are using terms like “particularist” and “absolutist” in lieu of simple and clear arguments that show how “this follows from that” in Kant. I mean, polytheism? Really?
If you didn’t dismiss him by using big words and sweeping statements, it might be harder to make Kant (with whose ethics something like 30% of contemporary philosophers tend to side, if I can guesstimate) look like a blithering idiot. He might be wrong, but he has been influential for a reason.
April 13th, 2010 | 3:20 pm | #19
Steve,
Using your examples, Marx’ incoherence comes by his promotion of violence as a resolution. He does not solve problems. He simply destroys the question. I hope those terms are simple enough for you.
Were Chris as well-read in philosophy as he seems to indicate then those terms would be neither foreign nor untelligible to him. Instead, I observe him to be on a personal crusade of some irrational sort. Somebody (probably me from an earlier post) hurt his little feelings. Poor thing.
The conclusion re a potential polytheism equivalence is consistent given the conditions noted.
Truth is not arrived at via consensus.
April 13th, 2010 | 3:54 pm | #20
Collin,
I can understand if you won’t allow yourself to be corrected by me, but Steve, on the other hand, just made a very sympathetic and polite attempt to enlighten you.
Is there anyone whose corrections you would heed–and who might also be willing to read your posts and comment on your responses?
If so, give us a name. If not, well…I fear for you.
April 13th, 2010 | 4:40 pm | #21
Chris,
Now you are trolling.
First, all I did in my response to Steve was explain myself. The point is still open for discussion. Nobody closed down the dialogue.
But asserting that I am in error and providing me some substance are two different matters. The former is your behavior; the latter, not.
April 14th, 2010 | 4:44 pm | #22
Chris,
If you happen to be attending Ohio State, perhaps we might meet sometime.
April 14th, 2010 | 6:08 pm | #23
Sadly, I can’t have the pleasure. The are, however, a number of people in the phil department there who work on history of philosophy.
http://philosophy.osu.edu/people/default.cfm
I suspect you could audit a course there, or even enroll. It’d be a very good experience for you to have your writings carefully read and graded by any one of the philosophers there. You’d do well to ask around a bit, and find out from the students which instructors are most generous with their comments and time, when it comes to grading student papers.
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