This term I have been teaching Ancient & Mediaeval Political Theory, a course that is crosslisted between the philosophy and political science departments at Redeemer. Yesterday we heard two fine student presentations on Thomas Aquinas’ writings on the virtues (Summa Theologica Ia-IIae, qq. 55-64). Here we encountered his explanation of the four cardinal natural virtues, viz., prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, which he borrowed from Augustine, the stoics and, ultimately, Plato, even as his account of these virtues is basically Aristotelian.
Then we were introduced to the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity or love. The difference between the natural and theological virtues is that, while the former are acquired through habitually choosing the right mean between vicious extremes, the latter are directly infused in us by God without our effort and are not defined by a mean. It is impossible, e.g., to love God to excess. Thomas, of course, took these virtues from the famous 13th chapter of Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians.
Evangelical and Reformed Christians often express discomfort with Thomas’ distinction between natural and supernatural virtues, as they do with the parallel synergism of Roman soteriology which suggests that we can contribute so much to our own salvation but must then wait for God to complete it through his grace. This distinction appears to downplay the role of God’s grace in enabling even our own response to his call.
But there is something else that appears to indicate that Thomas’ identification of faith, hope and love as virtues is not entirely without difficulties. It further suggests that perhaps his debt to Augustine is not as great as it might have been. Augustine famously defined virtue as rightly ordered love. The two cities are distinguished from each other precisely by their different loves. The city of God loves God above all that he has created, while the city of this world loves the creature rather than the creator. Both love, but in the latter case love is ill-directed and out of order.
If so, then perhaps faith, hope and love are not virtues at all, but created human functions that are themselves subject to virtuous or vicious use. Just as we can love inordinately, so also can we put our faith in the wrong things. Everyone, even the professed atheist, puts her faith in something, whether it be reason, material or biological forces, economic growth, a messianic proletariat or the continual satisfaction of subjective desires. Similarly we have a tendency to misplace our hope in things that will ultimately disappoint, as we are so often encouraged to do in election campaigns and even ordinary advertising.
As I am painfully aware that there are scholars better versed in Thomas’ works than I am, I would be interested to know from them how Thomas might address this apparent difficulty in his account of the virtues. I do not, of course, exclude the possibility that it is I who am missing something here.
December 2nd, 2009 | 1:53 pm | #1
They are gifts, from the One who is, in His person and work, faith, hope and love incarnate.
December 2nd, 2009 | 3:39 pm | #2
the parallel synergism of Roman soteriology which suggests that we can contribute so much to our own salvation but must then wait for God to complete it through his grace. This distinction appears to downplay the role of God’s grace in enabling even our own response to his call.
From this Catholic’s perspective, this is somewhat backwards. From the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Paragraph 2008: “The merit of man before God in the Christian life arises from the fact that God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace. The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man’s free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful. Man’s merit, moreover, itself is due to God, for his good action proceed in Christ, from the predispositions and assistance given by the Holy Spirit.”
As to the main question, Aquinas is using the terms faith, hope, and charity in a more precise sense than we use them in everyday discourse. Faith is specifically belief in the First Truth, which is God (ST, II-II 1.1), hope is specifically the hope for eternal happiness in God (II-II.17.1, 2–see especially Article 1, which addresses the question “Whether hope is a virtue?”), and charity is specifically friendship with God (II-II.23.1, II-II.27).
December 2nd, 2009 | 4:38 pm | #3
Great article! I am sometimes suspicious that we Protestants don’t always give Aquinas his fair due, usually out of laziness and apathy. (Why read Aquinas, who is long, dense, and Catholic, when we could be reading the Puritans/Dutch Reformed, who are long, dense, and Protestant?)
Having said that, I would suggest that the Protestant issue with Aquinas isn’t so much his ideas about virtue (he’s definitely not as synergistic or semi-Pelagian as later Catholic writers when it comes to grace), but rather it is with his ideas about sin. From my admittely limited exposure to Aquinas, it seems that doesn’t quite believe in the noetic effects of the fall. That is, I think you could make the case that Aquinas believes reason is a faculty of man that is untouched by sin in some people (I’m a little unclear if he thinks that of everyone, or just of a limited number of people). “Reason” then becomes a means by which access to God is possible even outside of faith, particularly through the “natural law.”
At least, that’s my main beef with Aquinas. Though maybe I’m missing something in his thought…
December 3rd, 2009 | 1:01 am | #4
Nice post.
I suspect the solution is to emphasize that Aquinas is talking about theological virtues. That is, virtues that have a different object than the non-theological virtues. So we might distuish between types of love based upon the different types of objects that these states are directed towards. Doing this may allow us to distinguish between a focal meaning and analogous meanings. For example, I love pizza, I love my wife and I love God. Since, in general Aquinas thinks that love involves a desire for the good of another and union with the beloved the claim that I love pizza is either incoherent or analogous (related to but distinct from a central controlling meaning). I’m not sure if the central or focal meaning of love would be best exemplified in the statement ‘I love my wife’ or ‘I love God’. I suspect the former since Aquinas believes in general that our terms have their natural meaning when they refer to objects that we perceive (sensorily). If that’s correct, then the focal meaning is in terms of human-human love and talk of loving God is analogous (this seems right given that love involves a desire for the good of the other). So the theological virtue of love is distinct but related to the focal meaning of love. Hence, there is nothing surprising that there are disanalogies between these virtues and the others.
On the other hand we could take love of God as the focal meaning (this is how I think Augustine sees it–to put an Aristotelian spin on him) and the other loves as analogous. Thus my love of my wife is related to my love of God but loving my wife is to be understood in terms of loving God. Either way we get significant differences between the types of love because the objects of love are different but related.
I hope that makes some sense.
December 3rd, 2009 | 9:49 am | #5
Mr. Martin, thanks for your corrective to my take on the Catholic view of salvation. The Catholic Catechism’s description sounds almost (but not quite) Reformed. Please take that as a compliment!
Mr. Coyle, you write: “From my admittedly limited exposure to Aquinas, it seems that [he] doesn’t quite believe in the noetic effects of the fall.” Thomas himself would disagree, for which please see ST, Ia-IIae, q. 74, especially articles. 5,7-10. That said, I believe that Thomas’ concept of the noetic effects of the Fall does fall short of total depravity, as understood by Reformed Christians. As one myself, I am sceptical of many formulations of the natural law, about which I will write here at some point. It is not that I deny the reality for which natural law theory attempts to account. (I am not a Barthian!) But I do think that the theory is problematic on a number of grounds, which I will explain soon in this space.
Today in class we will be hearing two students present on Thomas’ so-called Treatise on the Law. This may provide an opportunity for me to put forward my thoughts on natural law, if I can take time out from my marking.
Mr. Martin and David, thanks for the clarifications on Thomas’ use of love. Yes, of course we must assume that his use of fides, spes and caritas presupposes their right direction.
Nevertheless, I can resonate more easily with Augustine’s treatment of love, because it seems to recognize the centrality of idolatry as the root of sin. I don’t think Thomas would deny this, but it does not appear to play as central a role for him as it does for Augustine.
December 4th, 2009 | 6:49 am | #6
Both Augustine and Aquinas are fatally flawed. These men take the principles of Greek philosophy and try to project them upon the Bible. While Paul speaks of the fruit of the Spirit( Gal 5:22-23), A&A speak of virtues. Love is not a virtue, but an Attribute of God and a fruit of the Spirit. Thus both of these men were deceived, confused, and significantly in error.
Col. 2:8, “See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deception, according to the tradition of men, according to the elementary principles of the world, rather than according to Christ.”
Links
Blogs
Find Us
Contact